Categories
Uncategorized

New Sanctions on Rwanda, but the Sky Isn’t Falling Down

On October 28th, 2026, the Trump Administration introduced new sanctions on Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its bank, Zigama CSS. This new wave built on the March 2nd, 2026, sanctions, which targeted not only the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) but also some of its military leaders. However, this was not the end: on November 3rd, 2025, the US announced that it would remove Rwanda and South Africa from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) by the end of the year. This trade policy reduces or effectively removes tariffs on African goods sold in the US. While this is not the first time Rwanda has been removed from the list, as in 2018, it still shows a worrisome trend for Rwanda and its relationship with the US.

Foreign-based critics of Rwanda may be celebrating the Trump Administration’s recent wave of anti-Rwandan policies. Reviewing social media posts from supporters of the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) or Congolese politically aligned accounts suggests that President Paul Kagame and his government are on the brink of collapse. They are celebrating the new sanctions and applauding Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi for turning the US against Rwanda. Even some Western-based colleagues have privately asked me about the impact of the sanctions and whether this will lead to significant political, military or economic change.

However, the sky is not falling in Rwanda. Sanctions and foreign aid withdrawals have occurred before, and the country survived. Rwanda will survive these sanctions, as it has before. It survived the worst act imaginable, the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, and rebuilt stronger than ever before. However, Rwandan perceptions of the US have taken a greater hit than anything the US could do to Rwanda.

Agaciro and 2013:

International sanctions, political pressures and foreign aid withdrawals are nothing new within the African Great Lakes region. Since the closing years of the Second Congo War (1998-2003), Rwanda has faced sanctions over its engagements within eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Global North continues with a narrative, whether supported or not, securitising Rwanda for Congolese instability, corruption and conflict. Often, it ignores the reality that the Congolese government continues to ignore local grievances by focusing on corruption and poor governance. This has the economic consequences of many, especially in eastern DRC, to either pick up a weapon and join a rebel group, often the Mai Mai, or work in horrific conditions in mining. Perhaps most relevant to the current instability, Kinshasa has shown an unwillingness or perhaps inability to honour past agreements. The Movement of March 23rd (M23) takes its name from what it sees as a failed implementation of the March 23rd, 2009 peace agreement between the Congolese government and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP).

Despite attempts to restore Joseph Kabila’s shaky credibility after he joined the M23, now called the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), he was instrumental in past campaigns to sanction Rwanda in the late 2000s and early/mid 2010s. Additionally, in 2013, he applauded the international community’s sanctions on Rwanda and Uganda after the UN Group of Experts accused the two of aiding the first incarnation of the M23. He was more than willing to support sanctions and policies against Rwanda to suit his political needs during his eighteen years in power. Despite recent interviews that try to depict him in a more positive light, experienced researchers of the region see right through his words and recognise his interests, which now happen to align with the M23.

I recall the economic impact of the early-2010s sanctions and foreign aid withdrawals against Rwanda and Uganda. As in previous periods, the nations were accused of interfering in eastern DRC for conflict-mineral wealth and to expand their spheres of influence through rebel forces such as the M23. Like the most recent incarnation of the M23, the core reasons the M23, along with 100+ other rebel groups, rose to prominence are often ignored. As I wrote previously, the core political, social and economic instability, along with military strategic errors, are the primary reasons for the seemingly continuous conflict rather than just scapegoating Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, Uganda.

However, I lived in Rwanda in 2013 and 2014 for two six-month periods and witnessed the economic slowdown from foreign aid withdrawals. Rwanda responded by promoting the agaciro ideology, which is akin to Max Weber’s Etica Protestante, focused on ‘pulling oneself up by one’s bootstraps’ through self-determination, self-reliance and, importantly, self-respect. Rwandans, while critical of the Global North’s decision, used the opportunity to foster greater national pride by framing the withdrawals as a way to promote national unity. Rwandans had to come together to get through this turbulent period as nearly everyone was affected. Even a farmer in the Southern Province told me in May 2013 that the withdrawal hit her farm’s ability to purchase easy-access fertiliser. Still, she was willing to power through it for the sake of the nation’s development. Perhaps the best-known output from this period was the Agaciro Development Fund, initially seen as a way to replace some (even if only a small fraction) of the removed aid.

Perception of the United States:

During my 2013/2014 stay, Rwandans expressed frustration with the sanctions and foreign aid withdrawals. However, unlike some European nations, the US only withdrew a token amount, US$200,000, citing Rwanda’s engagement with the M23 and its domestic human rights situation. Although previous aid withdrawals were larger, this amount still made the US appear to join other European nations in condemning Rwanda. Perhaps President Barack Obama’s presence and charisma helped soften the blow, but during Rwanda Day 2012 in Boston, Massachusetts, Rwandans living in the US were still upset. But at no time did Rwandans openly tell me that Rwanda needed to step away from its close relationship with the US.

Over the last few weeks in Kigali, I have seen a significant shift: more Rwandans are openly discussing the need to divest from their relationship with the US and focus more on non-traditional allies such as Turkey and Qatar. Since my first visit to Rwanda in 2008, I have not heard Rwandans speak about the necessity to broaden their diplomatic relations, especially away from the US, as much as I have now.

Many tell me that, unlike past US Administrations, the current Trump administration seems more problematic. The veneer of ‘promoting human rights’ or wanting the conflict in eastern DRC to end is largely absent. Many believe President Tshisekedi may have paid off members of the Trump Administration or President Trump’s inner circle to impose those sanctions on Rwanda. These accusations of corruption are not entirely out of the realm of possibility after recent news of US Special Envoy and son-in-law of President Trump, Jared Kushner, receiving bribes from Saudi Arabia and other nations. While these accusations have yet to be proven, they nevertheless suggest a corrupt political system that prioritises short-term American interests over long-term interests with a stable partner, i.e., Rwanda. Additionally, few understand the strategy of sanctioning Rwanda to stop the M23, as local grievances led to the formation of many rebel groups.

It seems that questions of corruption in the Trump Administration were a key instrument for the Democrats during the recent 2026 midterm elections. Gallup, a respected polling research centre, suggested that 89% of Americans believe corruption exists within the Trump Administration—many respondents claim it is widespread. Thus, Rwandans assuming that the recent sanctions come from corruption is not unreasonable. Additionally, the recent Belgian raids on President Tshisekedi’s homes, following accusations of money laundering and corruption, add fuel to these claims.

The Sky is NOT Falling:

While the new sanctions and Rwanda’s removal from AGOA might seem like a victory for Rwanda’s critics, the question is whether they will significantly affect the nation’s political, economic, or military policy. No one can argue that these developments will force Rwanda to rethink its foreign relations or even recalculate some of its operations. Additionally, removing AGOA will hurt some exporters that focus on selling Rwandan goods to the US market. However, little will change for most Rwandans.

Fundamentally, the sky is not falling, as many critics hope.

Few, if any, Rwandans see the new sanctions as requiring major changes. The only significant change is Rwanda’s diversification of allies, trading partners and military relationships. The US’s credibility continues to take a beating among Rwandans, who are increasingly perceiving the Trump Administration as biased, supporting President Tshisekedi to gain access to Congo’s vast mineral wealth, corrupt and unreliable. Additionally, many question how these sanctions will actually lead to peace in the region, especially if the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) continue to receive Congolese aid.

Perhaps the only people celebrating the 2026 midterm results more than the Democrats are Rwandans…

Leave a Reply