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Review: Modern Rwanda: A Political History

Filip Reyntjens. Modern Rwanda: A Political History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. $30.99. Paper. ISBN: 9781009284486.

Rwanda is perhaps best known for its experiences during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, more commonly known as the Rwandan Genocide. Since the end of the genocide, researchers flocked to the small African nation to better understand what led to the massacres and how the society rebuilt itself. The level of success to which Rwanda rebuilds itself since the genocide is hotly debated. Reyntjens is perhaps one of the most known scholars and critics of Rwanda. Despite not visiting Rwanda since October 1994, he continues to write on Rwanda’s politics and human rights. His new book somewhat differs from much of his current research, focusing mostly on Rwanda’s pre-colonial and colonial history.

The book is divided into seven chapters, excluding the Introduction and Conclusion. After the Introduction, the book’s first chapter examines the pre-colonial history of Rwanda. Reyntjens illustrates the complexities of this period of Rwandan history, which is mainly unexplored compared to the genocide but heavily debated within Rwandan studies. The current Rwandan government often describes this period as relatively tranquil, with no Tutsi, Hutu and Twa divisions. However, this chapter problematises this perception to indicate how not only did these ethnic divisions exist but also how the pre-colonial Rwandan state was not as united and uniform as described. The following two chapters explain how Germany and Belgium influenced and engaged with colonial Rwanda. The fourth chapter describes the final years of colonisation with the rise of the Hutu Revolution and independence. Despite somewhat minimising the human suffering during this period for Rwanda’s Tutsis, the chapter exceeds in clearly categorising the political turmoil and actors of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The final three chapters examine Rwanda’s political history since independence. The First (1962-1973) and Second (1973-1994) Republics are described in terms of historical narratives that do not focus on explaining the genocide. Rather, chapter five provides a purer form of political-historical analysis to understand that historical period rather than how it led to the genocide. Chapter six briefly examines the Rwandan Civil War and the genocide. The final chapter, before the book’s conclusion, contains Reyntjens’ harsh critiques of Rwanda since the genocide. His attention is not on describing the complexities of governance under the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) as he did with ruling elites in the previous chapters. Instead, his focus is to repeat previously published claims of how the ruling RPF conducts human rights violations both inside and outside Rwanda. In all of the book’s chapters, his seventh chapter on Rwanda’s post-genocide governance feels the most disconnected from the rest as it lacks the same nuance as in previous chapters.

While there is no doubt this book will be used as a major source on Rwandan politics, it does contain some issues that need to be at least mentioned. The majority of this book is unique in providing a relatively straightforward description of early Rwandan history, both before and during colonisation. However, many of its citations stem from somewhat older sources, with only a few exceptions, such as Jan Vansina’s 2004 book Antecedents to Modern Rwanda[1]. There is also an underlying problem in how Reyntjens seems to downplay the suffering that occurred during and after the Hutu Revolution against Rwandan Tutsis and others who did not align with the Hutu ideological movement during much of the country’s independence and up until the genocide. It reads as a setup to later try to criticise the RPF’s governance by establishing a narrative of how things are worse now in Rwanda than decades ago.

His criticisms of present-day Rwanda read more like an overview of other research, as his lack of fieldwork experience severely limited the practical realities of the complex nature of Rwandan politics within the nation. Fundamentally, one can only write so much insight into the current political dynamics while writing from Europe. The book’s methodology is the first topic covered in the Introduction, but it never addresses the issues found in Chapter Seven, which is either an incomplete or problematic illustration of Rwanda today as it relies solely upon observations from afar rather than proper fieldwork.

One of the primary claims made against Reyntjens by Rwandans is his involvement in the 1978 constitution. This constitution legitimised former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s grip on power by establishing a one-party state along with the discriminatory quota system against Rwandan Tutsis. Supporters of the RPF often cite Reyntjens’ involvement in drafting the constitution with little supporting evidence. While reading the fifth chapter he does not address this accusation by writing, “space forbids a detailed analysis of the constitution” (page 114). This is despite him being a legal and constitutional specialist. However, in the following chapter, on page 146, he has space to write a subsection on the number of genocide victims. While this might seem a minor issue, it illustrates a missed opportunity for Reyntjens to refute some of the significant and damning claims made against him. It was an overlooked opportunity to provide a new element within his vast work on Rwanda.

Reyntjens’ new book on Rwanda’s political history will undoubtedly be a much-used text in criticising Rwanda’s government and perception of the nation’s history. The book’s greatest strength is its clarity in describing the complex issues and history of Rwanda’s pre-colonial and colonial history. Its description of the political dynamics between former President Grégoire Kayibanda and Dominique Mbonyumutwa is unique in terms of clarity. However, the examination of modern Rwandan politics faces the issues found in his other publications, a lack of actual observational data collected from conducting proper fieldwork.

[1] Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2004.

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Rwanda Suspends Belgium Aid

On 18 February 2025, the Rwandan government announced the termination of its development cooperation deal with Belgium. The five-year €95 million deal is roughly a year old and was negotiated to aid in Rwanda’s economic and social development. But now, the deal is off, with relations between the two nations soured.

Context Behind the Suspension:

Akin to much of past suspended foreign aid, the root cause of the current situation stems from the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Over the last few years, the resurrected Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), which had not been active for nearly a decade, began capturing villages, towns, and cities. While there are multiple reasons for their new offensive, one of the primary causes is the treatment of the Banyarwanda. Increased discrimination and attacks by the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and its allies, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Wazalendo forces and the localised militias of the Mai Mai was a leading factor in the M23’s resurgence. The FARDC’s ineffectiveness to stop the rebels resulted in much of North Kivu, including its capital city of Goma, being captured in January 2025. In a journal article for Military Strategy Magazine, I argue that the root cause of the renewed M23 is not Rwanda but the Congolese government’s lack of an effective strategy. Despite a brief cease-fire proposal, the M23’s forces now deployed in South Kivu with its forces, at the time of writing, at the cusps of Bukavu. The accusations of Rwandan involvement in the M23’s success are nothing new.

During the M23’s initial period in the early 2010s, the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNGoE) accused Rwandans of aiding the rebels. Akin to a decade ago, Rwanda is again accused of assisting the rebels with logistics, military equipment and even a few thousand soldiers. The root cause for Rwanda’s involvement is often described within existing narratives of mineral theft, sovereign violations and expansionist attitudes. Rwandan security concerns in neighbouring DRC, specifically of the FDLR, are minimised, with evidence of Rwanda’s actions often being vague. For instance, the accusations of Rwanda’s military contribution in terms of soldiers stem from photos of African soldiers without specific identity markers to clearly indicate they are part of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). Belgium is a major critic, accusing Rwanda of aiding the M23. While some in Rwanda speculate the Belgian government is just repeating Congolese accusations to try to advance their foreign relations, its impact on Rwanda would be felt. As Professor of Law and Politics Filip Reyntjens tweeted, it was just a matter of time before Belgium would suspend their foreign aid to Rwanda. Despite Rwanda denying the accusations, it negatively impacted the country, with many countries suspending their foreign aid.

While the economic effects could be felt throughout the country, the Rwandan government used it as an opportunity. In theory, the Agaciro Development Fund was an attempt to help alleviate foreign aid withdrawals by establishing a public wealth fund for Rwandans. While the fund could never compensate for the loss of foreign aid, it did help spur nationalism. Rwandan news media and government officials proclaimed how the fund was a sign of defiance against foreign aid and dependence on the Global North. The following section shows that foreign aid dependency is a major concern within Rwandan foreign policy.

