On 2 March 2026, the United States Department of State, the primary government institution responsible for US foreign policy, announced new sanctions against commanders within the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF). Specifically, Chief of Defence Staff General Mubarakh Muganga, Special Operations Force Commander Brigadier General Stanislas Gashugi, Army Chief of Staff Major General Vincent Nyakarundi and Major General Ruki Karusisi were subject to sanctions. They are a response to alleged Rwandan military interference in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly in support of the March 23 Movement (M23). This comes after the US sanctioned General (Rtd) James Kabarebe in February 2025.
Friendship with General Mubarakh:
I learned about the sanctions from a close Rwandan friend. After reading the news, I felt a mix of emotions, especially when I saw General Mubarakh’s name on the list of sanctioned Rwandan military officials. Despite initially meeting General Mubarakh at an APR FC match back in 2016 (we celebrated a goal together despite not knowing each other), I only got to know him properly during my research on the Campaign against Genocide War. He served as the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)’s Operational Tactical Officer for the 157th CMF. This force did not fight in Kigali but focused on liberating much of the countryside. Interestingly enough, the 157th CMF produced many current Rwandan military leaders, such as General Mubarakh, Major General Joseph Nzabamwita, the late (and, in my opinion, great) Lt General Innocent Kabandana, to name a few.
Despite not fighting in Kigali, I was recommended to interview General Mubarakh based on his unique knowledge of military tactics. He became the basis for a subsequent chapter in a book on the Rwandan military (including RPA and FAR) tactics. Since that first interview in 2023, I have met with him several times to discuss and for me to understand Rwandan military tactics and politics. Perhaps that is why I was caught off guard when I read about the sanctions.
Rwanda has been here before:
On social media, both Congolese and Rwandan commentators stormed with their opinions on the sanctions. While the Rwandans condemned what they saw as a one-sided, biased decision, many Congolese celebrated. During the back-and-forth on social media, I remembered my early research experiences in Rwanda between 2012 and 2014[1]. It was during much of this period that the Obama Administration sanctioned multiple Rwandan military officials. They were sanctioned for alleged support of the M23. It was during this wave of sanctions and foreign aid withdrawals in January 2013 that I first met General Kabarebe. At the time, General Kabarebe was Minister of Defence. We discussed the withdrawal of foreign aid and the imposition of sanctions with him, but he never seemed stressed or even outraged by them. Rather, he was rather indifferent to them.
General Kabarebe’s reaction stemmed from having seen it all, from the hardships in Ugandan refugee camps, war in the DRC, the complexities of rebuilding his homeland and the worst of all, the Genocide against the Tutsi. The sanctions could do little to affect his mind, beliefs and determination about what he believes is best for his country. His attitude would not change, as he held the same beliefs during the recent 2025 sanctions.
But why is that? Perhaps more importantly, why are many Rwandans seemingly embracing the sanctions?
Perception of the Sanctions:
In the aftermath of the 2012 foreign aid withdrawals, Rwanda created the Agaciro Development Fund, intended as a replacement for lost foreign aid. While it could never compensate for the lost revenue, it fostered a sense of national pride. The effect was not only felt in Kigali but in many other parts of the country. While visiting a small farming village outside of Butare in 2013, Rwandans discussed with me the seriousness of the sanctions to their everyday lives, but also how they felt at ease. They held confidence in the leadership to see them through that period. One man in his fifties commented that he felt the sanctions should be seen as a positive, as they can bring the nation together. While this touched on the ‘rally around the flag effect’, it was successful in adding yet another element of national unity akin to Ndi Umunyarwanda.
The new wave of sanctions has seemingly (on social media at least) fostered this feeling yet again. I will have a better understanding of the true impact when I return to Rwanda this upcoming May. But this still leaves a question. Why did the United States impose the new sanctions after the recent DRC-Rwandan agreement signed in the summer of 2025?
Why the Sanctions?
Fundamentally, and this is only my analysis, based on my research on Rwandan foreign affairs for over a decade, the role of history and convenience. As I wrote in my article on the M23, history plays a significant role in shaping how the Global North views Congolese instability. Rwanda led the overthrow of former Zairian President Joseph Mobutu during the First Congo War and was instrumental during the Second Congo War. Since the Second Congo War’s end, Rwanda often been accused of supporting Congolese rebel forces. Nevertheless, Rwanda holds a significant security interest in eastern DRC as the rebel force, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), resides in the region and aids the Congolese military during its operations against the M23, with rather mixed results (to put it mildly).
For Rwandan security officials, the FDLR pose both a physical and ontological security threat to Rwanda’s post-Genocide development. The FDLR are composed of the remnants of Rwanda’s past genocide forces, which desire to return Rwanda’s ethnic divisions and accomplish their genocidal ambitions of finishing off Rwanda’s Tutsi population. Despite the previously mentioned DRC-Rwanda agreement, which was supposed to address Rwanda’s concerns about the FDLR, there has been little to no effort by the Congolese government to end this threat.
Fundamentally, Rwanda’s past engagements, especially the Second Congo War, in the DRC, lead to a narrative that any rebel forces, such as the M23, must be receiving support from Rwanda. This assessment often ignores asymmetric warfare or basic understandings of strategic theory. But I believe there is another element: how the US and President Donald Trump want an easy answer to the failed attempts to foster peace in the DRC.
The United States ideally wants simplification when addressing African conflicts. Taking a page from Johan Pottier, the ‘West’ (or Global North) often tries to hastily formulate ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ guys in conflicts. While Pottier uses this notion to criticise Rwanda’s post-genocide engagement with the Global North, it can be used to help understand the sanctions. Rwanda’s historical engagement in the DRC allows for the simplification that one side must be good and the other bad as the root of the conflict. However, this is problematic, as it ignores the realities of Congolese instability in the east, as well as in many other parts of the nation. A country does not have more than 100 rebel groups because of one external actor, but because of internal instability and fundamental problems.
However, addressing Congolese instability requires more work than the United States, especially under the Trump Administration, is willing to commit. As I wrote in several publications, blogs, etc., Congolese instability stems from poor governance, a lack of economic opportunities, antagonistic racial policies and widespread corruption. Addressing these issues requires nation-building, which the US is not going to commit to anytime soon. Additionally, fixing these issues will take years, if not decades, to achieve, which is another reason the US will want to pursue the easy policy of sanctions against some Rwandan military officials, even if it will not foster true stability and peace.
Conclusion:
Thus, the new sanctions against some of Rwanda’s military leadership stem from a combination of historical narratives and a lack of commitment to true peace in the DRC. These reasons do not include other factors, such as potential Congolese mineral deals or lobbying by Congolese actors. I have no doubt some Congolese social media activists will condemn my thoughts and analysis. However, the reality is much more brutal: Even if Rwanda did not exist, the DRC would face similar, if not the same, challenges, hardships and conflict. Rwanda will survive this moment and, if properly handled, can emerge from it more united than before.
[1] My first trip to Rwanda was in 2008, but I only began properly focusing on Rwanda research during my graduate studies in 2011-2012.
Jonathan R Beloff 