Combatting African conflicts and human rights violations tends to fall within international responsibility with little to no beneficial actions or policies. Global commitments to foster peace and reconciliation, often in the form of peacekeeping missions, often fail or keep a fragile sense of stability as the contributions come from distant nations. Attention needs to be given towards regional solutions to conflicts. Understanding and promoting regional solutions provides insights into regional power dynamics that can be more beneficial in critically solving conflicts than relying on distant actors. An example is the current instability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
The DRC is experiencing a wave of violence against the Banyarwanda population, who originate from Rwanda, which sparked the Movement of March 23 (M23) rebel force from its near decade of inaction.[1] The M23, based in the DRC’s eastern North Kivu province, is a mostly Banyarwanda rebel force promoting the community’s security interests by capturing important towns, villages and cities. Despite international attention to this crisis and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) intervention, there seems to be little hope for peace. While the core crisis is a domestic issue, its ramifications impact neighbouring Rwanda and the African Great Lakes region. This is not the first time the M23 and the Congolese military, the Armed Forces for the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), fought against each other, as the M23 became an internationally known rebel force after its relatively short-term military success in the early 2010s. During this military action, the M23 captured the important eastern Congolese city of Goma in 2013.[2]
As the M23 caused havoc for the FARDC, the international community bounded together to combat what they perceived were the root causes of the conflict: interference from the neighbouring countries of Uganda and Rwanda. A United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNGoE) Report suggested these neighbouring countries were supplying, harbouring, and training M23 rebel forces.[3] In response, many nations withdrew foreign aid support to Uganda and Rwanda. While some international actors, such as the European Union and Germany, suspended aid, other countries, such as the United States, limited their foreign aid.[4] Various agreements between the Congolese government and M23, along with Uganda and Rwanda, such as the Luanda and Nairobi Peace processes, led to the rebels becoming relatively inactive.
Historical Context of the M23 and Banyarwanda:
Since the end of Rwanda’s genocide in 1994, when over a million refugees fled into then-Zaire, now the DRC, the two countries have become entangled. The First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars witnessed bloody wars between Congo and Rwanda, including multiple other nations such as Angola, Uganda and Burundi. Despite the Luanda Agreement 2002, which saw the removal of foreign troops, DRC has remained in turmoil.[5] There are over 100 active rebel groups, from the small community-based ‘Mai Mai’ to larger groups such as the M23. One of these rebel groups is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which comprises the military remains and ideology of Hutu extremists who perpetrated Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.[6] The Rwandan government consistently seeks to combat the FDLR, typically by force. Banyarwanda were targeted during the conflicts and became an essential ally for Rwandan forces. However, Reyntjens suggests that many have turned away from supporting Rwanda.[7] Since the end of the Second Congo War, Rwanda has been accused of interfering in Congolese affairs by supporting various rebel groups, such as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and the M23.
However, the recent wave of violence sparked regional concern with a relatively muted response by the international community. Within Rwanda, officials and citizens are cautiously worried about events in their neighbouring country spilling over into Rwanda. Despite some military incursions, such as the encroachment of a Congolese fighter jet in Rwandan airspace[8], the real concerns stem from what many perceive as genocidal threats. Genocide Watch describes the situation facing the Banyarwanda as “a slow genocide unnoticed by the international press.”[9] Specifically, the Congolese government’s rhetoric and treatment of the Banyarwanda is an acute cause for concern. The language used by members of the Congolese government, such as the Congolese Minister of Higher Education Muhindo Nzangi, suggests the FARDC work with the FDLR and the ‘Mai Mai’ groups in fighting not only the M23 but also anyone who holds Rwandan, specifically Tutsi, heritage.[10] One Rwandan genocide survivor commented:
What we [Rwandans] are hearing from Congo reminds us of 1994. We hear [from the DRC] the same anti-Tutsi hate speech as right before and during the genocide [1994 Genocide against the Tutsis]. Our [Banyarwanda] relatives are being targeted, terrorised and are in danger. Something must be done.[11]
Despite only being in the early months of the crisis[12], the international community has remained relatively silent. While some, such as New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez, a member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have condemned Rwanda for the recent wave of M23 violence[13], there has yet to be any form of financial, military or other type of sanctions. During past accusations of Rwandan interference in eastern Congo and accusations of dictatorial practices and human rights violations, the Rwandan government often responded with political tactics. One tactic frequently used is threatening the removal of its effective military contribution to peacekeeping missions.[14] Another tactic is to remind donor nations of how Rwanda is a case study in terms of how to effectively deploy foreign aid from the Global North.[15] These tactics and others are reasons for the continued international support for Rwanda. Nevertheless, how the international community currently is responding to the renewed crisis, and M23 contradicts past experiences when it condemned the rebel force and implemented sanctions against its alleged allies of Uganda and Rwanda. The critical question becomes why the international response has been so limited.
Discussions in Rwanda focus on the underlying belief that the DRC President Felix Tshisekedi does not have the same sway with the international community as his predecessor, Joseph Kabila.[16] The UNGoE’s most recent report seems to support the Rwandan government’s concerns about the FARDC’s relationship with the FDLR as an illegal mineral trade between the two actors reached US$71 million in 2022.[17] Nevertheless, there seems to be a preparation for future accusations. Rwandan officials such as the High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Johnston Busingye, are warning that the root causes of the conflict are not because of Rwanda but ethnic divisions spurred by the Congolese government, which are, he alleges, not following past agreements.
