Tag: Politics

DRC and Rwanda sign a US-brokered peace deal: what are the chances of its success?

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date Jun 30, 2025
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Jonathan Beloff, King’s College London

The foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed a new peace agreement on 27 June 2025 under the auspices of the US.

The agreement aims to foster long-term peace, and increased economic trade and security. The DRC is one of Africa’s largest nations, with over 110 million people. Rwanda has a population of 14 million.

After three decades of war and tensions between the two neighbours since the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the hope is that this agreement will establish the foundations for progress that benefits both nations.

It was the Donald Trump administration’s moment to illustrate the effectiveness of its “transactional” foreign policy, focused on exchanges and short-term benefits for each actor.

Most of the agreement’s details remained undisclosed until its signing. One aspect that’s surfaced was the claim that the DRC abandoned its demand for the removal of Rwandan soldiers from its territory. The Congolese government, research groups and the UN have accused Rwanda of supplying military aid, including soldiers, to the March 23 Movement (M23), which has been at war with the government in Kinshasa since 2021. The Rwandan government denies any active involvement but has some sympathies for the Congolese rebel group.

Under the June 2025 agreement, each side provided concessions and demands that are perhaps easier said than done. Both countries also want to show the Trump administration their willingness to negotiate and make a deal. This is in the hopes of future deals with the US, which Trump has remained vague on.

The DRC has immense mineral wealth, including gold, diamonds, tungsten, coltan, tin and lithium. These latter minerals are used in computer chips, batteries and other technologies.

The question is whether this latest agreement will lead to peace in the DRC. The likely answer is no, based on research on instability in the eastern DRC, Rwandan foreign policy and the security and political dynamics between Rwanda and the DRC for over 15 years.

This is mainly because

key players involved in the crisis were left out of negotiations
no provisions are made for enforcement
the opportunities for US companies remain questionable given the lack of security in the mining regions.

The roots of the crisis

After the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, former genocide perpetrators used the DRC’s vast size as cover to plan attacks on Rwanda. They intended to return to Rwanda to finish the genocide. The consequences led to the First Congo War (1996-1997) and the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

It was during the bloody Second War that the DRC was carved up by multiple rebel groups aligned with various nations and political actors. The UN accuses Rwanda and Uganda of carrying out a massive illegal mineral trade. Both nations deny this.

The consequences of the conflict are still felt over 20 years later. Despite multiple peace agreements, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, an estimated 120 rebel groups remain active in the Congo.

One of them, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), aims to return Rwanda to ethnic division and the genocide. The Rwandan government fears the group’s genocide and hate ideology.

Additionally, the FDLR and other extremist actors such as Wazalendo target the Banyarwanda. This ethnic group, residing primarily in eastern DRC, is historically related to Rwanda. It has been the target of attacks, which have forced tens of thousands of people to flee into Rwanda.

These attacks led to the resurrection of the M23. Despite its failures in 2013, the M23 scored major advances in late 2021 in response to attacks on the Banyarwanda. The rebel group led a successful military campaign that occupied large swathes of territory in eastern DRC.

Their success is largely attributed to the Rwandan Defence Forces, despite Kigali denying this claim.

Concessions from each nation

The latest peace agreement addresses the security, political and economic interests of both nations.

The specifics are still unavailable. However, several assumptions based on the framework and leaked reports can be made.

The first is that both nations must respect each other’s territorial sovereignty and stop aiding rebel forces. This will include joint security coordination, and working with the existing UN peacekeeping mission. Additionally, Congolese refugees who fled eastern DRC – estimated to be over 80,000 – will be allowed to return. Finally, the two nations will establish mechanisms to foster greater economic integration.

The DRC has also signalled its willingness to attract American investors. DRC’s vast mineral wealth remains largely underdeveloped. American investment could develop mining that’s safer and extracts larger amounts of minerals than current methods. Kinshasa has also agreed to combat corruption and simplify the tax system.

While most of these incentives would be aimed at mineral extraction companies, they also include private security firms. The Congolese military’s inability to defeat the M23 highlights a problematic security environment that some in the DRC believe can be addressed through foreign intervention. However, these security guarantees are still relatively unknown and face complications that could affect the success of any agreement.

The weaknesses

There are a number of reasons this latest agreement is unlikely to lead to peace.

First, the M23 did not participate in the negotiations. Given that they are the primary military actor in eastern DRC, their commitment to a peace process cannot be guaranteed.

Second, other rebel forces in different parts of the country will feel left out too. They could see this agreement as an opportunity to press for greater concessions from the Congolese government.

Third, there are few mechanisms to enforce the agreement. Since the Second Congo War, there have been multiple treaties, agreements and disarmament programmes with little success. The Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and the DRC in 2002 did not lead to long-term peace. The M23’s name is a nod to their anger over a failed 2009 agreement. In 2024, Rwanda and Congo nearly reached an agreement under Angola’s mediation, but Angola stepped down. The process was then taken over by Qatar and later the US.

Lastly, American investors may be deterred by the security, regulatory and corruption issues that plague the DRC. Even if the Congolese government promises to address these issues, it lacks the necessary capabilities to fulfil its commitment.

Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Tags africa, DRC, news, Politics, Rwanda

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Early Thoughts on the Rwanda-DRC Agreement

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date Jun 28, 2025
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This was written prior to the release of the Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda framework.

On June 27, 2025, Congolese and Rwandan officials signed an agreement that some hope will lead to stability and peace between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. The ongoing crisis in eastern DRC has been somewhat overlooked, as much international attention is focused on events within the Middle East. For the Trump Administration, the agreement is an example of its shifting foreign relations, especially with the Global South, from the previous administration’s ‘humanitarian approach’ towards a ‘transactional’ foreign policy. The question of whether this new agreement will lead to long-term security and peace within the region is questionable.

DRC and Rwanda’s Complex Relationship:

Summarising Rwanda and the DRC’s relationship is near impossible. Over the past thirty years, the two nations witnessed the aftereffects of the Genocide against the Tutsi, First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars, conflicts with and often between irregular (rebel) fighters, failed agreements, corruption, and so much more. After the Genocide against the Tutsi, when up to a million Rwandan Tutsis and non-extremist Hutus were murdered in one hundred days, it led to a mass exodus of Rwandan Hutus fearing a double genocide, which never happened. Over two million Rwandan refugees fled to eastern DRC, at the time known as Zaire, and resided in horrific conditions. While former Zarian dictator Joseph-Désiré Mobutu welcomed the refugees, he did so with less than altruistic reasons. He saw those people and the growing humanitarian crisis as a way to regain favour with Western nations who recently abandoned him after the end of the Cold War.

For Rwanda, the refugees were not composed solely of civilians. Entangled within the mass refugee camps were the remnants of the leaders and orchestrators of the recent genocide. Rwanda’s genocide only ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) under General (now President) Paul Kagame, defeated the Rwandan military, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and genocide actors. Many who were defeated fled into Zaire to regroup and plan for their return. However, their goal to return to Rwanda to continue the genocide would never happen. Rather, in October 1996, a coalition of multiple national forces initiated the First Congo War, which ended with the capture of Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, and the removal of Joseph Mobutu, with Laurent Kabila replacing him as President. Despite the forces being labelled as an internal organisation, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), it was a predominantly Rwandan-led operation. General (at the time Colonel) James Kabarebe was not only the leader of the invasion but also became the Minister of Defence under the new Congolese government. More importantly, Rwandan refugees returned, with human rights groups citing classification as being forced, with former genocide leaders either killed, captured or forced deeper in the harsh jungles. Many former Rwandan military soldiers who had fought against the RPA reintegrated into the new Rwandan military, with notable examples including the current Minister of Defence, Juvenal Marizamunda, and the Minister in charge of Emergency Management, Albert Murasira.

However, the conflict did not come to an end. Rifts began between the two nations. Congolese officials began accusing Rwanda of treating the new government as a puppet rather than an equal partner. Laurent Kabila would sack Kabarebe and dismiss Rwandans from not only his government but from Congo. Rwanda began to worry that their new ally was repeating his predecessor’s errors by supporting remnants of the genocide forces. Various incarnations of genocide forces, such as the Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (AliR) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), appeared to receive support from the Congolese government. What ignited the Second Congo War is hotly debated. Nevertheless, it ignited a war that continues to this day. Rwanda’s inability to formulate a similar successful coalition, as it had done just years prior, led to a fractured DRC with various rebel groups, allied to specific governments, countries, or interests, carving up the country. The trade of conflict minerals became so great that ‘New Wars’ theory began to overshadow traditional understandings of warfare. By October 2002, peace agreements had been signed between various governments and actors, ultimately leading to the end of the war. However, the instability remains.

The nation remains very divided between the Congolese government and over one hundred rebel forces. Many of these irregular actors are Mai Mai, composed of localised militias, which protect specific cities, villages, or regions. However, there are roughly forty to fifty major forces, such as the previously mentioned FDLR, who participate in mineral smuggling, harassment of villages, massacring of different Congolese ethnic groups and much more. The FDLR, along with Wazalendo, residing in the jungles of eastern DRC, often target the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge populations. These groups, historically related to Rwanda, faced significant persecution with the Congolese government either ignoring or even at times aiding in the violence. Despite the Umoja Wetu military operation between Rwandan and Congolese forces, elements of the FDLR remained and eventually regrouped. This would lead to the resurrection of the March 23 Movement, better known as the M23.

Who are the M23?

Like many Congolese rebel groups, the M23’s history is complex as it evolved from former rebel forces. As I wrote in a previous publication, the origins of the M23 date back to the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), which later evolved into the RCD-Goma. After the Congo Wars, it became the Congrès National Pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). Eventually, in 2009, CNDP leaders signed several agreements with the Congolese government, allowing them to become part of the Congolese military and political institutions. The last major agreement, signed on March 23, did not yield a satisfactory outcome for the former fighters. Many believed the Congolese government had not honoured the agreement with their populations, composed mainly of the Banyarwanda, still targeted by former genocide forces and facing increasing discrimination.