Foreign Aid:

As I wrote, Rwandan foreign policy comprises three overarching issues. The first comprises state security interests and the second and third focus on economic development. More specifically, the second issue is the reduction of foreign aid reliance. With the recent news media focusing on USAID cuts by the Trump Administration, Rwanda’s government has long desired to remove its dependence on foreign aid. After the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the country’s bankrupt status forced it to be largely reliant on aid from the Global North. Just under 100 per cent of government income came from foreign aid in 1995. That number decreased over time as the economy rebounded and grew. During much of the 2010s, foreign aid composed around 40 per cent of the government’s income. With the exception of the Covid-19 pandemic, which witnessed an increase in foreign aid reliance due to the global economic shutdown, Rwanda recently returned to reducing its reliance, with aid accounting for roughly a third of the budget.

But why is foreign aid considered harmful in Rwanda, specifically the Rwandan government? Fundamentally, foreign aid is seen as a method of dependence on the Global North, which has historically abandoned Rwanda. While most people will immediately think of how the world abandoned Rwanda during the Genocide, this was not the first instance. Rather, the Hutu Revolution (1959) and independence (1962) led to a massive forced emigration of Rwandan Tutsis and politically excluded Hutus. Despite some assurances from the United Nations and other nations, including Belgium, that the refugees would not be forgotten, they were quickly abandoned. Many of the Rwandan government’s leadership (recent trends of younger Rwandans taking positions of power and influence indicate this will no longer be the case in the near future) lived as refugees in much of the African Great Lakes region. The abandonment they experienced shaped their perceptions of how the international community can, and will, simply walk away from Rwanda. Thus, there is a need, whether through economic development or institutions such as the Agaciro Development Fund, to reduce reliance on foreign aid.

The theme of abandonment, along with Rwandan human security and agaciro, underpins Rwandan foreign policy decisions. Foreign aid threatens Rwandan human security in multiple ways. On the surface, government programs funded by aid are significantly impacted during times of suspension. During the 2012-2013 aid withdrawals, I witnessed a farming education centre having to cut back services to subsistence farmers because the funds from the Global North ceased. Additionally, defining Rwandan human security, which composes the right of return and safety for all those who identify as ‘Rwandan’, is seen as necessary based on historical experiences of Germany and Belgium redefining identity that eventually led to the Genocide. The origins of Rwandan identity are hotly debated within academic circles, but they play an important role in terms of agency. While President Paul Kagame insists the Banyarwanda are Congolese, historical kinships connect Rwandans and Banyarwandas. Thus, Rwanda will show sympathy towards a group that is not only closely related to them but experiences persecution similar to that found before and during the Genocide.

Lastly, the dependency created by foreign aid is largely seen as reducing the country’s self-reliance and dignity within the agaciro identity. As many Rwandan government officials commented to me during my PhD research, a beggar’s pride is only as far as the coins dropped into their cup. At times, the description of Rwanda accepting foreign aid illustrated a contradictory image of one who wants to build themselves up but cannot as they rely on others. Max Webber’s Protestant work ethic (specifically the ‘pulling oneself up by their bootstraps’) description often does not include a self-made man who asks for money. Overall, foreign aid dependency is seen not only as a threat to state security and interests but, at its root, as an unreliable substitute for national pride in its development for all those who identify as ‘Rwandan’.

So Now What?

The M23’s renewal and military successes can be seen impacting not only those who reside in eastern DRC. One of its consequences is the end of the Belgium-Rwanda foreign aid package. Rwandans on social media hailed the move to end the foreign aid with Belgium. Many perceive it as a sign of national pride that it upheld its agency through the agaciro ideology rather than caving to Belgium’s accusations. While Belgium indicated it remains committed to its foreign relations with Rwanda, this commitment will truly be tested in the upcoming weeks and months. There is no doubt that some in Rwanda will suffer because of the aid cut, as the nation is still developing, only thirty years after the Genocide.

However, the decision should not surprise those who study Rwandan foreign relations or how the small nation perceives international relations. The distrust towards the reliance on other nations, forged over the decades, provides insights into how the Rwandan government perceives and engages with the international community. As there is no end in sight for a quick end for the conflict in eastern DRC, there is a greater chance for other Global North nations to cut their foreign aid as in years past. However, Rwanda’s economy can better absorb the shocks compared to the past, and the nation’s services, especially in its effective peacekeeping, make the country a necessary partner for those who might be accusing it of supporting the M23 now.

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Rwanda: Paul Kagame’s fourth term as president – what his agenda will need to cover

Jonathan Beloff, King’s College London

Paul Kagame started his fourth term as Rwanda’s president in August 2024. He first became president in April 2000. However, as the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, he has been the country’s de facto head since his rebel forces ended the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

The Rwanda that Kagame now leads is significantly different from the one he took over in 2000. While economic challenges continue, the nation is largely more socially and politically stable and secure.

Rwanda still has a long way to go in its public-sector-led development – the country has set out to become a middle-income country by 2035 and high-income by 2050. Inequalities between the capital city Kigali and the rest of the country continue to grow. Rwanda still faces threats from the remains of the forces behind the 1994 genocide and growing tensions with neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Kagame faces the challenge of ensuring national stability as the foundation for economic growth and security. He also faces regional challenges, especially in Burundi and DRC, with questions surrounding their support for anti-Rwandan forces. This especially includes the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) based in eastern DRC.

I have studied Rwanda’s political development, security landscape and foreign policy since 2008. In my view, Kagame’s primary agenda for his new term will be increased state-building and capacity, regional policy and continuing national stability.

Success for Kagame over the next five years should be a Rwanda closer to reaching its middle-income plan, with a better run government bureaucracy to implement public policy and distribute social services. Hopefully the neighbourhood will be more peaceful too.

Building state institutions

Rwanda’s development requires additional investment and economic growth, as well as better functioning state institutions. The country is currently classified as a low-income economy. Kagame will continue to be the nation’s primary ambassador for its commercial diplomacy and build the state’s institutional capacity for national development.

The continued construction of the Rwandan state includes developing government institutions to implement public policy and governance. Many new bureaucrats and leaders within government offices are part of Rwanda’s generation of millennials who hope to become Rwanda’s future. This would help move the country away from a reliance on established but older officials.

The extent to which government boards, ministries and organisations become effective could determine the future of Rwandan politics. Some Rwandan Patriotic Front members believe that a post-Kagame Rwanda will not necessarily have another single strong leader, but rather institutions capable of carrying out public policy and governing the country.

Building up state institutions would help deliver on the nation’s development plans. Vision 2020 and Vision 2050 are hinged on providing security, education, universal healthcare and growing cash crop exports like coffee and tea.

Tense regional context

Rwanda’s growth relies on securing its borders. In his inauguration speech, Kagame noted the importance of addressing regional security threats and sources of instability. The most pressing of these are the deteriorating relationship with neighbouring Burundi and the long-running conflict in the DRC.

Over the past two years, relations between Rwanda and Burundi have declined as Burundian president Évariste Ndayishimiye has developed closer ties with DRC president Felix Tshisekedi.

In January 2024, Ndayishimiye closed Burundi’s border with Rwanda. He accused his northern neighbour of contributing to the growing instability in eastern DRC by supporting the M23 rebel group. He also accused Kigali of aiding in the training of the Red Tabara rebel group, which has been fighting the Burundi government since 2015.