What is the Solution to the Violence?
However, the ineffectiveness of regional efforts might signal difficulties to the broader international community in the current situation. Unlike when the UNGoE blamed the M23 and instability on outside actors, Uganda and Rwanda, today, there is no clear link between external forces and the M23. The rhetoric and attacks against the Banyarwanda also make it difficult for the Global North to support the Congolese government. On September 9, 2022, the East African Community sent a military force, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF)[18], to foster safe zones and camps for internally displaced persons affected by the recent wave of violence.[19] A similar task force, the International Intervention Brigade, was sent into eastern DRC to stop the M23’s initial military campaign in 2012-2013 to take control over North and South Kivu. At the time, the DRC and Tanzania deemed it adequate to stop the M23 forces.[20] It enabled regional actors to solve neighbouring conflicts in what can best be described as ‘African Solutions for African Problems’.[21] Despite initially supporting it, the Tshisekedi government has recently encouraged public demonstrations against the regional military force. Accusations of the EACRF’s collaboration with the M23 largely stem from how, on multiple occasions, the M23 reportedly handed over captured towns and villages to the EACRF.
With the international community seemingly remaining largely silent, the East African Community has taken the lead in solving eastern Congo’s military and humanitarian crises. The EACRF deployment in eastern DRC illustrates the importance of regional powers and organisations in solving local crises, conflicts and instabilities rather than relying on distant international actors. However, the likelihood of its success seems unlikely as the Congolese government continues its rhetoric and policies against the M23, the Banyarwanda and Rwanda. Additionally, the M23 seems focused on the plight of the Banyarwanda and seeking greater political power within DRC rather than threatening, unlike the FDLR, regional nations. Despite the desire for regional solutions to the crisis, it appears neighbouring countries are unable to solve it in the foreseeable future.
[1] Vincent Gasana, “DRC conflict: M23 offered government unconditional surrender, before a shot was fired,” KT Press, December 20, 2022, https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/12/drc-conflict-m23-offered-government-unconditional-surrender-before-a-shot-was-fired/.
[2] “Goma: M23 rebels capture DR Congo city,” BBC News, November 20, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20405739.
[3] Jonathan R Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Elite Perceptions of Global Engagement (Oxon: Routledge, 2021)., 142-143.
[4] Ibid., 118, 126-131.
[5] Taylor, Alexandra. “A Violent Peace: The Ongoing Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Cornell International Affairs Review 2, no. 1 (2008): 50-56.
[6] Beloff, Jonathan R. “Rwanda’s securitisation of genocide denial: A political mechanism for power or to combat ontological insecurity?.” African Security Review 30, no. 2 (2021): 184-203.
[7] Reyntjens, Filip. “Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship.” African affairs 103, no. 411 (2004): 177-210., 208.
[8] “Rwanda shoots at Congolese military jet over alleged airspace violation,” Reuters, January 25, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwanda-says-congo-fighter-jet-violated-its-airspace-2023-01-24/.
[9] “Genocide Emergency: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Genocide Watch, August 3, 2022, https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-emergency-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-1.
[10] “DRC / North Kivu: In Butembo, Muhindo Nzangi invites the Mai-Mai militiamen not to learn from the army,” GrandJournal CD, September 5, 2022, GrandJournalCD.net; “ICCN Director Accused Of Supplying Fuel To M23 Rebels,” Taarifa Rwanda, November 20, 2022, https://taarifa.rw/iccn-director-accused-of-supplying-guns-to-m23-rebels/.
[11] Unnamed Rwandan, interviewed by Author, Kigali, Rwanda, January 23, 2023.
[12] At the time of writing in January 2023.
[13] Reuters, “US Senator Questions Aid to Rwanda Over Human Rights, Role in Congo,” VOA, July 26, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-senator-questions-aid-to-rwanda-over-human-rights-role-in-congo-/6674174.html.
[14] “Rwanda threatens to withdraw peacekeepers from Darfur over UN report,” France24, Augusst 31, 2010, https://www.france24.com/en/20100831-rwanda-threatens-darfur-peacekeeper-withdrawal-un-report-war-crimes.
[15] Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-genocide, 158.
[16] Jason Stearns, Dancing in the glory of monsters: The collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2012)., 168, 267, 307–330
[17] “How FDLR Generated $71m Annually from Businesses with Wives of DRC Officers,” The Chronicles, January 5, 2023, https://www.chronicles.rw/2023/01/05/how-fdlr-generated-71m-annually-from-businesses-with-wives-of-drc-officers/.
[18] This will be in addition to the already existing the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo (MONOSCU) with over 20,000 troops, observes and commanders.
[19] International Relations, “DRC President presides over signing of Agreement giving greenlight to the deployment of the EAC Joint Regional Force,” East African Community, September 9, 2022, https://www.eac.int/press-releases/151-international-relations/2589-drc-president-presides-over-signing-of-agreement-giving-greenlight-to-the-deployment-of-the-eac-joint-regional-force; Jenna Russo, “The East African Community Steps into the Crisis in the DRC. Will It Help?,” IPI Global Observatory, December 12, 2022, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/12/east-african-community-crisis-drc/.
[20] Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-genocide, 216, 224-228.
[21] Beswick, Danielle. “Peacekeeping, regime security and ‘African solutions to African problems’: exploring motivations for Rwanda’s involvement in Darfur.” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010): 739-754.
Jonathan R Beloff 