Thus, in 2012, the remains of the CNDP, under the leadership of Bosco Ntaganda, Makenga Sultani, and Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, among others, formed the M23. The new rebel force’s name, March 23, is a nod to what they perceive as the Congolese government’s failures to honour past agreements. Despite some successes, the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the specific Foreign Intervention Brigade (FIB), was able to essentially defeat the forces. Many fled to Uganda and Rwanda. During their short rise to regional power, even occupying Goma for a day or so, the United Nations Group of Experts for the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNGoE) accused Rwanda and Uganda, to a lesser extent, of aiding the M23. Similar to the Congo Wars, they accuse Rwanda of supporting the M23 in order to gain valuable minerals to boost the bank accounts of military officials (as in the case of Uganda) or to advance national development (as in the case of Rwanda). However, both governments denied the accusation.

Despite the M23’s earlier defeat, increased persecution of the Banyarwanda led to the resurrection of the former rebel group. While the current Global North narratives blame Rwanda for the current M23, the rebel’s military leadership crossed from Uganda into Congo. Many who had previously fled to Rwanda would not be in the initial operations seen on November 7, 2021. One former M23 fighter, who had fled to Rwanda, privately expressed concern that Rwandan officials were monitoring their actions to prevent them from rejoining the group. Nevertheless, the international community accuses Rwanda of aiding the M23. Some of the accusations include the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) providing military equipment, logistical support and even up to 4000 soldiers to the rebels. However, the available evidence has been relatively poor, with vague evidence, innuendo, and a reliance on historical narratives.

Even one researcher from the African Great Lakes region, a critic of Rwanda, admitted privately that they had no evidence to support their accusations but assumed Rwanda was involved due to the past Congo Wars. Even the evidence of Rwandan military active participation relies on pictures of African soldiers, with no means to verify whether they are Rwandan or Congolese. One could argue that they could be from any African military. Nevertheless, Rwanda is accused of being the mastermind of the conflict. As I wrote in a previous publication, I believe that much of the criticism of Rwanda stems from a lack of understanding of strategic theory, military operations, and tactics among humanitarians and researchers. Despite the semi-pedestal they are placed upon, researchers explaining a war from thousands of miles away, with little or no experience of actual warfare, will often rely on existing narratives to explain a complex situation. However, this trap is not composed solely of those criticising Rwanda for the M23 (but that is another story to be told for a different day).

But why does Kinshasa perceive the M23, and particularly President Felix Tshisekedi, when there are multiple other major and minor rebel groups causing chaos throughout the DRC? While there are multiple reasons for the Congolese government’s focus on the M23, a significant part of it deals with the rebel group’s success. Unlike in 2012, the M23’s successes are much greater. They occupy large areas of eastern DRC, including the regional capital city of Goma. Unlike their actions a decade ago, the M23 are positioning themselves as a legitimate alternative to Congolese governance. One of their greatest targets has been against the existing systems of corruption by establishing new policies for governance. Stories (which I have not been able to confirm independently) illustrate how the M23’s policies include paying civil servants, many of whom had not been paid in months, actual policing of neighbourhoods, combating bribery, and constructing infrastructure such as roads and water pipes. This focus on public policy is radically different from a decade ago, when its motivations were unclear. Thus, it was easier to accuse the M23 of being like many other rebel forces, i.e., focusing on protecting their ethnic brothers and sisters, illegal mineral trade and the power search. Unlike in the past, the M23 seemed to have incorporated governance and security as key elements within their overall strategy.

Trump and Africa:

What does this conflict have to do with President Trump, more specifically, why does he care about it? The answer to this question may be known only by the President himself. His relationship with African countries ranges from calling some ‘sh-thole countries‘, forcing the trade of used clothing and most recently, showing a video to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, the racist proclamations made by some within his governing coalition. However, both the DRC and Rwanda can spark President Trump’s interest.

The first reason why President Trump’s interest stems from economic opportunities. The vast DRC contains large deposits of rare earth minerals, such as gold, coltan, and lithium, which are essential for modern technological devices. Congo’s mineral wealth is largely a curse as it is a root cause for much of the corruption and underdevelopment since colonisation. Mobutu’s rise to power largely stemmed from his promises to guarantee Western companies access to valuable mines at the expense of, not his wealth, but of the nation. This trend continued in future governments and persists to this day. Fundamentally, it is challenging for many Western companies to invest properly in the DRC, as a substantial budget is required to address the extensive corruption. The cost of corruption disincentivises investment, with only a handful of companies willing to deal with the constant need to pay off government officials. Soon after President Trump’s re-election in November 2024, President Tshisekedi allegedly attempted to establish inroads with the incoming Trump administration by offering unfettered access to Congo’s mineral wealth in exchange for the US to withdraw its support for Rwanda. President Trump’s mineral agreement with Ukraine only aided in this belief. However, there are some elements of truth to this concept.

President Trump’s focus on ‘transactional’ foreign policy and increasing the American economy leads to the opening of trade deals for Congo’s mineral access. Nevertheless, the agreement is not as easy at first sight. Congo’s corruption and overly complex tax revenue process are a headache too significant for many American companies to handle. The new Rwanda-DRC agreement contains provisions to simplify the tax code for foreign investment. Additionally, the Congolese military, particularly in light of its numerous defeats at the hands of the M23, is unable to provide adequate security. American companies will need to factor in how they protect their investments from the multiple rebel forces that exist throughout the country.

Rwanda’s unique role within American foreign policy in the region also aids Trump’s interest. Since the end of the genocide, Rwanda positioned itself as an ally of the US and the United Kingdom compared to its past relationship with Belgium and France. Former US President Bill Clinton classified Paul Kagame as one of the new faces of Africa during the 1990s. Even during the Congo Wars, Rwanda continued to receive support from the US. After those conflicts, Rwanda repositioned itself as an important ally for the West in terms of proper utilisation of foreign aid and contribution to peacekeeping. This last aspect is critical for the US. While there are debates about the extent to which the famed ‘Mogadishu Line’ still exists, there is an intense desire by American officials not to have US soldiers fight in African conflicts. Thus, Rwanda positioned itself since the end of the Second Congo War as willing and, more importantly, able to provide the necessary forces in African conflicts. Since the early 2000s, Rwandan soldiers have been sent to Mali, Darfur, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mozambique. Unlike other peacekeeping contributing nations, Rwandan soldiers are well-equipped, trained, and willing to engage antagonistic forces to bring about stability and peace militarily. For President Trump, Rwanda can be seen, as his predecessors have, as a force on the ground, rather than an American one. This aligns with the recent Israel-Iran war, with Israel providing much of the military forces in the air combat zones. The recent US bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites came about after Israel secured Iranian airspace. For African conflicts, Rwanda can serve as a similar role model.

Lastly, President Trump’s ego is well-known with an eye towards the Nobel Peace Prize. He perceives himself as a dealmaker above all else. The conflict presents an opportunity for his administration to be the dealmakers and perhaps resolve a crisis that began decades ago and continues to rage. Despite a majority of Americans being barely aware of the DRC crisis, an agreement can be depicted as a foreign policy ‘win’ not only for him but also for his ‘transactional’ foreign policy. But will it lead to actual peace?

Will the Peace Last?

Will this agreement between Rwanda and the DRC lead to sustained peace? Probably, no. There are multiple concessions made by both the Rwandan and Congolese, but the question is how they are enforced. The Congolese will take Rwandan security concerns, specifically the FDLR, seriously and withdraw their support from those forces. But how can the Congolese military achieve these goals? Its military has shown an inability not only to fight the M23 but also to control its forces. The M23’s name is based on a failed peace agreement between the CNDP and the DRC government. Additionally, there is the promise that the Banyarwanda will be better protected. However, members of the President Felix Tshisekedi coalition, which keeps him in power, have and continue to express their hatred for the Banyarwanda. Will he be willing to clamp down on this rhetoric even if it risks his political power?

Another question is how the Congolese government try to entice American investment, something that the Trump Administration will monitor closely. While American companies will face fewer barriers to entry when investing in the DRC, along with reduced bribery requirements and a commitment to combat corruption, how will this be implemented? The means to enact these changes are beyond the current Congolese political and governance infrastructure. For over half a century, corruption has been the primary means by which the Congo state operates, and to change that requires time, money, and political will that are severely lacking in Kinshasa.

The Rwandan agreement to honour Congolese sovereignty is relatively minor, as the primary security threats within the DRC do not come from outside actors but from within. As mentioned earlier, the DRC comprises over 100 rebel forces, each with its own distinct strategic objectives. If we accept the narrative that Rwanda supports the M23, removing the M23 does little to address the systemic issues of poor governance, corruption, Mai Mai, underdevelopment, and a lack of nationwide infrastructure. The securitisation of Rwanda is great political theatre in Kinshasa, but does little to solve Congolese problems.

Rwanda’s engagement in the negotiations appears to be more akin to playing a political game. They know that the Trump Administration wants a deal even if it is doomed to fail. Rather than try to fight it by describing the complexities of Congo’s problems, they would rather depict themselves as negotiating in good will to show President Trump that they can be trusted. Rwanda appears not to want to be the one who states the apparent past failures of Congolese peace agreements with internal and regional actors. Rather, let them be seen as the ones who kept their end of the deal when the DRC inevitably fails to uphold their side. This could be due to Congolese officials again aiding the FDLR, American investments being unprotected by various rebel forces, or the M23 not submitting to Kinshasa’s authority.