The deteriorating security situation in eastern DRC has led to growing tensions between Kagame and Tshisekedi, who has previously called the Rwandan leader “Hitler”. Tshisekedi also threatened to invade Rwanda, accusing the country of meddling in Kinshasa’s affairs. The UN has accused Rwanda of aiding the M23 rebels, which Kigali has denied.

Since 2021, increased attacks against the Banyarwanda community in eastern DRC by various rebel groups and the Congolese military have led to a revival of the M23. The rebel group was largely defeated in 2013. It claims to be fighting for the rights of the Banyarwanda.

Congolese government officials, such as higher education minister Muhindo Nzangi, have called for greater military action by the Congolese military and civilians against the M23, Rwanda and the Banyarwanda community. While Kagame consistently calls the issue domestic for the DRC, there is growing concern in Rwanda for the Banyarwanda, whom some see as being at risk of experiencing genocide akin to Rwandans in 1994.

As it stands, tensions between Rwanda and the DRC have led to several border skirmishes. For instance, a Congolese fighter jet was shot at by Rwandan military forces in January 2023. Two months later, a Congolese soldier was killed after he crossed into Rwanda and shot at soldiers.

Kagame must balance national security and the rising tensions with his country’s neighbours. This will most likely require him to work with regional allies to address the roots of the Congolese conflict.

Political stability

Kagame’s primary campaign promise was continued political stability for sustained economic growth. On the surface of it, this seems to have been a persuasive argument: Kagame won the election with 99.18% of the vote.

However, human rights groups have condemned the July 2024 election results, claiming they were a result of Kagame having stifled internal opposition.

Political opposition actors such as Victoire Ingabire and Diane Rwigara have little room to rally support within Rwanda. Western organisations often claim this is a result of political suppression. However, for some Rwandans, these politicians are viewed as promoting a failed ideology based on identity politics that doesn’t align with the aspirations of the country.

Kagame continues to be viewed as a symbol of Rwanda’s post-genocide consistency. However, there will come a point where a successor will need to be found. If the country develops strong political and governing institutions, it will no longer need to rely on a singular leader after Kagame eventually steps down.

Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Analysis of Rwanda’s 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary Election

This is a modified version of a report submitted on Rwanda’s recent election.

Abstract:

This report reviews Rwanda’s 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary Election by Dr Jonathan R Beloff. The paper examines and analyses how Rwanda carried out its election. It provides insights about the final day of the campaign trail, the casting of ballots and vote counting. The research relies on data collected during a fieldwork period from 12 to 16 July. Research methods during fieldwork include interviews and conversations with Rwandans and ethnographic observations. This report provides observations, analysis and suggestions for future elections. Overall, it concludes that Rwanda conducted a relatively smooth election with no issues of voter fraud, intimidation or ballot stuffing.

Introduction:

From the 14 to 16 July, Rwandans went to the polls to cast their ballots for the President and Parliamentarians in the Chamber of Deputies. An estimated 8.9 million out of 9 million eligible Rwandans voted in the elections in Rwanda and internationally. As of 17 July, President Paul Kagame from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) won the Presidential election with over 99% or 8.8 million votes. Opposition candidates Dr Frank Habineza from the Green Party and Independent candidate Philippe Mpayimana won 44,479 and 28,466 votes, respectively. At the writing of this report, the RPF won over 68.8 per cent of Parliamentary votes or 37 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, with other minority parties reaching between 5 and 11 per cent. The final vote counts were announced on the 22 July.

This report concludes that no violence, election fraud, or other problems occurred at visited polling locations.

Despite the relatively smooth operations of this election, it will receive international criticism as unfair and unfree. The election process has and will continue to receive international criticism as many accuse the Rwandan government of promoting a one-party dictatorship under the control of the RPF and President Paul Kagame. The accusations made against Rwanda’s elections broadly compose excluding potential oppositional candidates, voter suppression and intimidation, as well as fraudulent vote count. Despite many international news media, organisations on democracy, human rights organisations and individuals accusing the election as fraudulent, they did not take the opportunity given by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to observe. While it is not proper to speculate their reasons not to do so, it likely stems from how witnessing Rwanda’s election will not benefit their existing narratives and conclusions about Rwanda’s political system.

After receiving permission from the NEC, I (Dr Beloff) travelled to Rwanda to witness the election process. Since December 2022, I have asked several Rwandans, mainly in Kigali and Musanze, their opinions of Rwanda’s political system and democracy. During recent fieldwork periods of December 2022 to March 2023; August to September 2023; March to April 2024; and June 2024, I interviewed or held conversations with Rwandans of different ages about their perceptions of Rwanda’s political system. These interviews were intended to establish a preset understanding of their beliefs, perceptions, and problems with the current political structures. Additionally, I observed how Rwandans engage on social media within the context of the political system, both in terms of structures (how the government operates) and politics (political party campaigns). Returning to Rwanda on 12 July and staying during the election permitted me to engage with Rwandans while they voted and witnessed the political process in person. This methodology was important as it prevented preconceived notions or conclusions from the Global North when studying Rwanda’s political election.

Overall, I conclude that no significant problems existed in Rwanda’s 2024 election that would signal fraud. I witnessed no voter intimidation, pressure or ill practices while the votes were cast and counted. As an observer, the entire process was transparent, with Rwandans willing to discuss why they were voting rather than who they were voting for. Nevertheless, there are ways for the election to be improved, which are suggested later in this review.

Methods:

This report relies on qualitative research methodology. The primary researcher, Dr Jonathan Beloff, is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at King’s College London focusing on the African Great Lakes region. While his research typically focuses on Rwandan foreign relations and the Campaign against Genocide War, his research capabilities allow for a wide range of topics. His first visit to Rwanda was in 2008; he began researching Rwanda in 2012. His research methodology uses qualitative research methods such as semi-structured interviews, conversations, archival material and ethnography. Dr Beloff approached Bonheur Bobo d’Amour Pacifique, a Rwandan, to assist in the research for this report. The two have known each other since 2012, when Mr Pacifique worked at the Kigali Genocide Memorial (KGM). Mr Pacifique provided translation support and helped Rwandans to identify their perceptions, beliefs, and opinions at the various polling stations.

Dr Beloff travelled to eleven polling stations in Kigali, Bugesera, Ntarama, Masaka and Kabuga on 15 July. As the elections were from 7:00 am to 3:00 pm, there was a logistical limit to the number of sites the two could visit. Appendix A has a list of the polling stations that were visited. Observations of vote counting were in Kabuga. Dr Beloff and Mr Pacifique presented themselves to the site manager at each site. After introductions, they requested to visit different voting rooms with an average of three per site. The two observers inspected the rooms to see if outside actors such as police, military or other security officials were in the voting rooms.

Additionally, Dr Beloff inspected voting booths to see whether outside influence could impact a voter’s selection. They would then talk to one to three staff workers and observe people, often two to five at a time, voting in each room within the polling station. Afterwards, they would talk to Rwandans, an average of two to ten, who were waiting in line or had just voted. A rough estimate of fifty Rwandans were interviewed on their opinions of the election. No Rwandan was asked who they voted for or for their identification. They used every measure to protect all individual rights, and no names were recorded in order to promote privacy. The research included ethical considerations prior to conducting any interviews or conversations. Dr Beloff did visit an additional polling site on 16 July in Gisozi, Kigali.

Dr Beloff analysed the collected data through a triangulation process and discourse analysis. Triangulation utilises different sources of data to find underlying correlations and themes. Discourse analysis focuses on the use of language and terms to uncover understanding. These methodologies for processing the data are still in the early phases. Beyond this report, Dr Beloff will be submitting at least one academic journal article on the election and a blog post for his website for non-academic readers. Triangulation and discourse analysis will be utilised in the writing of these articles.

