On 18 February 2025, the Rwandan government announced the termination of its development cooperation deal with Belgium. The five-year €95 million deal is roughly a year old and was negotiated to aid in Rwanda’s economic and social development. But now, the deal is off, with relations between the two nations soured.
Context Behind the Suspension:
Akin to much of past suspended foreign aid, the root cause of the current situation stems from the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Over the last few years, the resurrected Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), which had not been active for nearly a decade, began capturing villages, towns, and cities. While there are multiple reasons for their new offensive, one of the primary causes is the treatment of the Banyarwanda. Increased discrimination and attacks by the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and its allies, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Wazalendo forces and the localised militias of the Mai Mai was a leading factor in the M23’s resurgence. The FARDC’s ineffectiveness to stop the rebels resulted in much of North Kivu, including its capital city of Goma, being captured in January 2025. In a journal article for Military Strategy Magazine, I argue that the root cause of the renewed M23 is not Rwanda but the Congolese government’s lack of an effective strategy. Despite a brief cease-fire proposal, the M23’s forces now deployed in South Kivu with its forces, at the time of writing, at the cusps of Bukavu. The accusations of Rwandan involvement in the M23’s success are nothing new.
During the M23’s initial period in the early 2010s, the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNGoE) accused Rwandans of aiding the rebels. Akin to a decade ago, Rwanda is again accused of assisting the rebels with logistics, military equipment and even a few thousand soldiers. The root cause for Rwanda’s involvement is often described within existing narratives of mineral theft, sovereign violations and expansionist attitudes. Rwandan security concerns in neighbouring DRC, specifically of the FDLR, are minimised, with evidence of Rwanda’s actions often being vague. For instance, the accusations of Rwanda’s military contribution in terms of soldiers stem from photos of African soldiers without specific identity markers to clearly indicate they are part of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). Belgium is a major critic, accusing Rwanda of aiding the M23. While some in Rwanda speculate the Belgian government is just repeating Congolese accusations to try to advance their foreign relations, its impact on Rwanda would be felt. As Professor of Law and Politics Filip Reyntjens tweeted, it was just a matter of time before Belgium would suspend their foreign aid to Rwanda. Despite Rwanda denying the accusations, it negatively impacted the country, with many countries suspending their foreign aid.
While the economic effects could be felt throughout the country, the Rwandan government used it as an opportunity. In theory, the Agaciro Development Fund was an attempt to help alleviate foreign aid withdrawals by establishing a public wealth fund for Rwandans. While the fund could never compensate for the loss of foreign aid, it did help spur nationalism. Rwandan news media and government officials proclaimed how the fund was a sign of defiance against foreign aid and dependence on the Global North. The following section shows that foreign aid dependency is a major concern within Rwandan foreign policy.
Foreign Aid:
As I wrote, Rwandan foreign policy comprises three overarching issues. The first comprises state security interests and the second and third focus on economic development. More specifically, the second issue is the reduction of foreign aid reliance. With the recent news media focusing on USAID cuts by the Trump Administration, Rwanda’s government has long desired to remove its dependence on foreign aid. After the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the country’s bankrupt status forced it to be largely reliant on aid from the Global North. Just under 100 per cent of government income came from foreign aid in 1995. That number decreased over time as the economy rebounded and grew. During much of the 2010s, foreign aid composed around 40 per cent of the government’s income. With the exception of the Covid-19 pandemic, which witnessed an increase in foreign aid reliance due to the global economic shutdown, Rwanda recently returned to reducing its reliance, with aid accounting for roughly a third of the budget.
But why is foreign aid considered harmful in Rwanda, specifically the Rwandan government? Fundamentally, foreign aid is seen as a method of dependence on the Global North, which has historically abandoned Rwanda. While most people will immediately think of how the world abandoned Rwanda during the Genocide, this was not the first instance. Rather, the Hutu Revolution (1959) and independence (1962) led to a massive forced emigration of Rwandan Tutsis and politically excluded Hutus. Despite some assurances from the United Nations and other nations, including Belgium, that the refugees would not be forgotten, they were quickly abandoned. Many of the Rwandan government’s leadership (recent trends of younger Rwandans taking positions of power and influence indicate this will no longer be the case in the near future) lived as refugees in much of the African Great Lakes region. The abandonment they experienced shaped their perceptions of how the international community can, and will, simply walk away from Rwanda. Thus, there is a need, whether through economic development or institutions such as the Agaciro Development Fund, to reduce reliance on foreign aid.
The theme of abandonment, along with Rwandan human security and agaciro, underpins Rwandan foreign policy decisions. Foreign aid threatens Rwandan human security in multiple ways. On the surface, government programs funded by aid are significantly impacted during times of suspension. During the 2012-2013 aid withdrawals, I witnessed a farming education centre having to cut back services to subsistence farmers because the funds from the Global North ceased. Additionally, defining Rwandan human security, which composes the right of return and safety for all those who identify as ‘Rwandan’, is seen as necessary based on historical experiences of Germany and Belgium redefining identity that eventually led to the Genocide. The origins of Rwandan identity are hotly debated within academic circles, but they play an important role in terms of agency. While President Paul Kagame insists the Banyarwanda are Congolese, historical kinships connect Rwandans and Banyarwandas. Thus, Rwanda will show sympathy towards a group that is not only closely related to them but experiences persecution similar to that found before and during the Genocide.
Lastly, the dependency created by foreign aid is largely seen as reducing the country’s self-reliance and dignity within the agaciro identity. As many Rwandan government officials commented to me during my PhD research, a beggar’s pride is only as far as the coins dropped into their cup. At times, the description of Rwanda accepting foreign aid illustrated a contradictory image of one who wants to build themselves up but cannot as they rely on others. Max Webber’s Protestant work ethic (specifically the ‘pulling oneself up by their bootstraps’) description often does not include a self-made man who asks for money. Overall, foreign aid dependency is seen not only as a threat to state security and interests but, at its root, as an unreliable substitute for national pride in its development for all those who identify as ‘Rwandan’.
So Now What?
The M23’s renewal and military successes can be seen impacting not only those who reside in eastern DRC. One of its consequences is the end of the Belgium-Rwanda foreign aid package. Rwandans on social media hailed the move to end the foreign aid with Belgium. Many perceive it as a sign of national pride that it upheld its agency through the agaciro ideology rather than caving to Belgium’s accusations. While Belgium indicated it remains committed to its foreign relations with Rwanda, this commitment will truly be tested in the upcoming weeks and months. There is no doubt that some in Rwanda will suffer because of the aid cut, as the nation is still developing, only thirty years after the Genocide.
However, the decision should not surprise those who study Rwandan foreign relations or how the small nation perceives international relations. The distrust towards the reliance on other nations, forged over the decades, provides insights into how the Rwandan government perceives and engages with the international community. As there is no end in sight for a quick end for the conflict in eastern DRC, there is a greater chance for other Global North nations to cut their foreign aid as in years past. However, Rwanda’s economy can better absorb the shocks compared to the past, and the nation’s services, especially in its effective peacekeeping, make the country a necessary partner for those who might be accusing it of supporting the M23 now.
Jonathan R Beloff 