Lastly, the agreement will likely fail because the M23 were not part of the negotiations. No matter the accusations made by humanitarian groups and activists, the M23 are an independent actor with their own policy, goals, and objectives. They will enact policies through strategies to achieve their desired outcomes. While Kinsasha has promised more autonomy for eastern Congo, which benefits the M23 as the de facto governing actor in the region, how long will this last? Conceding autonomy to eastern DRC will be seen by some or most of President Tshisekedi’s supporters as an admission to the M23 and Rwanda. After years of securitising the M23, Rwanda and the Banyarwanda, there will be many within the DRC who are not willing to concede an inch of power to the M23, despite not even controlling the region.

I hope I am wrong, and this agreement leads to some sort of stability and peace within the region. The Congolese are victims of their rich mineral wealth, geographical challenges, and, most importantly, poor political leadership.

Tags africa, DRC, M23, news, Politics, Rwanda, Trump

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Rwanda and Belgium are at odds over the DRC: what’s led to the latest low point

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date Mar 31, 2025
No Comments on Rwanda and Belgium are at odds over the DRC: what’s led to the latest low point

Jonathan Beloff, King’s College London

Rwanda’s foreign affairs ministry suspended all diplomatic relations with Belgium in March 2025. Soon afterwards, Belgium expelled Rwandan diplomats. This came weeks after Belgium had suspended foreign aid to Rwanda. At the root of this diplomatic fallout is the resurgence of the rebel group, March 23 Movement (M23), which has made recent military gains in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Prior to Rwanda suspending diplomatic relations, President Paul Kagame accused Belgium of continually undermining Rwanda. This deterioration in Rwanda-Belgium relations illustrates decades of the Kagame regime’s lack of trust in Brussels since the 1994 genocide. Jonathan Beloff, who has studied Rwanda’s political, security and foreign policies for nearly two decades, explains.

What is the historical relationship between Rwanda and Belgium?

Belgium is perhaps better known for having colonised the Congo. However, it also colonised present-day Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi.

Belgian forces conquered Rwanda, a former German colony, in 1916 during the first world war. They got help from nearby British forces in Uganda. The Treaty of Versailles, which brought an end to the world war, officially transferred Rwanda and Burundi to Belgium’s colonial holdings.

While Rwanda was never a significant interest for the Belgian colonial authorities compared to neighbouring Congo, Brussels nevertheless helped shape Rwandan politics, economy and society for decades.

Rwanda’s current government claims that ethnic divisions of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa only came to the foreground during Belgian colonial rule, which ended in 1962. Before German and Belgian colonisation, Rwandan officials described these communities as socio-economic groupings rather than ethnicities. It was only with the introduction of ethnic identification cards in 1933 that these groups became intractable ethnicities.

During much of its rule, Belgium used the existing political structures of kings, called Mwami, to carry out colonial policies.

While a majority of Tutsis and Hutus suffered under these policies, Belgian officials often blamed the Mwami and his courts. The Mwami was often a Tutsi based on the number of cattle he owned. This led to a growing anti-Tutsi sentiment within the majority Hutu population.

Eventually, it boiled over and led to the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the 1961 Coup of Gitarama. This anti-Tutsi sentiment established much of the political order following Rwandan independence in July 1962.

What key moments have shaped the relationship?

Prior to Rwandan independence, Belgium’s political allegiance shifted away from the mostly Tutsi Mwami and their power base to the growing Hutu movement. Under Rwanda’s Hutu leader and later first post-independence president Grégoire Kayibanda, Belgium began favouring Hutus. The community got increased education opportunities. Its leaders were given more say over post-colonial political events than the Mwami and his court.

Rwanda-Belgium relations focused on promoting the majority Hutu population, despite some discontent from conservative, mostly Tutsi, actors. With independence, Belgium played an important but diminishing role. It did not provide the financial support Kigali wanted. In response, Kigali turned to France, whose influence grew significantly under President Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994).

Despite their diminished state, relations between Rwanda and Belgium were still important. Belgium became the primary western nation to help provide stability in Rwanda during the waning years of the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), known locally as the Liberation War.

A peace deal in 1993, called the Arusha Accords, between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Habyarimana regime paved the way for a UN mission. However, getting western nations to send soldiers for the mission proved difficult. This was after a peacekeeping disaster in Somalia (the Battle of Mogadishu) earlier that year. As a result, Belgium ended up providing the bulk of troops for the Rwanda mission.

The assassination of Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 triggered the Genocide against the Tutsi. The UN mission’s commander sent a platoon to guard the home of prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The platoon had 10 Belgian and five Ghanaian soldiers. They were captured when Rwandan Presidential Guard officers stormed Uwilingiyimana’s home and killed her.

The Ghanaian soldiers were released relatively unharmed, while the Belgian soldiers were killed at the Camp Kigali military base. The murders were intended to provoke the UN mission’s withdrawal from Rwanda. Belgian troops departed within the genocide’s first week. This allowed Rwanda’s genocide to run uninterrupted for 100 days until the Rwandan Patriotic Front stopped it in July 1994.

Since the genocide, the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front has had a sceptical view of Belgium. In 2000, former prime minister Guy Verhofstadt apologised for Belgium’s failure to stop the genocide and for fostering ethnic divisions during the colonial period.

Nevertheless, many Rwandan officials still believe Brussels hasn’t done enough to acknowledge its colonial record.

What’s behind the current fallout?

The current diplomatic crisis erupted because of accusations of Rwandan involvement in eastern DRC. UN experts’ reports have accused Rwanda of supporting the reanimated M23. The rebel group has captured large swathes of eastern DRC.

Belgium has been leading calls for European sanctions against Rwanda for this involvement. However, Rwanda – which denies supporting the M23 – claims that Belgium’s accusations are aimed at gaining favourable mining rights in the DRC.

Relations between the two countries have been deteriorating steadily in 2025. In February, Rwanda suspended a five-year (2024-2029) €95 million (US$102.8 million) deal. This was one of the largest aid deals between the two countries. In March, in addition to the suspension of diplomatic ties, the Rwanda Governance Board, which registers and monitors non-governmental organisations, placed restrictions on NGOs receiving financial support from Belgium.

What’s the impact of this diplomatic falling out?

Rwanda-Belgium relations have never broken down to the current level.

It is unlikely to last in the long term. Like many other donor nations, Belgium needs Rwanda as a case study for proper aid utilisation and for its contribution to African peacekeeping.

Rwanda is Africa’s most active troop-contributing country to UN missions and the fourth most active worldwide. Its primary political, security and economic allies remain the United States and the United Kingdom. While relations with these two nations are strained, they’re not at the level reached with Belgium.

Nevertheless, the current state of affairs will continue in the near future unless the M23 is defeated. The only available avenues for quick restoration of relations are if Belgium apologises for seemingly siding with the DRC over Rwanda in the conflict in eastern Congo and repeats its apology for its colonial legacy. Neither of these options seems likely in the short term.

Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Tags belgium, DRC, M23, Politics, Rwanda

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Review: Modern Rwanda: A Political History

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date Mar 23, 2025
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Filip Reyntjens. Modern Rwanda: A Political History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. $30.99. Paper. ISBN: 9781009284486.

Rwanda is perhaps best known for its experiences during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, more commonly known as the Rwandan Genocide. Since the end of the genocide, researchers flocked to the small African nation to better understand what led to the massacres and how the society rebuilt itself. The level of success to which Rwanda rebuilds itself since the genocide is hotly debated. Reyntjens is perhaps one of the most known scholars and critics of Rwanda. Despite not visiting Rwanda since October 1994, he continues to write on Rwanda’s politics and human rights. His new book somewhat differs from much of his current research, focusing mostly on Rwanda’s pre-colonial and colonial history.

The book is divided into seven chapters, excluding the Introduction and Conclusion. After the Introduction, the book’s first chapter examines the pre-colonial history of Rwanda. Reyntjens illustrates the complexities of this period of Rwandan history, which is mainly unexplored compared to the genocide but heavily debated within Rwandan studies. The current Rwandan government often describes this period as relatively tranquil, with no Tutsi, Hutu and Twa divisions. However, this chapter problematises this perception to indicate how not only did these ethnic divisions exist but also how the pre-colonial Rwandan state was not as united and uniform as described. The following two chapters explain how Germany and Belgium influenced and engaged with colonial Rwanda. The fourth chapter describes the final years of colonisation with the rise of the Hutu Revolution and independence. Despite somewhat minimising the human suffering during this period for Rwanda’s Tutsis, the chapter exceeds in clearly categorising the political turmoil and actors of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The final three chapters examine Rwanda’s political history since independence. The First (1962-1973) and Second (1973-1994) Republics are described in terms of historical narratives that do not focus on explaining the genocide. Rather, chapter five provides a purer form of political-historical analysis to understand that historical period rather than how it led to the genocide. Chapter six briefly examines the Rwandan Civil War and the genocide. The final chapter, before the book’s conclusion, contains Reyntjens’ harsh critiques of Rwanda since the genocide. His attention is not on describing the complexities of governance under the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) as he did with ruling elites in the previous chapters. Instead, his focus is to repeat previously published claims of how the ruling RPF conducts human rights violations both inside and outside Rwanda. In all of the book’s chapters, his seventh chapter on Rwanda’s post-genocide governance feels the most disconnected from the rest as it lacks the same nuance as in previous chapters.

While there is no doubt this book will be used as a major source on Rwandan politics, it does contain some issues that need to be at least mentioned. The majority of this book is unique in providing a relatively straightforward description of early Rwandan history, both before and during colonisation. However, many of its citations stem from somewhat older sources, with only a few exceptions, such as Jan Vansina’s 2004 book Antecedents to Modern Rwanda[1]. There is also an underlying problem in how Reyntjens seems to downplay the suffering that occurred during and after the Hutu Revolution against Rwandan Tutsis and others who did not align with the Hutu ideological movement during much of the country’s independence and up until the genocide. It reads as a setup to later try to criticise the RPF’s governance by establishing a narrative of how things are worse now in Rwanda than decades ago.