It is important to state how no polling site prohibited Dr Beloff or Mr Pacifique from observing the election, whether in terms of voting or counting ballots. There were no obstructions in asking questions, and many election workers provided full access and responses. Neither observer provided prior notification to visited polling sites.

Background:

Rwanda’s pre-colonial political system relied on the jurisdiction of the Mwami, translated as ‘King’. The political system relied on the Mwami, with their chiefs running much of the kingdom at the local level. Most hills, villages, or locations had three chiefs who would implement political rulings and govern, all subject to the Mwami. With the arrival of European colonisation, first by the Germans in 1884 and later by Belgium in 1917, the powers of the Mwami were privately minimised while publicly still being seen very much as the law of the land. However, actual political power rested with colonial officials. The Mwami often became either a puppet or a scapegoat for European powers to avoid local anger and responsibility for their frequently brutal policies. Rwanda’s 1961 referendum on the monarchy signalled the end of its rule while the nation turned into a republic. The following election that year for Parliament saw the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu (Parmehutu) gain a majority of seats in the newly established Parliament. Its leader, Grégoire Kayibanda, became Rwanda’s first President after independence in 1962. His First Republic (1962-1973) witnessed greater authoritarian control and the dismissal of oppositional political parties following subsequent elections. In July 1973, Minister of Defence Juvénal Habyarimana instituted a coup d’état, removing President Kayibanda from power. He quickly established his political party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), and banned other political parties such as the previous Parmehutu. President Habyarimana and the akazu, loosely translated as ‘little house’, dominated Rwanda’s political landscape until 1990.

During the early 1990s, Rwanda’s political space opened, with many parties establishing themselves. For instance, were the established parties of: Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), Parti Libéral (PL), and the notorious Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR). Additionally, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) established itself in 1987 after its Kampala Congress when it adopted its central political, economic and social plan of the Eight Point Programme. As described by Guichaoua[1], the early 1990s was a very turbulent political period. The Liberation War (1990-1993) and French pressure on Rwanda’s political space, sometimes referred to as Paristroika[2], led to significant instability within the existing political dynamics. The opening of political space allowed for extremist parties, such as the CDR, along with extremist elements in the non-Habyarimana (MRND) parties. Political assassinations, intimidations and cancelled elections were common during this period. Despite the initial hopes for stability and peace after the August 1993 signing of the Arusha Accords, Rwanda collapsed into genocide. The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi began on the night of 6 April and continued until the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the RPF, ended the genocidal massacres in the Campaign against Genocide War. However, up to one million Tutsis and non-extremist Hutus died. After the Genocide, a new government was formed on 19 July with a modified version of the past Arusha Accords. The changes mainly consisted of removing Hutu extremist parties such as the MRND and CDR. By 2000, Vice President and Minister of Defence Paul Kagame became President with a new constitution by 2003.

Rwanda’s 2003 Constitution shifted the nation’s political institutions. The President would have up to two terms consisting of seven years each. This changed in 2015, with the President only having five-year terms. The new Parliament contained two chambers. The lower, the Chamber of Deputies, consisted of 80 seats, with only 53 for elected officials. The remaining 27 seats are designated for women, disabled and youth officials. Elections are held every five years, except for the 2024 election, six years after the previous election. Unlike the lower chamber, the upper chamber, the Senate, consists of 26 members. They provide reviews of laws passed by the Chamber of Deputies. The NEC announced the 2024 Rwandan Presidential and Parliamentary elections earlier that year. Article 100 of the Rwandan Constitution states that, “Elections for the President of the Republic are held at least thirty (30) days and not more than sixty (60) days before the end of the term of the incumbent President.” Three candidates stood for President (incumbent President Paul Kagame, Green Party Leader Dr Frank Habineza and Independent candidate Philippe Mpayimana) with a total of six political parties (RPF, Liberal Party [PL], Social Democratic Party [PSD], Ideal Democratic Party [PDI], Democratic Green Party and PS-Imberakuri) and one independent candidate (Janvier Nsengimana). The election took place between 14 to 16 July. Voters from the diaspora voted on 14 July, with Rwandans in the country voting on the following 15. The final day of voting, 16 July, consisted of the 27 special seats for the Chamber of Deputies. 

Rwanda’s political environment is mired by international criticism alleging Rwanda is a one-party state controlled by the RPF, with President Kagame as an authoritarian dictator. Professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham Nic Cheeseman and Human Rights Advocate Jeffrey Smith categorise Rwanda’s democratic elections as saturated in authoritarian practices in human rights abuse.[3] Professor Filip Reyntjens from the University of Antwerp consistently described Rwanda’s political system as a dictatorship with no political or electoral rights.[4] Human Rights Watch[5] and Amnesty International[6] also criticise Rwanda’s democratic practices. Their findings influence foreign governments’ engagements with the Rwandan government. For example, a 2017 Amnesty International report criticised Rwanda’s democracy as authoritarian and aimed in its report to influence US foreign policy towards Rwanda.[7] These critiques continued before, during and after the July 2024 election.

Election Campaign:

This section is rather limited as much of my exposure to the political campaigns came from social media and online articles. However, I arrived in Rwanda on 12 July, before the RPF’s final campaign rally at Gahanga. As I was unaware of the rally’s location, I went along with an official from the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB). Accompanying the RGB official was beneficial as he and others at RGB informed me of the procedures of Rwanda’s election and the institution’s role in ensuring a free and fair election. We arrived at the rally around 8:00 am with long traffic lines and tens of thousands of people already camped out at the venue. At the event, I spoke to roughly 20 Rwandans about why they were attending and their opinions of Rwanda’s democracy. Many commented on their desire to see President Kagame at the final campaign rally. For some, this was possibly their only time to see their President live rather than through the internet or television. Others commented that they wanted to ‘join the party’, a synonym for the rally. The rally’s environment was infectious as Rwandans danced and sang songs blasted on the speaker system.

The rally itself was a fascinating event in terms of messaging. The primary difference between the smaller parties and the other Presidential candidates compared with the RPF and President Kagame was rhetoric. The first group discussed public policy they would implement if elected. The RPF and President Kagame differed, focusing more on general slogans of ‘development’, ‘security’, ‘stability’ and so on. It was important to hear these keywords as voters would later use them as reasons for their decision to vote. However, little to no public policy recommendations were mentioned (based on the translation I received from a different RGB official). President Kagame’s campaign message was on how voters should continue to trust him and the RPF to continue Rwanda’s development since the Genocide against the Tutsi.

The rally illustrated the political realities of Rwanda. The RPF is the de facto political party for which Rwandans will vote. The other parties and Presidential candidates have to convince voters, through policy suggestions, why they should vote for them. The RPF does not need to campaign as the population is well aware of its track record regarding broad policies and decision-making. Many commented during the campaign rally and election that they trust the RPF to continue Rwanda’s stability, which is necessary for continued growth and development. There is a significant distrust in voting for political parties or actors unconnected with President Kagame. One older woman in her 70s commented on how the pluralistic political system of the early 1990s led to instability. It only ended after the RPF took power by ending the Genocide against the Tutsi. Thus, the claims that the RPF suppresses political parties and candidates are problematic as they do not reflect the reality of the difficulties faced by any different political party. Rwandans seemingly trust and will continue to rely on the RPF and President Kagame as they know their governance, policy, and security accomplishments.

