This was written prior to the release of the Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda framework.
On June 27, 2025, Congolese and Rwandan officials signed an agreement that some hope will lead to stability and peace between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. The ongoing crisis in eastern DRC has been somewhat overlooked, as much international attention is focused on events within the Middle East. For the Trump Administration, the agreement is an example of its shifting foreign relations, especially with the Global South, from the previous administration’s ‘humanitarian approach’ towards a ‘transactional’ foreign policy. The question of whether this new agreement will lead to long-term security and peace within the region is questionable.
DRC and Rwanda’s Complex Relationship:
Summarising Rwanda and the DRC’s relationship is near impossible. Over the past thirty years, the two nations witnessed the aftereffects of the Genocide against the Tutsi, First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars, conflicts with and often between irregular (rebel) fighters, failed agreements, corruption, and so much more. After the Genocide against the Tutsi, when up to a million Rwandan Tutsis and non-extremist Hutus were murdered in one hundred days, it led to a mass exodus of Rwandan Hutus fearing a double genocide, which never happened. Over two million Rwandan refugees fled to eastern DRC, at the time known as Zaire, and resided in horrific conditions. While former Zarian dictator Joseph-Désiré Mobutu welcomed the refugees, he did so with less than altruistic reasons. He saw those people and the growing humanitarian crisis as a way to regain favour with Western nations who recently abandoned him after the end of the Cold War.
For Rwanda, the refugees were not composed solely of civilians. Entangled within the mass refugee camps were the remnants of the leaders and orchestrators of the recent genocide. Rwanda’s genocide only ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) under General (now President) Paul Kagame, defeated the Rwandan military, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and genocide actors. Many who were defeated fled into Zaire to regroup and plan for their return. However, their goal to return to Rwanda to continue the genocide would never happen. Rather, in October 1996, a coalition of multiple national forces initiated the First Congo War, which ended with the capture of Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, and the removal of Joseph Mobutu, with Laurent Kabila replacing him as President. Despite the forces being labelled as an internal organisation, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), it was a predominantly Rwandan-led operation. General (at the time Colonel) James Kabarebe was not only the leader of the invasion but also became the Minister of Defence under the new Congolese government. More importantly, Rwandan refugees returned, with human rights groups citing classification as being forced, with former genocide leaders either killed, captured or forced deeper in the harsh jungles. Many former Rwandan military soldiers who had fought against the RPA reintegrated into the new Rwandan military, with notable examples including the current Minister of Defence, Juvenal Marizamunda, and the Minister in charge of Emergency Management, Albert Murasira.
However, the conflict did not come to an end. Rifts began between the two nations. Congolese officials began accusing Rwanda of treating the new government as a puppet rather than an equal partner. Laurent Kabila would sack Kabarebe and dismiss Rwandans from not only his government but from Congo. Rwanda began to worry that their new ally was repeating his predecessor’s errors by supporting remnants of the genocide forces. Various incarnations of genocide forces, such as the Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (AliR) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), appeared to receive support from the Congolese government. What ignited the Second Congo War is hotly debated. Nevertheless, it ignited a war that continues to this day. Rwanda’s inability to formulate a similar successful coalition, as it had done just years prior, led to a fractured DRC with various rebel groups, allied to specific governments, countries, or interests, carving up the country. The trade of conflict minerals became so great that ‘New Wars’ theory began to overshadow traditional understandings of warfare. By October 2002, peace agreements had been signed between various governments and actors, ultimately leading to the end of the war. However, the instability remains.
The nation remains very divided between the Congolese government and over one hundred rebel forces. Many of these irregular actors are Mai Mai, composed of localised militias, which protect specific cities, villages, or regions. However, there are roughly forty to fifty major forces, such as the previously mentioned FDLR, who participate in mineral smuggling, harassment of villages, massacring of different Congolese ethnic groups and much more. The FDLR, along with Wazalendo, residing in the jungles of eastern DRC, often target the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge populations. These groups, historically related to Rwanda, faced significant persecution with the Congolese government either ignoring or even at times aiding in the violence. Despite the Umoja Wetu military operation between Rwandan and Congolese forces, elements of the FDLR remained and eventually regrouped. This would lead to the resurrection of the March 23 Movement, better known as the M23.
Who are the M23?
Like many Congolese rebel groups, the M23’s history is complex as it evolved from former rebel forces. As I wrote in a previous publication, the origins of the M23 date back to the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), which later evolved into the RCD-Goma. After the Congo Wars, it became the Congrès National Pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). Eventually, in 2009, CNDP leaders signed several agreements with the Congolese government, allowing them to become part of the Congolese military and political institutions. The last major agreement, signed on March 23, did not yield a satisfactory outcome for the former fighters. Many believed the Congolese government had not honoured the agreement with their populations, composed mainly of the Banyarwanda, still targeted by former genocide forces and facing increasing discrimination.