His criticisms of present-day Rwanda read more like an overview of other research, as his lack of fieldwork experience severely limited the practical realities of the complex nature of Rwandan politics within the nation. Fundamentally, one can only write so much insight into the current political dynamics while writing from Europe. The book’s methodology is the first topic covered in the Introduction, but it never addresses the issues found in Chapter Seven, which is either an incomplete or problematic illustration of Rwanda today as it relies solely upon observations from afar rather than proper fieldwork.

One of the primary claims made against Reyntjens by Rwandans is his involvement in the 1978 constitution. This constitution legitimised former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s grip on power by establishing a one-party state along with the discriminatory quota system against Rwandan Tutsis. Supporters of the RPF often cite Reyntjens’ involvement in drafting the constitution with little supporting evidence. While reading the fifth chapter he does not address this accusation by writing, “space forbids a detailed analysis of the constitution” (page 114). This is despite him being a legal and constitutional specialist. However, in the following chapter, on page 146, he has space to write a subsection on the number of genocide victims. While this might seem a minor issue, it illustrates a missed opportunity for Reyntjens to refute some of the significant and damning claims made against him. It was an overlooked opportunity to provide a new element within his vast work on Rwanda.

Reyntjens’ new book on Rwanda’s political history will undoubtedly be a much-used text in criticising Rwanda’s government and perception of the nation’s history. The book’s greatest strength is its clarity in describing the complex issues and history of Rwanda’s pre-colonial and colonial history. Its description of the political dynamics between former President Grégoire Kayibanda and Dominique Mbonyumutwa is unique in terms of clarity. However, the examination of modern Rwandan politics faces the issues found in his other publications, a lack of actual observational data collected from conducting proper fieldwork.

[1] Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2004.

Tags africa, Genocide, history, Kagame, Politics, Reyntjens, Rwanda

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Rwanda: Paul Kagame’s fourth term as president – what his agenda will need to cover

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date Aug 23, 2024
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Jonathan Beloff, King’s College London

Paul Kagame started his fourth term as Rwanda’s president in August 2024. He first became president in April 2000. However, as the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, he has been the country’s de facto head since his rebel forces ended the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

The Rwanda that Kagame now leads is significantly different from the one he took over in 2000. While economic challenges continue, the nation is largely more socially and politically stable and secure.

Rwanda still has a long way to go in its public-sector-led development – the country has set out to become a middle-income country by 2035 and high-income by 2050. Inequalities between the capital city Kigali and the rest of the country continue to grow. Rwanda still faces threats from the remains of the forces behind the 1994 genocide and growing tensions with neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Kagame faces the challenge of ensuring national stability as the foundation for economic growth and security. He also faces regional challenges, especially in Burundi and DRC, with questions surrounding their support for anti-Rwandan forces. This especially includes the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) based in eastern DRC.

I have studied Rwanda’s political development, security landscape and foreign policy since 2008. In my view, Kagame’s primary agenda for his new term will be increased state-building and capacity, regional policy and continuing national stability.

Success for Kagame over the next five years should be a Rwanda closer to reaching its middle-income plan, with a better run government bureaucracy to implement public policy and distribute social services. Hopefully the neighbourhood will be more peaceful too.

Building state institutions

Rwanda’s development requires additional investment and economic growth, as well as better functioning state institutions. The country is currently classified as a low-income economy. Kagame will continue to be the nation’s primary ambassador for its commercial diplomacy and build the state’s institutional capacity for national development.

The continued construction of the Rwandan state includes developing government institutions to implement public policy and governance. Many new bureaucrats and leaders within government offices are part of Rwanda’s generation of millennials who hope to become Rwanda’s future. This would help move the country away from a reliance on established but older officials.

The extent to which government boards, ministries and organisations become effective could determine the future of Rwandan politics. Some Rwandan Patriotic Front members believe that a post-Kagame Rwanda will not necessarily have another single strong leader, but rather institutions capable of carrying out public policy and governing the country.

Building up state institutions would help deliver on the nation’s development plans. Vision 2020 and Vision 2050 are hinged on providing security, education, universal healthcare and growing cash crop exports like coffee and tea.

Tense regional context

Rwanda’s growth relies on securing its borders. In his inauguration speech, Kagame noted the importance of addressing regional security threats and sources of instability. The most pressing of these are the deteriorating relationship with neighbouring Burundi and the long-running conflict in the DRC.

Over the past two years, relations between Rwanda and Burundi have declined as Burundian president Évariste Ndayishimiye has developed closer ties with DRC president Felix Tshisekedi.

In January 2024, Ndayishimiye closed Burundi’s border with Rwanda. He accused his northern neighbour of contributing to the growing instability in eastern DRC by supporting the M23 rebel group. He also accused Kigali of aiding in the training of the Red Tabara rebel group, which has been fighting the Burundi government since 2015.

The deteriorating security situation in eastern DRC has led to growing tensions between Kagame and Tshisekedi, who has previously called the Rwandan leader “Hitler”. Tshisekedi also threatened to invade Rwanda, accusing the country of meddling in Kinshasa’s affairs. The UN has accused Rwanda of aiding the M23 rebels, which Kigali has denied.

Since 2021, increased attacks against the Banyarwanda community in eastern DRC by various rebel groups and the Congolese military have led to a revival of the M23. The rebel group was largely defeated in 2013. It claims to be fighting for the rights of the Banyarwanda.

Congolese government officials, such as higher education minister Muhindo Nzangi, have called for greater military action by the Congolese military and civilians against the M23, Rwanda and the Banyarwanda community. While Kagame consistently calls the issue domestic for the DRC, there is growing concern in Rwanda for the Banyarwanda, whom some see as being at risk of experiencing genocide akin to Rwandans in 1994.

As it stands, tensions between Rwanda and the DRC have led to several border skirmishes. For instance, a Congolese fighter jet was shot at by Rwandan military forces in January 2023. Two months later, a Congolese soldier was killed after he crossed into Rwanda and shot at soldiers.

Kagame must balance national security and the rising tensions with his country’s neighbours. This will most likely require him to work with regional allies to address the roots of the Congolese conflict.

Political stability

Kagame’s primary campaign promise was continued political stability for sustained economic growth. On the surface of it, this seems to have been a persuasive argument: Kagame won the election with 99.18% of the vote.

However, human rights groups have condemned the July 2024 election results, claiming they were a result of Kagame having stifled internal opposition.

Political opposition actors such as Victoire Ingabire and Diane Rwigara have little room to rally support within Rwanda. Western organisations often claim this is a result of political suppression. However, for some Rwandans, these politicians are viewed as promoting a failed ideology based on identity politics that doesn’t align with the aspirations of the country.

Kagame continues to be viewed as a symbol of Rwanda’s post-genocide consistency. However, there will come a point where a successor will need to be found. If the country develops strong political and governing institutions, it will no longer need to rely on a singular leader after Kagame eventually steps down.

Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Tags Election, Kagame, Politics, Rwanda

Election

Rwanda’s President Kagame Sworn in for Another Term: Challenges and Promises

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date Aug 13, 2024
3 Comments on Rwanda’s President Kagame Sworn in for Another Term: Challenges and Promises

On 11 August, Paul Kagame was sworn in for another term as President after winning the recent July 2024 Presidential election. He won over 99% of the vote, promising a continuation of Rwanda’s current tract towards development. Unlike the smaller parties, President Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) promised broad development ideas, security and continued stability. Other political parties and his presidential opponents, such as Green Party Leader Dr Frank Habineza and Independent candidate Philippe Mpayimana, focused more on specific public policy ideas. While only being appointed President back in 2000, he has been the primary political actor since the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. International critics in academia and human rights organisations question what they see as President Kagame’s authoritarian rule over the country.

Since officially taking power, President Kagame’s primary policy goals consist of security, national development and stopping the cycle of ethnic divisions which led to Rwanda’s genocide. These policies are all under the social contract between President Kagame and his RPF with Rwandans. The political establishment retains power to guide Rwanda’s development, and in return, the population receives security, stability and improvement in their daily lives, such as electricity, health care facilities and schooling. However, President Kagame faces significant challenges in ensuring Rwanda’s continued development. These challenges include the growing socio-economic divisions, the rural-urban divide, the need for growth in the private sector, and the effects of climate change on Rwanda’s agricultural industry. Below are the broad issues which will occupy President Kagame’s next five years.

Continuing the Stability:

During the RPF’s campaign, promises of continued stability were found throughout the country. This encompasses several aspects of life beyond security, including economic and political factors. The stability issue could be heard frequently during President Kagame’s campaign speeches. He often promised continued stability for Rwandans, which was seemingly very welcomed. During the day of domestic voting on 15 July, many Rwandans discussed their desire for continued stability. The concept broadly meant for these Rwandans how they could set up their lives knowing that their investments, whether in terms of a business, farmland, etc, will still be intact in the future.

Economic stability encompasses the continued progress of Rwanda’s current path of development. Rwanda aspires to become a middle-income country by 2035, which requires significant economic growth. Beyond the global COVID-19 economic slowdown, Rwanda consistently sees GDP annual growth rates between 3.9 to 10.9 per cent. While there are accusations that these numbers are intentionally inflated, it is hard to argue with Rwanda’s growth over the past decade. Nevertheless, stability is a foundation for economic development as investors and businesses will be less concerned about future risks while establishing a business or investing. The lack of instability means their economic venture will not depreciate because of insecurity or violence, unlike in Rwanda’s past. Significant challenges still face Rwanda’s growth, such as the need for larger foreign direct investment in the private sector, the reduction of foreign debt, and unemployment. The issue of youth unemployment is a pressing concern, as seen in neighbouring Kenya. However, Rwandans seem to trust that President Kagame can best handle these challenges. Nevertheless, he and his government will need to do more to help spur economic growth.