Election Day – 15 July:

At roughly 6:50 am, we reached the Rukiri I APAPAC in Remera, Kigali. This was the first location of an intense day of visiting 11 polling stations. The polls officially opened at 7:00 am, but perhaps 50-75 people formed two organised queues. In front of the lines were election volunteers being sworn in. One volunteer later stated how important it was for the public to witness the swearing-in ceremony. It illustrated public transparency and openness to invite Rwandan voters and quell any hesitation about the election’s legitimacy. At exactly 6:59 am, the site manager finished the ceremony by lowering his elevated right hand. People began to swarm to the rooms designated for their particular villages. At first, It seemed confusing why these people queued just to race to their respective rooms later. Rather than forming a mob around the doors, they formed new lines again. All while the police were perhaps 20 meters away, the furthest they could physically be, from the voting rooms. At this location, only one police officer could be spotted, with another community security man keeping his distance.

After finding the site manager, as per procedure, he showed us one of the voting rooms and explained the voting process. Waiting voters lined up outside the room, with those in the front of the line having their identification cards temporarily taken. The elderly and sick did not have to wait in line as volunteers would bring them directly to the voting rooms. The election volunteer searched for their name in the register book. Once found, the first volunteer checked their names off the register, and they could come in. The voter would be allowed in and given back their identification card. Some polling stations would return the identification cards once the person had finished voting.

Nevertheless, at this and all the other locations, the voter would be given a white paper ballot containing the Presidential candidates. The ballots contained the candidates’ names, party affiliation symbols, party names and pictures, and an empty box. The voter would vote for their desired candidate in a private voting booth. A check mark or fingerprint in blue ink indicates the chosen candidate. Once the voter chose, they folded their ballot and placed it in a box containing a white lid and multiple zip tags. These tags prevented the boxes from being opened before the official counting of the votes.

After voting for President, the voter would be given a light brown ballot containing the different political parties and a single independent candidate campaigning for the Chamber of Deputies. The ballots were laid out similarly to the Presidential ones, with the only exception being that there were no pictures of any individuals. Voters collected their ballots and went behind a separate voting booth to cast their votes. Afterwards, they folded their ballot and placed it with a black lid in the box. Akin to the Presidential box, this box also contained zip tags to prevent tampering. Once they finished voting, the voter received a bit of purple ink on a finger or nail. The ink indicated that the person had voted. At some voting locations, the person’s identification cards would be returned to them. However, at most locations, they already had their identification cards. So, they departed the polling site, often first talking to people still waiting to vote.

Throughout the day, voters who had just voted or were waiting in line were asked questions about the election and international criticism of Rwanda’s political system. Only one woman in her early 20s refused to answer, but many others wanted to explain why they were voting. Many commented how they saw it as their civic duty to help promote Rwanda’s reconstruction since the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Others remarked how they wished to be part of the political process. Interestingly, only 2 out of the at least 50 voters we spoke to explicitly stated which candidate they voted for, with others only stating why they wanted to vote. One expressed their duty to vote for President Kagame to illustrate support for his Presidency. History played a significant role in why some support Rwanda’s current political system. A middle-aged woman, perhaps in her 50s, commented how the instability of Rwanda’s political past in the early 1990s and up to the Genocide against the Tutsi influenced her voting patterns. Without stating explicitly who she voted for, she explained how the past instability led her to vote for the current establishment, which created and sustained stability and security. These two elements are necessary for any national development. The terms’ stability’, ‘security’, and ‘development’ were keywords used in the RPF’s campaigns. The frequency of their usage by voters who talked to us indicated who they were likely voting for without explicitly stating the political party or candidate. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of talking to voters was their desire to vote for rather than against a particular political party or candidate. Unlike in the Global North, where most voters often vote against a candidate rather than for one they truly support, Rwandan voters seemed to be voting for candidates and political parties they supported.

Many Rwandans shook their heads when asked about Global North’s criticism of Rwanda’s political system. A few voters became furious with even the question but calmed down once they realised the reason for it. The most common response was that international critics from human rights organisations, academics, news media sources, etc., needed to travel to Rwanda to witness the election. Many complimented me for my willingness to witness the elections and ask Rwandans questions. The engagement with Rwandan voters seemed to be non-existent with foreign-based observers. At one location, GS Gahanga I St Joseph A in Gahanga, a group of African foreign observers entered the polling site. The site manager later complained to us about how they did not follow protocol when reporting to him when they arrived. Additionally, they briefly went into a few voting rooms, made check marks on a paper and departed. One observer came to us for our opinions on the election and, more specifically, why we thought Rwandans were voting in the election. It seemed somewhat paradoxical that this foreign observer was more interested in our opinions than the Rwandan voters. When confronted about this issue, he quickly dismissed the need to ask Rwandans for their opinions.

Voters were also asked about the accusation made by those in the Global North of candidate suppression. Those interviewed dismissed the notion that any ‘serious’ candidate was denied the ability to campaign. Ndi Umunyarwanda influenced whether a candidate was considered as ‘serious’. Those who are seen as promoting ethnic divisions or genocide ideology were disregarded as not a ‘serious’ candidate. Their support for dismissing these candidates was seen as positive, as it illustrated how serious the Rwandan government was in promoting national security and stability. Critical political parties such as the FDU-Inkingi, Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda (RDR), Mouvement Rwandais pour le Changement Démocratique (MRCD), Ishema Party and the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) along with their supporters based outside of Rwanda, are seen as ‘spoilers’ of Rwanda’s current political, social and economic development. In particular, the mention of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza led those interviewed to roll their eyes, shake their heads or laugh at the name. Overall, no Rwandan commented on including these oppositional political actors in the election. Instead, they discussed their support for their exclusion as they are perceived as threats to Rwanda’s progress and a return to the failed political system of the early 1990s that led to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

Travelling to different polling locations allowed for a greater pool of responses from voters. All expressed how they did not feel forced or pressured in any way to vote. New and young voters between 18-30 years old expressed their excitement to vote. The RPF’s rhetoric on youth voting was in full force as this section of voters expressed their belief in the importance of voting with terminology similar to the Gahanga rally. However, there was no sense of blind support for the RPF. Rather, many commented on their support of Rwanda’s current development. One did mention how there were still serious problems in Rwanda, such as the rural-urban divide and unemployment, but felt the current government, i.e. the RPF and President Kagame, were best to solve these issues. As witnessed in every polling station, it was apparent that youth political outreach was effective.

The decision to visit multiple polling locations allowed us to determine whether there was consistency in the voting procedure. Consistency in the practices provides insights into whether election volunteers were properly trained. No polling stations were informed of our visit, with many site managers simply asking to see the observer identification badges. After briefly examining the badges, the entire polling station became open for inspection. We were allowed to ask questions to volunteers and voters alike. However, some other observers commented on how they faced inconsistency in access. While volunteers were friendly and completely transparent about the process, there was a greater sense of stress and exhaustion as the day continued. Many stations expected thousands of voters based on the registers, but by 10:00 am, hundreds to thousands of non-registered voters at the polling station arrived. This created more significant stress for volunteers who had to handle the influx of unexpected voters.

