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Review: The Struggle for Liberation: A History of the Rwandan Civil War, 1990-1994

Kegel, John Burton. The Struggle for Liberation: A History of the Rwandan Civil War, 1990-1994, (Ohio University Press, 2025) ISBN: 978-0-8214-2627-2 (Link).

In 2019, I sat at Kigali Heights sipping a Mutzig (a local beer) with Lt General (Rtd) Caesar Kayizari. While we initially met when he was still Chief of the Army, within the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF), it was during his retirement that he sparked an interesting question: how did Rwanda’s Genocide, known as the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, actually end? General Kayizari was one of the commanders of a combined mobile force (CMF), specifically Alpha CMF, which liberated large swaths of Kigali. Since his retirement, General Kayizari showed me different areas of Kigali and explained the military battles and rescue operations that took place there in 1994. By 2022, it sparked an idea that eventually led to my own research project on the subject. However, General Kayizari mentioned that someone else had already begun the research: John Burton Kegel.

Kegel’s relationship with General Kayizari served as a metaphorical ‘green flag’ for the authenticity of his research. Academia faces significant challenges, stemming from internal divisions, in understanding and critically engaging with Rwanda. As I wrote in a past article, the divide over whether to praise or condemn Rwanda, specifically its government under President Paul Kagame and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), is evident in nearly every piece of published material. In the past, some academics privately advised me that, to succeed in academia, one must find oneself on the ‘right’ side of this academic divide. This divide impacts researchers’ fieldwork, especially early-career researchers’, with many Rwandans commenting that they often feel Western researchers arrive in Rwanda with their conclusions already determined. However, Kegel does not fall into this trap as he seeks to understand and describe how the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the RPF, won the Rwandan Civil War[1].


Kegel’s book, The Struggle for Liberation: A History of the Rwandan Civil War, 1990-1994, examines a relatively unexplored but vital period of Rwandan history. Akin to Gerard Prunier’s The Rwanda Crisis, Kegel’s book is a holistic examination of Rwanda and how conditions led to the formation of the RPF, which remains in power. However, Kegel presents an interesting historical parallel to Rwanda’s early post-colonial years with the 1990s Civil War. He argues that Rwanda experienced two significant periods of civil war. The second is the better-known Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), but the first period is more interesting.

The original civil war began during the Social (Hutu) Revolution and lasted until the mid-1960s, ultimately leading to the defeat of the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) rebel forces from Burundi. Often, descriptions of the late colonial period focus on political divisions and the consolidation of Hutu ideology. Kegel’s description of the period is most convincing in sparking a new debate within Rwanda studies: should the period around Independence be considered part of a civil war, given that it encompassed many of the elements necessary to qualify as one? Within Rwanda, the Genocide against the Tutsi often receives its initial date during the Social (Hutu) Revolution rather than simply 1994. The reason stems from a modified understanding of Gregory H. Stanton’s description of a genocide’s lifeline.

An added note: there appears to be a rise in Rwandan historical books that attempt to rehabilitate the regimes of Gregoire Kayibanda (1962-1973) and Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994). Perhaps it is a tactic in a strategic campaign to try to discredit the RPF by disrupting their (and historical) narratives of the social and economic problems during those periods. However, it could be a genuine exploration of Rwandan history. Kegel never falls for this trap, as he provides a factually accurate account of Rwanda’s history prior to 1994.

Fundamentally, Kegel examines how history has shaped the RPF and Rwanda. However, we begin to encounter a blessing and a problem with the book’s research. The Struggle for Liberation utilises French, Dutch, British, American, and Belgian diplomatic records and cables, drawing on them in ways that go beyond any existing texts on Rwanda. The book describes and illustrates not only historical events but also how those serving at foreign embassies in Rwanda described the nation’s events. The only other person, I believe, who has done this type of research is Linda Melvern.

However, we encounter my first issue with the book: a lack of interview data. Kegel’s sources rely on diplomatic cables, existing information, and the interviews of a handful of people, all RPF. Those mentioned as the primary source of the interview data are Lt General (Rtd) Ceasar Kayizari, General James Kabarebe, Senator (Rtd) Tito Rutaremara and Christine Umutoni. While I hold the utmost respect (and friendship) with these people, there needed to be more voices, including those from the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). When the existing interview data is properly utilised, it elevates the description and overall storytelling of Rwandan history. However, the book needed more of their voices.