Stability often incorporates issues of state security. Rwanda receives criticism from international human rights specialists for an overt security state. A critical element within the social contract between the government and the population is the promise of security. The insecurity of the early 1990s found in the Liberation War, also referred to as the Rwandan Civil War in the West, the Genocide against the Tutsi and the later 1994-1996 attacks from neighbouring Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have largely ended since President Kagame took power. Physical security is important not only in terms of state security but for the previously mentioned economic stability. Rwanda’s security agencies, the Rwanda National Police (RNP), Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), largely keep Rwanda safe from security threats and instabilities from a region, the African Great Lakes, which is rife with civil wars, rebel groups and political turmoil. President Kagame’s government will need to continue to promote national security from physical, specifically the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and ontological, from genocide ideology, threats.

Finally, Rwandans’ desire for political stability seems contrary to the West’s increasing waves of populism and ‘change’ elections. While human rights organisations promote political fringe actors within Rwanda’s public space, such as Victoire Ingabire, most Rwandans are largely risk-averse to these political attitudes. Before the Genocide, from 1990-1994, Rwanda contained the multiparty democracy often preached by human rights groups. As Guichaoua describes, this period contained significant political turmoil, infighting and assassinations. It additionally opened the door for Hutu populism and genocide ideology to be legitimised as political actors, as seen by the establishment of the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR). The political instability of this time is primarily remembered by Rwandans who lived during the early 1990s.

During the domestic voting day, one elderly lady discussed how the period’s instability, or as she called chaos, influenced her current desire for the present political stability. Whether she agreed with President Kagame and the RPF’s policies, she supports the significant decrease in political instability since they took power. The memory of the past political instability has yet to be properly understood as one of the reasons why Rwandans are so accommodating to President Kagame’s promises of continued political stability. He and the RPF must address what happens after he eventually steps down from power, which could lead to instability if not appropriately handled.

Who is the Successor?

One of the pressing questions that lurked before, during and after the election was who would eventually be President Kagame’s successor. During an RPF conference last March, President Kagame called for his party to start discussing his eventual replacement. While he can run for an additional five-year term after his current one finishes in 2029, being 71 years old, there seems to be a growing sense that this might be it for him.

During the Gahanga campaign rally on 13 July, some Rwandans commented on their anxiety about Rwanda’s future when Kagame is no longer President. He is the symbol of Rwanda’s post-genocide consistency and for Rwanda’s large youth population, over 65 per cent under the age of 35, the only President they know. Finding the appropriate successor is a dubious prospect, as relatively few candidates could take the role. Additionally, one Rwandan official commented how succeeding President Kagame will be a tall task with little upside as their accomplishments will always be compared to their predecessor.

However, the question of the successor is perhaps not as important as one might assume. One RPF party official commented that there is no substantial desire within the party to pick another strong man (or woman) candidate after President Kagame eventually steps down. Akin to the Rwandan official, there is a sense of fear that whoever succeeds him will never be able to live up to the mantle left behind. There is a greater chance for the successor to be unable or incapable of being that strong leader, as seen with Pasteur Bizimungu’s lacklustre presidency from 1994-2000. Thus, they have a rather different vision for Rwanda’s future leadership.

The assumption that President Kagame’s successor needs to be a strong man/woman leader is perhaps problematic. There is a sense that the RPF and some Rwandans want to develop the political and governing institutions rather than finding another Paul Kagame. The belief is to develop the effectiveness and independence of the legislative, courts and government institutions (ministries and boards) to such an extent that Rwanda will no longer need a singular leader as they have now. This is a tall task for a government which took form after the implementation of the 2003 Constitution. Nevertheless, the RPF seem to push for the development of these institutions, often with young bureaucrats and officials, rather than find another singular strong leader. Either way, President Kagame and his RPF will need to find a succession plan, whether an individual or strengthening the governing institutions, before he steps down from power.

Conclusion:

With the 2024 presidential election over and President Kagame sworn in for another five-year term, the Rwandan government has much to do to continue Rwanda’s development. Economic challenges will remain on top of the President’s agenda as national growth is still critical so that Rwanda does not fall backwards. Beyond the economy, he will also have to continue the advancements of social programs (healthcare and education), security (from physical and ontological threats) and infrastructure (roads along with water and electricity expansion). Most importantly, he will have to continue the current stability that Rwandans expect despite perhaps the need to take greater risks to develop the economy and attract foreign investment. While many will look for the individual who will eventually succeed Paul Kagame as President, the true test for the government will be whether it can increase its capabilities and capacity to be the true leader of Rwanda’s future.

Tags Election, Politics, Rwanda

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UK-Rwanda Migrant Deal: What Happens Now?

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date Jul 10, 2024
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The newly elected Labour government under the leadership of Sir Kier Starmer has ended the UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership. As PM Starmer so bluntly commented, “The Rwanda scheme was dead and buried…” The controversial plan began while Boris Johnson was Prime Minister back in 2022. It was to send asylum seekers who entered the UK illegally to Rwanda. It would be in Rwanda where their claims would be assessed, and if they were credible, the asylum seekers could remain in the small but safe African nation. This plan is similar to the 2001 ‘Pacific Solution’ by Australia that sent thousands of asylum seekers to Nauru and Papua New Guinea.

The deal was criticised, with human rights organisations crying out about UK migration policy and Rwanda. Since its announcement, the agreement was challenged in the courts, eventually being termed unlawful based on Rwanda’s developing judicial sector. The Conservative-led government counteracted this decision by defining Rwanda as safe through the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. However, the UK government would increase the program cost beyond the initial £120 million to an estimated £541 million. Despite PM Starmer’s termination of the deal, at least an estimated £220 million had already been sent to Rwanda. Alain Mukuralinda, Deputy Spokesperson from the Office of the Government Spokesperson, announced that there was no clause within the previous agreement to return any funding.

Why did Rwanda go into this deal?

It should be no surprise to any observer of UK politics that the UK-Rwanda migrant deal would end with a Labour victory. The agreement was deeply partisan, with Rwanda being dragged into the British domestic political arena. While PM Starmer’s decision to terminate it might seem like a victory for critics of the Rwandan government, most Rwandans will not see it as that. While much discussion has been held on the UK’s perception of the deal, very few have tried to listen to Rwandans.

As I wrote before, many Rwandans held different opinions on why they supported the deal. Some supported it as they felt a sense of responsibility not to allow others to suffer the horrible refugee status they had once felt. A majority of Rwandans over the age of thirty have been either refugees or internally displaced persons at one time or another, with many governments not providing them with the opportunities, rights or dignity. Other Rwandans commented on how they saw it as a way to promote Rwandan nationalistic identity through a campaign to help others on the global stage. Working with various governments and global leaders to tackle the global illegal migration crisis increased the sense of national importance. While some commented on the financial opportunities, especially in developing Rwanda’s judicial sector, others were relatively uninterested. The challenges of everyday life overshadow Rwanda’s engagement with the international community.

During a recent trip to Rwanda in June 2024, I discussed the plan’s future with many Rwandans in Kigali. Many were interested in my analysis and its future with the incoming Labour government. As I tried to prepare Rwandans for its upcoming termination, many were seemingly just happy that their country had just been involved. Issues of illegal and legal migration saturate the political landscape of many nations, with Europe being no exception. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring in the early 2000s, hundreds of thousands from North Africa and the Middle East have crossed into Europe. This does not discount those from Africa, especially Eritrea and North Sudan, who trek across the Sahara desert and try to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Many do not make the journey as they either die from the extreme weather elements or are sold into modern slavery.

President Paul Kagame offered a solution for African nations, such as Rwanda, to play a critical role in solving this issue. This solution closely follows the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’. Additionally, Rwanda already accepts tens to hundreds of thousands of regional refugees. Some Rwandans were proud of their nation’s soft power politics in trying to find a solution to the crisis.

What does this now mean for Rwanda?

The question now is perhaps not what will happen regarding UK-Rwandan relations. There does not seem to be panic about a significant deterioration between Rwanda and the UK, possibly its second most important nation in terms of its foreign relations. What was always important was for the Rwandan government not to be dragged into the domestic arena of British politics.

The bigger question is whether Rwanda’s willingness to participate in such an agreement will elevate it within the international community. The nation already receives praise for its contribution to peacekeeping in nations facing civil strife and terrorism. Its engagement with the UK, along with other countries, in accepting migrants provided it with another opportunity to develop its soft power in the global crisis of legal and illegal immigration.

Despite most nations, especially in the Global North, facing a similar migration crisis, few have offered significant solutions. Many policymakers hold short-term answer of simple deportation rather than developing complex solutions that might require a considerable shift in understanding the global political economy, security and migration. Perhaps Rwanda provided another short-term answer, having asylum seekers sent to their country, but it was at least a relatively new answer to the crisis. However, some used Rwanda’s willingness to accept migrants as a way to attack its government rather than trying to find an actual solution to the crisis.

Either way, Rwanda illustrated itself as a nation willing to try to find a solution to a global crisis. Despite PM Starmer ending the UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership, other countries and institutions, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), will continue working to send asylum seekers and migrants to Rwanda.