Throughout the day, polling stations blasted music with messages about the importance of voting, democracy, Ndi Umunyarwanda, etc. There were no songs from any political parties or campaigns. The speakers also made announcements for voters. These contained information about the location of certain voting rooms, for voters to see an election volunteer if they needed assistance or how there were so many hours before the polls closed. The music did provide what many called a ‘wedding’ atmosphere. While driving to search for certain polling stations, we often looked for banana stems and leaves set up near polling sites, a traditional way to indicate the location of a wedding within Rwandan society. Each voting room contained decorations. Some contained fairy lights, streamers, pieces of art, and fruit, and in one location, there were reeves on the floor. The decorations were organised by community leaders from the different villages. When asked why the rooms were decorated, one volunteer commented on how the voting booth should feel like a ‘home’. Others commented how these are items used at weddings. Interestingly, there seemed to be some notion of how the Rwandan population was in a ‘wedding’ with the political system, and thus it was a time for celebration. The notion of the ‘wedding’ could be seen in nearly every polling station. Like the RPF’s campaign rallies, the party atmosphere allowed community engagement. After voting, Rwandans could be seen meeting with fellow voters to discuss social gossip.

Throughout the voting process, we inspected voting booths to see whether there were any outside influences or applied pressures. None can be reported. Police presence was always minimal, with many seemingly focusing more on providing assistance in parking than anything else. All were kept a distance from the voting rooms and could only enter if requested by the site manager. However, no site manager stated the need for police assistance. Fundamentally, there was no police or security interference in the election, including any form of intimidation or threats. The only presence of RDF soldiers was at the Kigali Primary School in Kanombe, Kigali, but their presence stemmed from their need to cast their votes. After arriving at the polling station, they reached the front of the line but went through the same processes as any civilian. Once they cast their vote, they departed. One RDF officer commented on the importance of the military voting as they, too, need to perform their civil duty.

Overall, I can report no issues during the voting process. Once again, I did not see any form of voter intimidation. This includes any threats, pressures or influence by any political party or government official. All site managers provided transparency and were willing to answer any questions. It was noticeable that by 12:00 pm, site managers and volunteers grew increasingly agitated, but it was a result of the stress of the larger-than-expected number of voters. The site managers seemed somewhat unwelcoming at only two sites, but they quickly explained the stressful situation. As seen in the Criticism and Suggestions section below, more resources and increased capacity at polling stations are needed. Nevertheless, based on the polling stations we visited, we observed no issues with the voting.

At around 5:30 pm, we returned to the Rusororo Adventist Primary School in Kabuga (which had an estimated 7000 voters) to witness the counting of the votes. We originally had reached the polling station at 3:00 pm, but there were still hundreds, if not over a thousand, Rwandans waiting to vote. The site manager requested that we return within two hours after our inspection when, hopefully, the voting was finished. It would take until 4:55 pm for the final ballot to be cast. The staff were given 30 to 45 minutes of badly needed rest. Once the counting began, the observers and some locals entered different voting rooms. The site manager informed us that the NEC required that the preliminary election results be reported by 9:00 pm. Thus, there were only a few hours to count the votes. Each room contained multiple green posters with handwritten names of the presidential candidates. Another section of the board included the political parties for the Chamber of Deputies. Each vote would be announced with someone on the posters (taped to the classroom’s blackboard) checking off the number. One person would open the ballots (which were previously folded) and hand them (whether one at a time or a bunch) to someone who would read the name (first President and then Parliament). They would then hand the paper off to someone for them to confirm. This person then handed it to one last person who showed me each vote. There were between 3-6 people at the vote counting. After the counting was done, another volunteer displayed the empty box. The ballots would then be placed into them with new zip tags.

Once the count for the Presidential ballots ended, the volunteers turned to the Parliamentary ballots. They began to be read off and check-marked for each political party for which the ballot was for. The high number of RPF led to a minor mistake of the PL not being counted. I brought this to the attention of the counters, who fixed it. They then decided to pause after reading all non-RPF votes so they would properly be recorded. Once the votes were counted, the ballots and the green posters were locked in a room. NEC would pick them up after the special election on 16 July. When the counting was done, we went to each room to see the election results and whether there were any discrepancies from the results in the first room. At no point were we denied the ability to see the green posters. Some offered to allow us to look into the boxes that had yet to be zip-tagged. Overall, there were no severe problems in the counting of the votes or anything to suggest ballot stuffing.

Election Day – 16 July:

The final election day focused on the special seats for the Chamber of Deputies. This includes 24 seats for women, 2 for youth and 1 for people with disabilities. Unlike the previous day, this election is not open to the public. Rather, voters are community leaders in those special communities. I visited the APAPEC school in Gisozi, Kigali, to observe this unique vote. Only 67 registered voters could vote for a wide range of women candidates at this polling station. The voting process was akin to the previous day, except for only one voting booth, which the site manager explained resulted in fewer voters. The previous day’s ballots were locked away in a separate room at the polling station. It was clear through the window the zip tags on the ballot boxes to prevent tampering. Despite being perhaps 15 meters away, the sole police officer at the location had instructions not to let anyone enter the locked room. When questioned about the security of the ballots, the site manager dismissed the concern. He commented on how the likelihood of someone wanting to get to the ballots was minimal, the presence of the police officer, and how the vote counts had already been reported to the NEC the previous night (around 9:30 pm). The site manager then informed me how an NEC official would collect the ballots sometime in the afternoon. Akin to the previous day, I witnessed no vote tampering, intimidation, or ballot stuffing.

Criticism and Suggestions:

No severe comments or complaints exist as we witnessed how the elections were held freely and fairly. There are only a few critical comments on how the election occurred. These are presented with complete respect towards the Rwandan Government. Nevertheless, it is important still to note areas of concern and ways for improvement.

  1. Increased Polling Capacity:
  • A serious problem observed during the 15 July election was the over-crowdedness of the polling stations and the volunteer’s exhaustion. Many site managers commented that while they prepared for a large number, the number of voters exceeded their capacity. Voting queues began at some voting stations, such as GS Gahanga I St Joseph A, at 4:00 am, three hours before voting began. Throughout the day, no voting station had less than 15 people waiting in line. However, the norm was for at least 25-75 people to wait. This led to voters waiting in lines from 30 minutes to nearly two hours. The wait resulted from the relatively slow process of collecting identification cards, checking registers, recording in overdraft lists and voting itself. At any given time, only two voters were in the voting room. The high temperatures, with some going beyond 30c, led to the dehydration of some waiting voters and volunteers. A few voters were seen suffering heat stroke and needing medical facilities. One site manager commented how they needed but could not open more rooms for voters to speed up the process.

    The long delays for voters led to the election ending at Rusororo Adventist Primary School in Kabuga at 4:55 pm. This was nearly two hours after the official end of the election. While an announcement at 3:05 pm was made for voters to try other polling stations, Rwandans there refused. The site manager balanced the voting rights of those at the centre with the exhaustion of the election volunteers. Nevertheless, this led to delays and minor errors in counting votes.

    Most polling sites should have used empty rooms for voting. Site managers commented on how they planned rooms to contain 400-750 voters each, but this number seems too large for the process. Thus, this report suggests that designated voting stations utilise all available space and increase the number of voting locations.

2.) Vote Counting:

  • During the voting at Rusororo Adventist Primary School in Kabuga, there were minor problems with the vote count. The rooms contained poor lighting, forcing the volunteers to use their cell phones for additional light. Additionally, NEC needs to better train volunteers in vote counting, such as reading the names slower, to prevent mistakes. During the vote count for Parliament, I noticed how one vote was misread as RPF when it was for PL. I brought it to the attention of the volunteers, who corrected the error. From then on, votes for non-RPF candidates were read slower, with a pause before the next ballot. This comment does not suggest that there was voter fraud or purposely misreading of votes.