This is where Kegel and my book differ. While he provides a more holistic examination of the RPF and Rwandan history, mine focuses more on the Campaign against Genocide War. It extensively utilises interview data from those who fought during the war, including RPA and ex-FAR members, to depict the various tactics, operations (humanitarian and military), and strategies of both sides. My book positions itself as a detailed exploration of Kegel’s Chapter 11, titled “The Campaign Against Genocide”. However, I do fully acknowledge the difficulties it would be for Kegel (or nearly any researcher) to gain the access I received while researching the topic. Nevertheless, I write this critique not to criticise the book, but rather to suggest how it could be elevated through greater use of interview data.

Another critique is what I previously hinted at, the Campaign against Genocide War chapter. This chapter describes the events starting with the assassination of Habyarimana until the RPF liberated Gisenyi, effectively ending the Genocide against the Tutsi. Unfortunately, the chapter reads as rushed compared to other chapters. Additionally, it lacks details of the RPA’s strategy compared to the ex-FAR, operational decision-making, humanitarian missions, the relationship between battles and tactics, and so on. All of these topics are mentioned and discussed, but only briefly. The reason I mention this issue is that many Rwandans are most interested in learning about this aspect of their history. Many want to understand not just the history of the RPF/RPA, but also how those forces liberated their home, village, town or city. 

There are other minor critiques I have of the book, such as its portrayal of the ex-FAR. The limitations of the research methods are evident here as well. Kegel discusses some of the internal controversies among its officers, in part due to the diplomatic cables. However, it largely does not address the complex relationship within the FAR. For instance, the divide between Northern and Southern Hutus (something current Minister of Defence Juvenal Marizamunda experienced); perceptions of the Arusha Accords or even how to categorise the RPF (Commissioner General of Rwanda Correctional Service Brigadier General Evariste Murenzi, who fought for the FAR, remembers being told in October 1990 that he was not fighting ‘Tutsis’, Mwami supporters or foreign invaders. Rather, his commander said they were fighting fellow Rwandans who were refugees.) These divisions are important as they greatly influenced decision-making during the Genocide by those within the military, and why some refused to participate in the massacres.

Rather than condemning these missing elements, it may be worth suggesting that our two books be read together. Where Kegel shines is where my own research could be strengthened and vice versa. That realisation is what makes this book even more enjoyable. Its level of historical detail will hopefully lead to new debates and research on how the RPA ended the Genocide against the Tutsi. One of its greatest contributions is how it should lead to new critical questions about Rwanda for us to understand better not only its history but how it exists today as it continues to rebuild and recover from the great horror of the Genocide.

Despite my minor critiques, I believe this book will be one of the great texts on Rwanda in the years to come. Akin to the previously mentioned Prunier’s The Rwanda Crisis, Kegel’s book will serve as a textbook for understanding Rwandan history. I highly recommend it, and then suggest either visiting my site or reading my book on the Campaign against Genocide War.

[1] Civil War is a general term to describe the Liberation War (1990-1993) and the Campaign against Genocide War (1994).

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No more Rwanda-Arsenal: A Win for Critics or Just Business?

On 19th November, the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) announced that its partnership with Arsenal Football Club would expire in June 2026. Back in 2018, Rwanda signed an initial three-year partnership with the North London football club to have the ‘Visit Rwanda’ slogan branded on the sleeves of Arsenal’s shirts. The deal was renewed until the recent announcement. For Rwanda, the initial deal signalled a new approach to promote the nation’s growing tourism sector. For the nation’s critics, the recent announcement will no doubt be celebrated as a ‘victory’ in their campaign against Rwanda. But what was the real reason behind the recent announcement?

As I wrote previously, Rwanda largely views the Arsenal deal, along with others such as Paris Saint-Germain F.C. and Atlético Madrid, as a billboard to promote the nation’s tourism. Tens, if not hundreds, of millions of football fans watch these clubs in multiple competitions. With each game, the ‘Visit Rwanda’ slogan is clearly visible. Whenever a fan purchases a football kit of their favourite team, the ‘Visit Rwanda’ logo is on the shirt, increasing the number of eyes. Advertising’s effectiveness is often a game of chance, but the increased viewership aids in spreading the ‘Visit Rwanda’ message to more people. Additionally, the advertising campaign boosted national pride and contributed to Ndi Umunyarwanda’s social development.

Within days of the initial announcement of the deal, critics of the Rwandan government and President Paul Kagame attacked it. Many political critics of Rwanda questioned the ethics of the deal. Some criticised the decision to classify a poor African nation, which still required foreign aid for up to 40% of its national budget and had roughly 90% of its workforce still in agriculture, many of which were subsistence, as having a developing economy, and to sponsor a mega-wealthy football organisation such as Arsenal. These criticisms often ignored Rwanda’s macroeconomic plans and commercial diplomacy aimed at developing the nation’s growing tourist industry.