Tags africa, Asylum, news, Politics, Rwanda, RWandan foreign affairs, Starmer, UK-Rwandan Relations

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How the International Community Continues to Fail in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date May 9, 2024
3 Comments on How the International Community Continues to Fail in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Combatting African conflicts and human rights violations tends to fall within international responsibility with little to no beneficial actions or policies. Global commitments to foster peace and reconciliation, often in the form of peacekeeping missions, often fail or keep a fragile sense of stability as the contributions come from distant nations. Attention needs to be given towards regional solutions to conflicts. Understanding and promoting regional solutions provides insights into regional power dynamics that can be more beneficial in critically solving conflicts than relying on distant actors. An example is the current instability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The DRC is experiencing a wave of violence against the Banyarwanda population, who originate from Rwanda, which sparked the Movement of March 23 (M23) rebel force from its near decade of inaction.[1] The M23, based in the DRC’s eastern North Kivu province, is a mostly Banyarwanda rebel force promoting the community’s security interests by capturing important towns, villages and cities. Despite international attention to this crisis and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) intervention, there seems to be little hope for peace. While the core crisis is a domestic issue, its ramifications impact neighbouring Rwanda and the African Great Lakes region. This is not the first time the M23 and the Congolese military, the Armed Forces for the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), fought against each other, as the M23 became an internationally known rebel force after its relatively short-term military success in the early 2010s. During this military action, the M23 captured the important eastern Congolese city of Goma in 2013.[2]

As the M23 caused havoc for the FARDC, the international community bounded together to combat what they perceived were the root causes of the conflict: interference from the neighbouring countries of Uganda and Rwanda. A United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNGoE) Report suggested these neighbouring countries were supplying, harbouring, and training M23 rebel forces.[3] In response, many nations withdrew foreign aid support to Uganda and Rwanda. While some international actors, such as the European Union and Germany, suspended aid, other countries, such as the United States, limited their foreign aid.[4] Various agreements between the Congolese government and M23, along with Uganda and Rwanda, such as the Luanda and Nairobi Peace processes, led to the rebels becoming relatively inactive.

Historical Context of the M23 and Banyarwanda:

Since the end of Rwanda’s genocide in 1994, when over a million refugees fled into then-Zaire, now the DRC, the two countries have become entangled. The First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars witnessed bloody wars between Congo and Rwanda, including multiple other nations such as Angola, Uganda and Burundi. Despite the Luanda Agreement 2002, which saw the removal of foreign troops, DRC has remained in turmoil.[5] There are over 100 active rebel groups, from the small community-based ‘Mai Mai’ to larger groups such as the M23. One of these rebel groups is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which comprises the military remains and ideology of Hutu extremists who perpetrated Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.[6] The Rwandan government consistently seeks to combat the FDLR, typically by force. Banyarwanda were targeted during the conflicts and became an essential ally for Rwandan forces. However, Reyntjens suggests that many have turned away from supporting Rwanda.[7] Since the end of the Second Congo War, Rwanda has been accused of interfering in Congolese affairs by supporting various rebel groups, such as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and the M23.

However, the recent wave of violence sparked regional concern with a relatively muted response by the international community. Within Rwanda, officials and citizens are cautiously worried about events in their neighbouring country spilling over into Rwanda. Despite some military incursions, such as the encroachment of a Congolese fighter jet in Rwandan airspace[8], the real concerns stem from what many perceive as genocidal threats. Genocide Watch describes the situation facing the Banyarwanda as “a slow genocide unnoticed by the international press.”[9] Specifically, the Congolese government’s rhetoric and treatment of the Banyarwanda is an acute cause for concern. The language used by members of the Congolese government, such as the Congolese Minister of Higher Education Muhindo Nzangi, suggests the FARDC work with the FDLR and the ‘Mai Mai’ groups in fighting not only the M23 but also anyone who holds Rwandan, specifically Tutsi, heritage.[10] One Rwandan genocide survivor commented:

What we [Rwandans] are hearing from Congo reminds us of 1994. We hear [from the DRC] the same anti-Tutsi hate speech as right before and during the genocide [1994 Genocide against the Tutsis]. Our [Banyarwanda] relatives are being targeted, terrorised and are in danger. Something must be done.[11]

Despite only being in the early months of the crisis[12], the international community has remained relatively silent. While some, such as New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez, a member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have condemned Rwanda for the recent wave of M23 violence[13], there has yet to be any form of financial, military or other type of sanctions. During past accusations of Rwandan interference in eastern Congo and accusations of dictatorial practices and human rights violations, the Rwandan government often responded with political tactics. One tactic frequently used is threatening the removal of its effective military contribution to peacekeeping missions.[14] Another tactic is to remind donor nations of how Rwanda is a case study in terms of how to effectively deploy foreign aid from the Global North.[15] These tactics and others are reasons for the continued international support for Rwanda. Nevertheless, how the international community currently is responding to the renewed crisis, and M23 contradicts past experiences when it condemned the rebel force and implemented sanctions against its alleged allies of Uganda and Rwanda. The critical question becomes why the international response has been so limited.

Discussions in Rwanda focus on the underlying belief that the DRC President Felix Tshisekedi does not have the same sway with the international community as his predecessor, Joseph Kabila.[16] The UNGoE’s most recent report seems to support the Rwandan government’s concerns about the FARDC’s relationship with the FDLR as an illegal mineral trade between the two actors reached US$71 million in 2022.[17] Nevertheless, there seems to be a preparation for future accusations. Rwandan officials such as the High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Johnston Busingye, are warning that the root causes of the conflict are not because of Rwanda but ethnic divisions spurred by the Congolese government, which are, he alleges, not following past agreements.

What is the Solution to the Violence?

However, the ineffectiveness of regional efforts might signal difficulties to the broader international community in the current situation. Unlike when the UNGoE blamed the M23 and instability on outside actors, Uganda and Rwanda, today, there is no clear link between external forces and the M23. The rhetoric and attacks against the Banyarwanda also make it difficult for the Global North to support the Congolese government. On September 9, 2022, the East African Community sent a military force, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF)[18], to foster safe zones and camps for internally displaced persons affected by the recent wave of violence.[19] A similar task force, the International Intervention Brigade, was sent into eastern DRC to stop the M23’s initial military campaign in 2012-2013 to take control over North and South Kivu. At the time, the DRC and Tanzania deemed it adequate to stop the M23 forces.[20] It enabled regional actors to solve neighbouring conflicts in what can best be described as ‘African Solutions for African Problems’.[21] Despite initially supporting it, the Tshisekedi government has recently encouraged public demonstrations against the regional military force. Accusations of the EACRF’s collaboration with the M23 largely stem from how, on multiple occasions, the M23 reportedly handed over captured towns and villages to the EACRF.

With the international community seemingly remaining largely silent, the East African Community has taken the lead in solving eastern Congo’s military and humanitarian crises. The EACRF deployment in eastern DRC illustrates the importance of regional powers and organisations in solving local crises, conflicts and instabilities rather than relying on distant international actors. However, the likelihood of its success seems unlikely as the Congolese government continues its rhetoric and policies against the M23, the Banyarwanda and Rwanda. Additionally, the M23 seems focused on the plight of the Banyarwanda and seeking greater political power within DRC rather than threatening, unlike the FDLR, regional nations. Despite the desire for regional solutions to the crisis, it appears neighbouring countries are unable to solve it in the foreseeable future.

[1] Vincent Gasana, “DRC conflict: M23 offered government unconditional surrender, before a shot was fired,” KT Press, December 20, 2022, https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/12/drc-conflict-m23-offered-government-unconditional-surrender-before-a-shot-was-fired/.

[2] “Goma: M23 rebels capture DR Congo city,” BBC News, November 20, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20405739.

[3] Jonathan R Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Elite Perceptions of Global Engagement (Oxon: Routledge, 2021)., 142-143.

[4] Ibid., 118, 126-131.

[5] Taylor, Alexandra. “A Violent Peace: The Ongoing Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Cornell International Affairs Review 2, no. 1 (2008): 50-56.

[6] Beloff, Jonathan R. “Rwanda’s securitisation of genocide denial: A political mechanism for power or to combat ontological insecurity?.” African Security Review 30, no. 2 (2021): 184-203.

[7] Reyntjens, Filip. “Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship.” African affairs 103, no. 411 (2004): 177-210., 208.

[8] “Rwanda shoots at Congolese military jet over alleged airspace violation,” Reuters, January 25, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwanda-says-congo-fighter-jet-violated-its-airspace-2023-01-24/.

[9] “Genocide Emergency: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Genocide Watch, August 3, 2022, https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-emergency-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-1.

[10] “DRC / North Kivu: In Butembo, Muhindo Nzangi invites the Mai-Mai militiamen not to learn from the army,” GrandJournal CD, September 5, 2022, GrandJournalCD.net; “ICCN Director Accused Of Supplying Fuel To M23 Rebels,” Taarifa Rwanda, November 20, 2022, https://taarifa.rw/iccn-director-accused-of-supplying-guns-to-m23-rebels/.

[11] Unnamed Rwandan, interviewed by Author, Kigali, Rwanda, January 23, 2023.

[12] At the time of writing in January 2023.

[13] Reuters, “US Senator Questions Aid to Rwanda Over Human Rights, Role in Congo,” VOA, July 26, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-senator-questions-aid-to-rwanda-over-human-rights-role-in-congo-/6674174.html.

[14] “Rwanda threatens to withdraw peacekeepers from Darfur over UN report,” France24, Augusst 31, 2010, https://www.france24.com/en/20100831-rwanda-threatens-darfur-peacekeeper-withdrawal-un-report-war-crimes.

[15] Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-genocide, 158.

[16] Jason Stearns, Dancing in the glory of monsters: The collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2012)., 168, 267, 307–330

[17] “How FDLR Generated $71m Annually from Businesses with Wives of DRC Officers,” The Chronicles, January 5, 2023, https://www.chronicles.rw/2023/01/05/how-fdlr-generated-71m-annually-from-businesses-with-wives-of-drc-officers/.

[18] This will be in addition to the already existing the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo (MONOSCU) with over 20,000 troops, observes and commanders.

[19] International Relations, “DRC President presides over signing of Agreement giving greenlight to the deployment of the EAC Joint Regional Force,” East African Community, September 9, 2022, https://www.eac.int/press-releases/151-international-relations/2589-drc-president-presides-over-signing-of-agreement-giving-greenlight-to-the-deployment-of-the-eac-joint-regional-force; Jenna Russo, “The East African Community Steps into the Crisis in the DRC. Will It Help?,” IPI Global Observatory, December 12, 2022, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/12/east-african-community-crisis-drc/.

[20] Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-genocide, 216, 224-228.

[21] Beswick, Danielle. “Peacekeeping, regime security and ‘African solutions to African problems’: exploring motivations for Rwanda’s involvement in Darfur.” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010): 739-754.