Conclusion:

Rwanda’s 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary elections witnessed over 7 million Rwandan voters casting their ballots for who they wish to see lead the nation over the next five years. This report relied on qualitative data collected at 12 polling stations in Kigali, Bugesera, Ntarama, Masaka, Gisozi and Kabuga, with a minimum of 50 Rwandans interviewed on their perceptions, beliefs and thoughts on the election and Rwanda’s political system. Additionally, the research relied on ethnographic methods to assess the election’s fairness. While international critics will make claims of the fraudulent nature of the election and the suppression of political candidates, this report concludes how I did not see any forms of voter intimidation, suppression or ballot stuffing to sway the election. This report does not deeply examine the allegations made by Global North critics of candidate suppression. Nevertheless, Rwandans were asked about this accusation, with all dismissing it. There were no police, military or any other form of security presence forcing Rwandans to vote for any particular candidate or political party. No RPF or political official forcibly influenced voters in casting their votes. The election should be considered as free and fair.

Appendix A: Visited Polling Stations

  1. Rukiri I Apapac Remera, Kigali
  2. Akabeza Remera, Kigali
  3. Busanza (Groupe Scolaire) Kanombe
  4. Kigali Primary School in Kanombe
  5. GS Gahanga I St Joseph A, Gahanga
  6. GS Gahanga I St Joseph B, Gahanga
  7. Ntarama GS, Ntarama
  8. Ntarama EP, Cyugaro
  9. Kanombe King David, Kanombe Kigali
  10. Wellspring Academy, Masaka
  11. Rusororo Adventist Primary School, Kabuga
  12. Gisozi APAPEC school, Kigali (site visit occurred on 16 July)

[1] Guichaoua, André, From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990-1994, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2015).

[2] Beloff, Jonathan R. “French-Rwandan Foreign Relations: Depth and Rebirth of Diplomatic Relations.” The African Review 1, no. aop (2023): 1-26.

[3] Cheeseman, Nic, and Jeffrey Smith. “The Retreat of African Democracy.” Foreign Affairs (2019).

[4] Reyntjens, Filip. “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world: Governance in post-genocide Rwanda.” African Affairs 110, no. 438 (2011): 1-34; “Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: problematising ‘liberation’ and ‘democratisation’.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 (2006): 1103-1117; “Rwanda: Progress or powder keg?.” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 3 (2015): 19-33.

[5] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2023: Rwanda,” 2024, retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/rwanda

[6] Amnesty International, “Human rights in Rwanda,” 2024, retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/rwanda/report-rwanda/

[7] Amnesty International, “The State of Human Rights in Rwanda,” September 29, 2017; chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.congress.gov/115/meeting/house/106435/witnesses/HHRG-115-FA16-Wstate-AkweiA-20170927.pdf

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Faustin Twagiramungu: A Dinosaur of Rwandan Politics Long Gone

On 2nd December 2023, the news broke on social media that Rwanda’s former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu died in Belgium. While most Global North-based activists mourn his loss and make somewhat questionable claims of him being a ‘symbol of democracy’ for Rwanda, his loss in Rwanda will go relatively unnoticed. This brings up an interesting question of what happened to Twagiramungu in the consciousness of not just the Rwandan public but the new generation of Rwandans whose lives consist mainly after the Genocide against the Tutsi. Global North social activists will answer how minor mention of his death in Rwanda originates from President Paul Kagame or the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). However, that is problematic as it does not reflect the realities in Rwanda.

Who Was Faustin Twagiramungu?

Born in 1945 in Cyangugu Province, Twagiramungu lived a relatively everyday life for a Rwandan Hutu. Since independence in 1962, Rwanda’s social norms favoured the majority Hutu (composing roughly 84% of the population) over the minority Tutsi (comprising approximately 15%) and the minority Twa (comprising less than 1%). The previous 1959 Hutu Revolution, promoted by the nation’s first post-colonial President, Grégoire Kayibanda, glorified Hutu supremacy. Mass pogroms led to thousands of Tutsi to flee into neighbouring countries. Over the coming years, anti-Tutsi pogroms left thousands dead and tens of thousands to flee into neighbouring countries. During the First Republic (1962-1973), southern Hutus, such as Twagiramungu, received economic, political and societal favouritism. However, he did not receive the benefits of his ethnic and geographical origins for long as he studied and worked in Canada starting in 1968 and continued until 1976. It was during the reign of General Juvénal Habyarimana, who overthrew Kayibanda in a coup d’état that he returned to run a transportation company called Société des Transports Internationaux au Rwanda (STIR).

His business success outstripped his now disenfranchised origins. President Habyarimana and his inner circle called the akazu, loosely translated as ‘little house’, shifted favouritism from the South to the North. Tutsis still experienced institutional racism, nonetheless. The geographical power shift and anger towards the President led him into politics. However, Rwanda’s political landscape was changing. The one-party dictatorship of Habyarimana began to loosen. As Kroslak writes, Rwanda and many African nations under the French’s sphere of influence started a ‘Paristroika’ moment. With the Cold War ending and Western capitalism winning the ideological war, the Western donor nations of the United States, France and Great Britain demanded political and economic liberalisation. This new movement became an opportunity for Twagiramungu.

The Beginning of his Political Career and the Genocide against the Tutsi:

In 1991, he became a prominent Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) member. While MDR attempted to differentiate itself from Habyarimana’s party, the Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement (MRND), by claiming it was the ideological successor of former President Kayibanda and his lost political party, the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu (Parmehutu) were banned and dissolved shortly after Habyarimana’s coup. Additionally, MDR softened its tone on Tutsis compared to its predecessor. But like many of Rwanda’s new political parties, there were significant divisions based not only on Rwanda’s Tutsi population but also on whether to engage with the RPF.

In October 1990, the RPF’s military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), crossed from Uganda to attack the Rwandan military, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). The beginning of the Liberation War (1990-1993) began with initial setbacks for the RPA. Successful tactics and offensives in 1991, 1992 and 1993 led to peace negations and political transformations. By August 1993, the RPF and the Habyarimana regime agreed upon the Arusha Accords. The akazu lost significant power as Rwanda’s political system broadened beyond the original ‘Paristroika’ of the early 1990s to include the RPF. This benefited Twagiramungu’s career and ambition.

Including the RPF in Rwanda’s political space led to President Habyarimana being much more tactical in engaging with the opposition parties. He used wealth, favours and threats to divide political parties. The MDR was no different, especially after the forced exile of MDR leader and Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye in July 1993. His favouritism towards working with the RPA led him to be seen as an ‘accomplice’ by the FAR and Habyarimana. While Twagiramungu would be the ideal replacement, he instead manoeuvred for Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate within the party, for the Prime Minister position. She would later die during the Genocide against the Tutsi. It is important to note that while MDR had its moderates, it also had its Hutu extremists, such as Jean Kambanda, who would become Rwanda’s Prime Minister during the Genocide against the Tutsi.

On the night of 6th April 1994, the Falcon-50 Presidential Plane carrying President Habyarimana was shot down, most likely by FAR extremist actors, igniting the Genocide against the Tutsi. Twagiramungu resided in Kigali and received help from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), who brought him and his family to safety at their base in Kissimenti. Prunier, Dallaire and Anyidoho write of how UNAMIR forces, rather than the better equipped RPA, who had previously stationed its 3rd Battalion (more popularly known as the 600), rescue Twagiramungu’s life. There is speculation that he did not want to be saved by the RPA in order to retain the image of independence from the RPF, unlike Nsengiyaremye. Whatever the reason, he did not want RPA assistance; nevertheless, he benefited from their protection at Amahoro Stadium. Shortly after the Genocide began, the RPA’s 3rd Battalion, under the command of Lt. General Charles Kayonga, sent Eagle Company to Amahoro Stadium, which housed UNAMIR’s headquarters, to protect it from military and genocidal forces. The Genocide ended when the RPA defeated and removed the genocide regime on the 18th of July 1994. The Campaign against Genocide War had ended, but Rwanda’s landscape dramatically changed.