Thus, in 2012, the remains of the CNDP, under the leadership of Bosco Ntaganda, Makenga Sultani, and Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, among others, formed the M23. The new rebel force’s name, March 23, is a nod to what they perceive as the Congolese government’s failures to honour past agreements. Despite some successes, the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the specific Foreign Intervention Brigade (FIB), was able to essentially defeat the forces. Many fled to Uganda and Rwanda. During their short rise to regional power, even occupying Goma for a day or so, the United Nations Group of Experts for the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNGoE) accused Rwanda and Uganda, to a lesser extent, of aiding the M23. Similar to the Congo Wars, they accuse Rwanda of supporting the M23 in order to gain valuable minerals to boost the bank accounts of military officials (as in the case of Uganda) or to advance national development (as in the case of Rwanda). However, both governments denied the accusation.
Despite the M23’s earlier defeat, increased persecution of the Banyarwanda led to the resurrection of the former rebel group. While the current Global North narratives blame Rwanda for the current M23, the rebel’s military leadership crossed from Uganda into Congo. Many who had previously fled to Rwanda would not be in the initial operations seen on November 7, 2021. One former M23 fighter, who had fled to Rwanda, privately expressed concern that Rwandan officials were monitoring their actions to prevent them from rejoining the group. Nevertheless, the international community accuses Rwanda of aiding the M23. Some of the accusations include the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) providing military equipment, logistical support and even up to 4000 soldiers to the rebels. However, the available evidence has been relatively poor, with vague evidence, innuendo, and a reliance on historical narratives.
Even one researcher from the African Great Lakes region, a critic of Rwanda, admitted privately that they had no evidence to support their accusations but assumed Rwanda was involved due to the past Congo Wars. Even the evidence of Rwandan military active participation relies on pictures of African soldiers, with no means to verify whether they are Rwandan or Congolese. One could argue that they could be from any African military. Nevertheless, Rwanda is accused of being the mastermind of the conflict. As I wrote in a previous publication, I believe that much of the criticism of Rwanda stems from a lack of understanding of strategic theory, military operations, and tactics among humanitarians and researchers. Despite the semi-pedestal they are placed upon, researchers explaining a war from thousands of miles away, with little or no experience of actual warfare, will often rely on existing narratives to explain a complex situation. However, this trap is not composed solely of those criticising Rwanda for the M23 (but that is another story to be told for a different day).
But why does Kinshasa perceive the M23, and particularly President Felix Tshisekedi, when there are multiple other major and minor rebel groups causing chaos throughout the DRC? While there are multiple reasons for the Congolese government’s focus on the M23, a significant part of it deals with the rebel group’s success. Unlike in 2012, the M23’s successes are much greater. They occupy large areas of eastern DRC, including the regional capital city of Goma. Unlike their actions a decade ago, the M23 are positioning themselves as a legitimate alternative to Congolese governance. One of their greatest targets has been against the existing systems of corruption by establishing new policies for governance. Stories (which I have not been able to confirm independently) illustrate how the M23’s policies include paying civil servants, many of whom had not been paid in months, actual policing of neighbourhoods, combating bribery, and constructing infrastructure such as roads and water pipes. This focus on public policy is radically different from a decade ago, when its motivations were unclear. Thus, it was easier to accuse the M23 of being like many other rebel forces, i.e., focusing on protecting their ethnic brothers and sisters, illegal mineral trade and the power search. Unlike in the past, the M23 seemed to have incorporated governance and security as key elements within their overall strategy.
Trump and Africa:
What does this conflict have to do with President Trump, more specifically, why does he care about it? The answer to this question may be known only by the President himself. His relationship with African countries ranges from calling some ‘sh-thole countries‘, forcing the trade of used clothing and most recently, showing a video to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, the racist proclamations made by some within his governing coalition. However, both the DRC and Rwanda can spark President Trump’s interest.
The first reason why President Trump’s interest stems from economic opportunities. The vast DRC contains large deposits of rare earth minerals, such as gold, coltan, and lithium, which are essential for modern technological devices. Congo’s mineral wealth is largely a curse as it is a root cause for much of the corruption and underdevelopment since colonisation. Mobutu’s rise to power largely stemmed from his promises to guarantee Western companies access to valuable mines at the expense of, not his wealth, but of the nation. This trend continued in future governments and persists to this day. Fundamentally, it is challenging for many Western companies to invest properly in the DRC, as a substantial budget is required to address the extensive corruption. The cost of corruption disincentivises investment, with only a handful of companies willing to deal with the constant need to pay off government officials. Soon after President Trump’s re-election in November 2024, President Tshisekedi allegedly attempted to establish inroads with the incoming Trump administration by offering unfettered access to Congo’s mineral wealth in exchange for the US to withdraw its support for Rwanda. President Trump’s mineral agreement with Ukraine only aided in this belief. However, there are some elements of truth to this concept.
President Trump’s focus on ‘transactional’ foreign policy and increasing the American economy leads to the opening of trade deals for Congo’s mineral access. Nevertheless, the agreement is not as easy at first sight. Congo’s corruption and overly complex tax revenue process are a headache too significant for many American companies to handle. The new Rwanda-DRC agreement contains provisions to simplify the tax code for foreign investment. Additionally, the Congolese military, particularly in light of its numerous defeats at the hands of the M23, is unable to provide adequate security. American companies will need to factor in how they protect their investments from the multiple rebel forces that exist throughout the country.