Tags africa, DRC, eac, fardc, M23, news, Politics, Rwanda

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Kwibuka 30: Commemorating Thirty Years since the Genocide against the Tutsi

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date May 1, 2024
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Kwibuka 30 Tree, which symbolises protection, aspirations, memory

It has been nearly a month since I attended Kwibuka in Kigali. The experience was truly unique as the main event, hosted at the BK Arena (as seen in the picture above), with speeches, dances and artwork that symbolised not only Rwanda’s horrific past but its desired future. While there are more experienced researchers focusing on commemorations (I highly suggest looking at the work done by Dr Samaantha Lakin), I decided to look back with my Political Science lenses. Baldwin, Longman, and others provide a more critical examination of Rwanda’s commemorations, so I decided to take a rather different approach to analysing this important event.

Rwandans are commemorating those who perished during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. It has been thirty years since the Genocide ripped through Rwandan society, leaving up to a million Tutsi and non-extremist Hutus dead. This 100-day commemoration period, starting on April 7, the day which initiated the Genocide, witnesses Rwandan society remembering and reflecting on historical divisions between Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa. More importantly, it is a time for Rwandans to come together to promote unity and reconciliation under the banner of Ndi Umunyarwanda, loosely translated as ‘I am Rwandan’.

While it initially comes from Article 10 of the 2003 Constitution, its current policy iteration began in 2013 with the desire to foster national unity to prevent future divisionism and genocide.

The Rwandan government’s agency responsible for Kwibuka, the Ministry of National Unity and Civic Engagement (MINUBUMWE), will make this year’s commemoration a grand event as it is the thirtieth anniversary of the Genocide. Similarly to the twentieth commemoration, multiple international, national, and local events will be held with an eye on the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the continuing social engineering of Ndi Umunyarwanda.

Tensions with DRC:

The recent wave of violence in eastern DRC has become ever so worrying for Rwandans. In an attempt to defeat one of the multiple Congolese rebel groups dotting the landscape, the DRC’s military, the Armed Forces for the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), have increasingly been cooperating with Rwanda’s primary external security threat, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). This Congolese-based rebel group are the remains of the genocide perpetrators of Rwanda’s Genocide who wish to re-establish ethnic divisions, outlawed by the Ndi Umunyarwanda policies of ethnic unity, and return the country to that of the Genocide. The increased cooperation between the two actors has led to Rwandan concerns about increased military supplies and political legitimacy given to the FDLR.

The true threat posed by the FDLR is not its ability to try to defeat the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) and retake the country. The perhaps 2000-strong FDLR force has little strategic, operational or tactical capabilities to control Rwanda from President Paul Kagame’s government. However, their genuine threat stems from their ideology.

Former RDF Chief of Staff and recently appointed Rwandan High Commissioner to Tanzania Patrick Nyamvumba commented on the FDLR’s threat to Rwanda’s ontological security. As I argue in my book, the danger is akin to a mosquito that cannot do much harm to an adult human. Instead, it is the malaria they carry, i.e. genocide ideology, which poses the threat. Many within the Rwandan government are fearful that not enough time has passed to foster a resilient post-genocide unified identity that can fully expel the tempting ideology which composes the FDLR. Whether this is true or not can be argued, but the threat remains in the minds of Rwandan policymakers.

The second threat posed by eastern DRC is the increasingly genocidal language coming from the Congolese government. Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi has already called President Kagame ‘Hitler‘, but more troubling is his government’s language and actions against the Banyamulenge population. This group historically originated from Rwanda but has resided in Congo for generations despite facing past persecution. Over the past two years, violence against them, often from the FARDC and their FDLR allies, has seen the return of the Movement of March 23 (M23) rebel force from its near decade of inaction. However, the language coming from the Congolese government is worrying Rwandan policymakers.

Congolese Minister of Higher Education Muhindo Nzangi and government Spokesman Patrick Muyaya Katembwe have openly called for the persecution of the Banyamulenge. One Rwandan policymaker commented that the language coming from Congolese officials reminded him of language used by Rwanda’s perpetrators just before the Genocide. With this level of genocide ideology just to the nation’s west, the question is how serious the threat is to Rwanda’s post-genocide social reconstruction of Ndi Umunyarwanda.

Combatting Genocide Ideology:

Since the National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation (NURC), the predecessor of MINUBUMWE, the Ndi Umunyarwanda, the Rwandan government has continued implementing this policy to foster ethnic unity among Rwandans. This ideology follows the governing Rwanda Patriotic Front’s (RPF) interpretation of Rwandan history, which upholds Tutsi, Hutu and Twa as a form of socio-economic division rather than rooted in ethnic differences. However, Western scholars such as Reyntjens, Des Forges and Newbury dismiss this interpretation of history. Nevertheless, they miss an essential aspect of why Ndi Umunyarwanda exists. It exists as a mechanism for the country to move on from its past divisions to formulate ethnic unity that will prevent the environment of social divisions that can lead to a repetition of the Genocide.

Many within the Rwandan government, especially in the inner circles of power, are those who either fought to end the Genocide or were victims of it. The deep-rooted scars of their experience influence their desire for national social re-engineering. Many are still nervous that the past Hutu extremist ideology that promoted divisionism and hatred, which the FDLR still promotes, can override the progress made by Ndi Umunyarwanda and return. The comfort of scapegoating others for one’s problems is often tempting. The language coming from the DRC is worrisome for Rwandan policymakers, as it not only threatens the Banyamulenge but also follows patterns that once and possibly again inflict on Rwandan society. At least in the capital city of Kigali, the conditions for social divisions seem relatively minimal.

During my most recent fieldwork periods in Rwanda (December 2022-March 2023 and August to September 2023), I paid particular interest in whether Ndi Umunyarwanda had taken hold in the new generation of Kigali’s residents. During a 2016 PhD fieldwork, some government officials commented that it would take a generation or two for social unity to be achieved in the form of Rwandans being unconcern of one’s family, possibly Tutsi, Hutu or Twa identity.

While conducting fieldwork, I attended multiple social gatherings with Kigali’s growing middle class of Rwandans between the ages of 24 and 35. During conversations with fifty Millennials and Gen Z, it appeared that the government’s wish for the youth’s acceptance of Ndi Umunyarwanda had been effective. All attendees had little desire to bring up what they classified as their ‘parent’s divisions’ and instead saw each other as fellow Rwandans. These conversations illustrate the success of Ndi Umunyarwanda and, more broadly, the Rwandan government’s desire for post-genocide social reconstruction.

What will Rwandans Commemorate?

With the thirtieth commemoration, Rwandans will continue to examine their history of how the nation descended into Genocide through divisionism. Rwandan embassies and high commissions have and are still engaging with the Rwandan diaspora, while local villages continue to have relatively simple events to remember the past and help foster a united future. They need not look far to see the warning signs of how society can slip into scapegoating and securitising each other can lead to violence. The increased violence and ethnic-based language in eastern DRC are a steadfast reminder of the importance of Ndi Umunyarwanda. While the physical threats from across the border cannot be dismissed, internally, Rwanda is closer to Ndi Umunyarwanda unity rather than genocide divisions.

Tags africa, kwibuka-30, news, Politics, Rwanda

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Faustin Twagiramungu: A Dinosaur of Rwandan Politics Long Gone

Post author By Jonathan Beloff
Post date Dec 3, 2023
No Comments on Faustin Twagiramungu: A Dinosaur of Rwandan Politics Long Gone

On 2^nd December 2023, the news broke on social media that Rwanda’s former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu died in Belgium. While most Global North-based activists mourn his loss and make somewhat questionable claims of him being a ‘symbol of democracy’ for Rwanda, his loss in Rwanda will go relatively unnoticed. This brings up an interesting question of what happened to Twagiramungu in the consciousness of not just the Rwandan public but the new generation of Rwandans whose lives consist mainly after the Genocide against the Tutsi. Global North social activists will answer how minor mention of his death in Rwanda originates from President Paul Kagame or the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). However, that is problematic as it does not reflect the realities in Rwanda.

Who Was Faustin Twagiramungu?

Born in 1945 in Cyangugu Province, Twagiramungu lived a relatively everyday life for a Rwandan Hutu. Since independence in 1962, Rwanda’s social norms favoured the majority Hutu (composing roughly 84% of the population) over the minority Tutsi (comprising approximately 15%) and the minority Twa (comprising less than 1%). The previous 1959 Hutu Revolution, promoted by the nation’s first post-colonial President, Grégoire Kayibanda, glorified Hutu supremacy. Mass pogroms led to thousands of Tutsi to flee into neighbouring countries. Over the coming years, anti-Tutsi pogroms left thousands dead and tens of thousands to flee into neighbouring countries. During the First Republic (1962-1973), southern Hutus, such as Twagiramungu, received economic, political and societal favouritism. However, he did not receive the benefits of his ethnic and geographical origins for long as he studied and worked in Canada starting in 1968 and continued until 1976. It was during the reign of General Juvénal Habyarimana, who overthrew Kayibanda in a coup d’état that he returned to run a transportation company called Société des Transports Internationaux au Rwanda (STIR).

His business success outstripped his now disenfranchised origins. President Habyarimana and his inner circle called the akazu, loosely translated as ‘little house’, shifted favouritism from the South to the North. Tutsis still experienced institutional racism, nonetheless. The geographical power shift and anger towards the President led him into politics. However, Rwanda’s political landscape was changing. The one-party dictatorship of Habyarimana began to loosen. As Kroslak writes, Rwanda and many African nations under the French’s sphere of influence started a ‘Paristroika’ moment. With the Cold War ending and Western capitalism winning the ideological war, the Western donor nations of the United States, France and Great Britain demanded political and economic liberalisation. This new movement became an opportunity for Twagiramungu.