After the Genocide:

Despite winning the war, the RPF kept much of the previous 1993 Arusha Accords in place. There were changes, such as the Hutu extremist parties that were once in the government would be banned. Their political seats and ministries were distributed to other parties but mostly RPF. While there were only minor changes in the new post-genocide transitional government compared to the one agreed upon in the Accords, Rwanda had changed. During the first few days of the Genocide against the Tutsi, non-extremist, politically active Hutus were targeted alongside Tutsis by genocide forces. The political party’s divisions, which President Habyarimana created within many oppositional parties, provided opportunities for extremist elements to kill off moderate party members during that first week. Many of the extremist political party members were either dead or fled the country. Thus, few oppositional leaders left when the war and Genocide was over. Twagiramungu was one of the lucky few.

In accordance with the Arusha Accords, the MDR retained the Office of the Prime Minister. Twagiramungu, being one of the few remaining MDR members, became the nation’s new Prime Minister. While he had hoped the position would grant him political favour, he did not realise how the political landscape had changed. Unlike the early 1990s, Rwanda was now under the control of the RPF, which had just ended the Genocide against the Tutsi and won the Campaign against Genocide War. They suffered the least in terms of lost political leaders. However, they were not immune to the political changes that had taken place. Kimonyo writes how, during the remaining 1990s, some RPF officials wanted to rule the country as the past presidents had done. This is not in reference to a political dictatorship but the style of politics and corruption that had existed before. The infighting, corruption and ineptness led to not only the removal of Rwanda’s post-Genocide President Pasteur Bizimungu in 2000 but a significant shakeup in the party and country. Vice-President and Minister of Defence Paul Kagame became the next President and de facto leader of the RPF.

Even before the constitutional changes in 2000, which included some of the first legislation to ban ethnic divisionism, the political system was considerably different than what Twagiramungu had hoped. The 1995 Kibeho Massacre, along with a diminished role in policymaking, led Twagiramungu to speak out against the post-Genocide government. He increasingly claimed that Hutus within the government were either puppets or their ethnic concerns were ignored. Recall that Twagiramungu grew up in Rwanda’s ethnic divisions, which had always not only favoured Hutus but acknowledged ethnic partitions. This radically differed from the RPF’s desired social belief, which dismissed ethnic divisionism to foster the unifying social norm of Ndi Umunyarwanda, loosely translated as ‘I am a Rwandan.’ While the policy would come into existence years later, the institutional foundation for social unity began shortly after the installation of the post-Genocide government.

Twagiramungu resigned as Prime Minister on 28th August 1995. He claimed it was a result of the Kibeho Massacre. However, this is not the whole answer, as he would never have longed for this new political landscape. Unlike those such as the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Vincent Biruta, a member of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) and saved by the RPA’s 3rd Battalion during the Genocide, he still felt that the pre-Genocide political atmosphere of Rwanda still existed. Fundamentally, it was gone, and he became somewhat of a dinosaur of a past political environment that no longer existed. The RPF were the winners of the Liberation and Campaign against Genocide War and thus set the tone for Rwanda’s political system. Even that system did not last long as by 2000, Paul Kagame began his Presidency, which continues until today. Rwanda’s political landscape would never return to the early 1990s.

Life outside Rwanda:

Twagiramungu departed Rwanda for Belgium in March 1996. It was there he created the oppositional party, Democratic Forces for Resistance, in 1997. Working with other exiled movements and former political leaders of the Habyarimana regime, he tried to mount a serious campaign against the RPF. However, there would be little hope for proper coordination as the widely different political parties, each holding various beliefs, never unified.

Despite Twagiramungu’s lack of recognition of the shifting political landscape and greatly diminished role for him and his party, he nevertheless attempted to run for President as an Independent during the 2003 Presidential Elections. His platform focused on economic issues and questioned the RPF’s social messages. He ran as an Independent as the MDR party became banned months before the election. The Rwandan government responded that its ban resulted from continued belief in ethnic divisionism. However, some members formed a new party, the Party for Progress and Concord (PPC), which currently has one representative in the Chamber of Deputies. As expected, Twagiramungu lost the election to President Kagame, winning just under 140,000 votes compared to his opponent, who won over 3.5 million. While international observers claimed election interference, there was little chance for Twagiramungu to win the election.

By 2003, Rwanda’s political landscape had changed again. President Kagame was now in control, and the nation would see changes towards economic growth, increased access to education and healthcare, and what Rwandans tell me is their most pressing concern: security. The political dynamics found in Rwanda in the early 1990s were now impossible to recreate. Additionally, Rwandans became somewhat sceptical of Western constructs of political liberalisation, which was perceived as a reason for Hutu extremist parties and actors gaining the power to conduct the Genocide against the Tutsi. Political landscapes had changed not just in Rwanda but throughout central and eastern Africa.

Despite the seeming rejection of Twagiramungu in 2003, it did not end his political ambitions. He formed the Rwandan Dream Initiative (RDI) in 2010. He later combined the party with others, including the Democratic Republic Liberation for Rwanda (FDLR), which contains remnant genocide forces, to form the Coalition of Political Parties for Change (CPC). The CPC’s inclusion of the FDLR is highly problematic as the Hutu extremist rebel force in eastern Congo holds policies containing Rwanda’s return to ethnic divisionism and ‘finishing’ the Genocide. The party collapsed within a year, but he remained President of the RDI party. However, he continued to be accused of being aligned with the FDLR’s genocide ideology. Until his final days, Twagiramungu continued to be active on social media, criticising the Rwandan government President Kagame and denying important facts about the Genocide against the Tutsi. He became an advocate of the false ‘Double Genocide’ theory, which claims the RPA committed their Genocide.

Twagiramungu’s Significance Today?

Twagiramungu’s recent passing holds little significance in Rwanda. Most Rwandans I talked to while conducting fieldwork either knew little about him (just that he was a Prime Minister and critic of the government) or were not interested. He is seen as a relic of the past or a historical footnote who did not adapt to Rwanda’s shifted political landscape. He also offered little to Rwandans who were satisfied with the status quo under the RPF. The stability the RPF brought to Rwanda should not be so easily dismissed. Rwandan informants often comment on how Global North critics live a privileged life of security, which leads to the great benefit of not knowing what it seriously means to have their lives at risk. The political luxuries in the Global North take time to develop, with most Rwandans expressing their satisfaction with the political stability even if it is not perfect.

Twagiramungu and his oppositional political successors, such as Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, try to operate within a Rwandan landscape that does not exist anymore. Most Rwandans, especially the growing Millennial and Generation Z population, are not interested in the political pluralism in the Global North or Rwanda during the early 1990s. While critics of the Rwandan government will quickly dismiss this notion, their voices do not represent the ones residing in Rwanda. Rwandans frequently express their views of Rwandan politics to me, often with many complaints from local officials or scandals. However, very few want President Kagame to be replaced. Instead, many express their concerns if President Kagame steps down in the near future.

Twagiramungu, Victoire Ingabire and others see Rwanda through the lens of the early 1990s rather than Rwanda in 2023. This is why their political impact on Rwanda will remain negligible at best.