Rwanda’s unique role within American foreign policy in the region also aids Trump’s interest. Since the end of the genocide, Rwanda positioned itself as an ally of the US and the United Kingdom compared to its past relationship with Belgium and France. Former US President Bill Clinton classified Paul Kagame as one of the new faces of Africa during the 1990s. Even during the Congo Wars, Rwanda continued to receive support from the US. After those conflicts, Rwanda repositioned itself as an important ally for the West in terms of proper utilisation of foreign aid and contribution to peacekeeping. This last aspect is critical for the US. While there are debates about the extent to which the famed ‘Mogadishu Line’ still exists, there is an intense desire by American officials not to have US soldiers fight in African conflicts. Thus, Rwanda positioned itself since the end of the Second Congo War as willing and, more importantly, able to provide the necessary forces in African conflicts. Since the early 2000s, Rwandan soldiers have been sent to Mali, Darfur, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mozambique. Unlike other peacekeeping contributing nations, Rwandan soldiers are well-equipped, trained, and willing to engage antagonistic forces to bring about stability and peace militarily. For President Trump, Rwanda can be seen, as his predecessors have, as a force on the ground, rather than an American one. This aligns with the recent Israel-Iran war, with Israel providing much of the military forces in the air combat zones. The recent US bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites came about after Israel secured Iranian airspace. For African conflicts, Rwanda can serve as a similar role model.
Lastly, President Trump’s ego is well-known with an eye towards the Nobel Peace Prize. He perceives himself as a dealmaker above all else. The conflict presents an opportunity for his administration to be the dealmakers and perhaps resolve a crisis that began decades ago and continues to rage. Despite a majority of Americans being barely aware of the DRC crisis, an agreement can be depicted as a foreign policy ‘win’ not only for him but also for his ‘transactional’ foreign policy. But will it lead to actual peace?
Will the Peace Last?
Will this agreement between Rwanda and the DRC lead to sustained peace? Probably, no. There are multiple concessions made by both the Rwandan and Congolese, but the question is how they are enforced. The Congolese will take Rwandan security concerns, specifically the FDLR, seriously and withdraw their support from those forces. But how can the Congolese military achieve these goals? Its military has shown an inability not only to fight the M23 but also to control its forces. The M23’s name is based on a failed peace agreement between the CNDP and the DRC government. Additionally, there is the promise that the Banyarwanda will be better protected. However, members of the President Felix Tshisekedi coalition, which keeps him in power, have and continue to express their hatred for the Banyarwanda. Will he be willing to clamp down on this rhetoric even if it risks his political power?
Another question is how the Congolese government try to entice American investment, something that the Trump Administration will monitor closely. While American companies will face fewer barriers to entry when investing in the DRC, along with reduced bribery requirements and a commitment to combat corruption, how will this be implemented? The means to enact these changes are beyond the current Congolese political and governance infrastructure. For over half a century, corruption has been the primary means by which the Congo state operates, and to change that requires time, money, and political will that are severely lacking in Kinshasa.
The Rwandan agreement to honour Congolese sovereignty is relatively minor, as the primary security threats within the DRC do not come from outside actors but from within. As mentioned earlier, the DRC comprises over 100 rebel forces, each with its own distinct strategic objectives. If we accept the narrative that Rwanda supports the M23, removing the M23 does little to address the systemic issues of poor governance, corruption, Mai Mai, underdevelopment, and a lack of nationwide infrastructure. The securitisation of Rwanda is great political theatre in Kinshasa, but does little to solve Congolese problems.
Rwanda’s engagement in the negotiations appears to be more akin to playing a political game. They know that the Trump Administration wants a deal even if it is doomed to fail. Rather than try to fight it by describing the complexities of Congo’s problems, they would rather depict themselves as negotiating in good will to show President Trump that they can be trusted. Rwanda appears not to want to be the one who states the apparent past failures of Congolese peace agreements with internal and regional actors. Rather, let them be seen as the ones who kept their end of the deal when the DRC inevitably fails to uphold their side. This could be due to Congolese officials again aiding the FDLR, American investments being unprotected by various rebel forces, or the M23 not submitting to Kinshasa’s authority.
Lastly, the agreement will likely fail because the M23 were not part of the negotiations. No matter the accusations made by humanitarian groups and activists, the M23 are an independent actor with their own policy, goals, and objectives. They will enact policies through strategies to achieve their desired outcomes. While Kinsasha has promised more autonomy for eastern Congo, which benefits the M23 as the de facto governing actor in the region, how long will this last? Conceding autonomy to eastern DRC will be seen by some or most of President Tshisekedi’s supporters as an admission to the M23 and Rwanda. After years of securitising the M23, Rwanda and the Banyarwanda, there will be many within the DRC who are not willing to concede an inch of power to the M23, despite not even controlling the region.
I hope I am wrong, and this agreement leads to some sort of stability and peace within the region. The Congolese are victims of their rich mineral wealth, geographical challenges, and, most importantly, poor political leadership.
Jonathan R Beloff 