The Beginning of his Political Career and the Genocide against the Tutsi:

In 1991, he became a prominent Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) member. While MDR attempted to differentiate itself from Habyarimana’s party, the Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement (MRND), by claiming it was the ideological successor of former President Kayibanda and his lost political party, the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu (Parmehutu) were banned and dissolved shortly after Habyarimana’s coup. Additionally, MDR softened its tone on Tutsis compared to its predecessor. But like many of Rwanda’s new political parties, there were significant divisions based not only on Rwanda’s Tutsi population but also on whether to engage with the RPF.

In October 1990, the RPF’s military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), crossed from Uganda to attack the Rwandan military, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). The beginning of the Liberation War (1990-1993) began with initial setbacks for the RPA. Successful tactics and offensives in 1991, 1992 and 1993 led to peace negations and political transformations. By August 1993, the RPF and the Habyarimana regime agreed upon the Arusha Accords. The akazu lost significant power as Rwanda’s political system broadened beyond the original ‘Paristroika’ of the early 1990s to include the RPF. This benefited Twagiramungu’s career and ambition.

Including the RPF in Rwanda’s political space led to President Habyarimana being much more tactical in engaging with the opposition parties. He used wealth, favours and threats to divide political parties. The MDR was no different, especially after the forced exile of MDR leader and Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye in July 1993. His favouritism towards working with the RPA led him to be seen as an ‘accomplice’ by the FAR and Habyarimana. While Twagiramungu would be the ideal replacement, he instead manoeuvred for Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate within the party, for the Prime Minister position. She would later die during the Genocide against the Tutsi. It is important to note that while MDR had its moderates, it also had its Hutu extremists, such as Jean Kambanda, who would become Rwanda’s Prime Minister during the Genocide against the Tutsi.

On the night of 6^th April 1994, the Falcon-50 Presidential Plane carrying President Habyarimana was shot down, most likely by FAR extremist actors, igniting the Genocide against the Tutsi. Twagiramungu resided in Kigali and received help from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), who brought him and his family to safety at their base in Kissimenti. Prunier, Dallaire and Anyidoho write of how UNAMIR forces, rather than the better equipped RPA, who had previously stationed its 3^rd Battalion (more popularly known as the 600), rescue Twagiramungu’s life. There is speculation that he did not want to be saved by the RPA in order to retain the image of independence from the RPF, unlike Nsengiyaremye. Whatever the reason, he did not want RPA assistance; nevertheless, he benefited from their protection at Amahoro Stadium. Shortly after the Genocide began, the RPA’s 3^rd Battalion, under the command of Lt. General Charles Kayonga, sent Eagle Company to Amahoro Stadium, which housed UNAMIR’s headquarters, to protect it from military and genocidal forces. The Genocide ended when the RPA defeated and removed the genocide regime on the 18^th of July 1994. The Campaign against Genocide War had ended, but Rwanda’s landscape dramatically changed.

After the Genocide:

Despite winning the war, the RPF kept much of the previous 1993 Arusha Accords in place. There were changes, such as the Hutu extremist parties that were once in the government would be banned. Their political seats and ministries were distributed to other parties but mostly RPF. While there were only minor changes in the new post-genocide transitional government compared to the one agreed upon in the Accords, Rwanda had changed. During the first few days of the Genocide against the Tutsi, non-extremist, politically active Hutus were targeted alongside Tutsis by genocide forces. The political party’s divisions, which President Habyarimana created within many oppositional parties, provided opportunities for extremist elements to kill off moderate party members during that first week. Many of the extremist political party members were either dead or fled the country. Thus, few oppositional leaders left when the war and Genocide was over. Twagiramungu was one of the lucky few.

In accordance with the Arusha Accords, the MDR retained the Office of the Prime Minister. Twagiramungu, being one of the few remaining MDR members, became the nation’s new Prime Minister. While he had hoped the position would grant him political favour, he did not realise how the political landscape had changed. Unlike the early 1990s, Rwanda was now under the control of the RPF, which had just ended the Genocide against the Tutsi and won the Campaign against Genocide War. They suffered the least in terms of lost political leaders. However, they were not immune to the political changes that had taken place. Kimonyo writes how, during the remaining 1990s, some RPF officials wanted to rule the country as the past presidents had done. This is not in reference to a political dictatorship but the style of politics and corruption that had existed before. The infighting, corruption and ineptness led to not only the removal of Rwanda’s post-Genocide President Pasteur Bizimungu in 2000 but a significant shakeup in the party and country. Vice-President and Minister of Defence Paul Kagame became the next President and de facto leader of the RPF.

Even before the constitutional changes in 2000, which included some of the first legislation to ban ethnic divisionism, the political system was considerably different than what Twagiramungu had hoped. The 1995 Kibeho Massacre, along with a diminished role in policymaking, led Twagiramungu to speak out against the post-Genocide government. He increasingly claimed that Hutus within the government were either puppets or their ethnic concerns were ignored. Recall that Twagiramungu grew up in Rwanda’s ethnic divisions, which had always not only favoured Hutus but acknowledged ethnic partitions. This radically differed from the RPF’s desired social belief, which dismissed ethnic divisionism to foster the unifying social norm of Ndi Umunyarwanda, loosely translated as ‘I am a Rwandan.’ While the policy would come into existence years later, the institutional foundation for social unity began shortly after the installation of the post-Genocide government.

Twagiramungu resigned as Prime Minister on 28^th August 1995. He claimed it was a result of the Kibeho Massacre. However, this is not the whole answer, as he would never have longed for this new political landscape. Unlike those such as the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Vincent Biruta, a member of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) and saved by the RPA’s 3^rd Battalion during the Genocide, he still felt that the pre-Genocide political atmosphere of Rwanda still existed. Fundamentally, it was gone, and he became somewhat of a dinosaur of a past political environment that no longer existed. The RPF were the winners of the Liberation and Campaign against Genocide War and thus set the tone for Rwanda’s political system. Even that system did not last long as by 2000, Paul Kagame began his Presidency, which continues until today. Rwanda’s political landscape would never return to the early 1990s.

Life outside Rwanda:

Twagiramungu departed Rwanda for Belgium in March 1996. It was there he created the oppositional party, Democratic Forces for Resistance, in 1997. Working with other exiled movements and former political leaders of the Habyarimana regime, he tried to mount a serious campaign against the RPF. However, there would be little hope for proper coordination as the widely different political parties, each holding various beliefs, never unified.

Despite Twagiramungu’s lack of recognition of the shifting political landscape and greatly diminished role for him and his party, he nevertheless attempted to run for President as an Independent during the 2003 Presidential Elections. His platform focused on economic issues and questioned the RPF’s social messages. He ran as an Independent as the MDR party became banned months before the election. The Rwandan government responded that its ban resulted from continued belief in ethnic divisionism. However, some members formed a new party, the Party for Progress and Concord (PPC), which currently has one representative in the Chamber of Deputies. As expected, Twagiramungu lost the election to President Kagame, winning just under 140,000 votes compared to his opponent, who won over 3.5 million. While international observers claimed election interference, there was little chance for Twagiramungu to win the election.

By 2003, Rwanda’s political landscape had changed again. President Kagame was now in control, and the nation would see changes towards economic growth, increased access to education and healthcare, and what Rwandans tell me is their most pressing concern: security. The political dynamics found in Rwanda in the early 1990s were now impossible to recreate. Additionally, Rwandans became somewhat sceptical of Western constructs of political liberalisation, which was perceived as a reason for Hutu extremist parties and actors gaining the power to conduct the Genocide against the Tutsi. Political landscapes had changed not just in Rwanda but throughout central and eastern Africa.

Despite the seeming rejection of Twagiramungu in 2003, it did not end his political ambitions. He formed the Rwandan Dream Initiative (RDI) in 2010. He later combined the party with others, including the Democratic Republic Liberation for Rwanda (FDLR), which contains remnant genocide forces, to form the Coalition of Political Parties for Change (CPC). The CPC’s inclusion of the FDLR is highly problematic as the Hutu extremist rebel force in eastern Congo holds policies containing Rwanda’s return to ethnic divisionism and ‘finishing’ the Genocide. The party collapsed within a year, but he remained President of the RDI party. However, he continued to be accused of being aligned with the FDLR’s genocide ideology. Until his final days, Twagiramungu continued to be active on social media, criticising the Rwandan government President Kagame and denying important facts about the Genocide against the Tutsi. He became an advocate of the false ‘Double Genocide’ theory, which claims the RPA committed their Genocide.

Twagiramungu’s Significance Today?

Twagiramungu’s recent passing holds little significance in Rwanda. Most Rwandans I talked to while conducting fieldwork either knew little about him (just that he was a Prime Minister and critic of the government) or were not interested. He is seen as a relic of the past or a historical footnote who did not adapt to Rwanda’s shifted political landscape. He also offered little to Rwandans who were satisfied with the status quo under the RPF. The stability the RPF brought to Rwanda should not be so easily dismissed. Rwandan informants often comment on how Global North critics live a privileged life of security, which leads to the great benefit of not knowing what it seriously means to have their lives at risk. The political luxuries in the Global North take time to develop, with most Rwandans expressing their satisfaction with the political stability even if it is not perfect.

Twagiramungu and his oppositional political successors, such as Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, try to operate within a Rwandan landscape that does not exist anymore. Most Rwandans, especially the growing Millennial and Generation Z population, are not interested in the political pluralism in the Global North or Rwanda during the early 1990s. While critics of the Rwandan government will quickly dismiss this notion, their voices do not represent the ones residing in Rwanda. Rwandans frequently express their views of Rwandan politics to me, often with many complaints from local officials or scandals. However, very few want President Kagame to be replaced. Instead, many express their concerns if President Kagame steps down in the near future.

Twagiramungu, Victoire Ingabire and others see Rwanda through the lens of the early 1990s rather than Rwanda in 2023. This is why their political impact on Rwanda will remain negligible at best.

Tags Genocide, Kagame, Politics, Rwanda, Twagiramungu