Others criticised Arsenal for engaging with Rwanda’s government, which many human rights organisations classify as dictatorial and a constant violator of fundamental human rights within Rwanda and in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, these criticisms often followed a rather formulaic reductionist pattern. Whenever Rwanda is in the news, whether for good or bad, critics utilise the same critical narratives to attack the government. While I have deconstructed and refuted many of their criticisms, they often boil down to a lack of understanding of Rwanda.

Their criticisms often originate from a relatively narrow view of the nation’s development, only thirty-one years removed from the end of the Genocide against the Tutsi, personal and perhaps financial influence, or unawareness of Rwanda itself. Ask yourself, how many of these critics have been to Rwanda in the past decade or two? It is easy to criticise a foreign entity when you have not visited it (or have not in a long while).

Some speculated that the Arsenal-Rwanda deal existed only because President Paul Kagame is an Arsenal fan. However, before the deal’s announcement, a Rwandan government official commented to me that they had also approached other football clubs. Thus, it had little to do with President Kagame’s football preference.

So, with the announcement, did the critics win?

Soon after the German Bundesliga team FC Bayern Munich changed the terms of the deal, focusing less on advertising and more on youth development, many critics celebrated it as a win. However, there had been private conversations months before the announcement of the shift in priorities. But the Arsenal deal might be different, as it was the first in the nation’s new attempt at this type of economic diplomacy and received the greatest attention when it was initially announced.

Despite the hopes and self-satisfaction Rwandan critics will soon express, their campaigns had little to do with the decision not to renew the contract. Rather, it was a business decision. A source warned me that Arsenal increased the fees for the continuation of the shirt sleeve sponsor. The increased cost alongside greater attention to the US sports market led to the decision to move on after eight years.

No one should be surprised by the decision, as it happens with most clubs that have sleeve and front-of-shirt sponsors. Football kits change each year, and sponsorships often last only a handful of years. The increased attention to the US market is perhaps also more lucrative than that of many football leagues.

Thus, the clear answer to the earlier question is no. Rwanda’s critics did not achieve a victory in their campaigns to smear Rwanda. Rather, the answer is quite dull. It was a business decision for how best to grow the ‘Visit Rwanda’ campaign.

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Goodbye Uncle General

There are a few people who can truly impact one’s life: their character, humour, knowledge and so much more lead to one being gravitated towards them.

While there are so many people whom I have the highest opinion of, none are like Lt General Innocent Kabandana. While others will be able to write a more detailed description of Kabandana’s accomplishments, I want to focus on what the man meant to me.

I met Kabandana in 2012 during the closing ceremonies for Gacaca. During the second day of proceedings, he, along with much of the RDF’s command, assembled just behind where my mother and I sat. We had both been invited to this historical conference. Sitting with so many other RDF leaders, he was perhaps the quietest of them all. He sat, intensely watching the proceedings.

He never dismissed or trivialised any opportunity to help Rwandans or better understand his homeland. He wanted to learn every detail about Gacaca’s success, as it was an opportunity for him to participate, even if only as an audience member, in something that helped repair the nation. We briefly talked afterwards, but I never expected to develop such an admiration for the man.

A few months later, Kabandana was sent to the United States. He became the Director of Military Cooperation (military attaché) at the Rwandan Embassy in Washington, DC. While he had served in other countries, such as South Sudan and later Mozambique, this was perhaps his first job that was inherently political, as he was representing his country’s security interests.

For those who knew Kabandana, they will know he was not a man of politics. Once, I joked that he could become a fine government minister one day, but he shook his head in disagreement. He was a soldier. All he wanted to do was finish the job as best he could by keeping his head down and not playing any games. For Kabandana, the military was an instrument that needed to be used for good.

As we discussed many years later, he firmly believed that the military followed the orders (public policy) of the government. Following the ideas from the famous Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz, the government creates public policy, and the military follows that policy. While militaries focused on providing state security, Kabandana believed it could be used for so much more.

For him, the RDF served a vital role in Rwanda’s reconstruction. It carried out the policies to make Rwanda safe for all those who follow Ndi Umunyarwanda. He was always proud to serve in a military that not only ended the Genocide against the Tutsi (which he served in the 157th CMF) but also prevented the nation from entering a cycle of death, hatred and continual violence. Additionally, the RDF could become a tool for public policy beyond just security, enhancing the lives of everyday Rwandans.

Returning to our developing friendship…

It was August 2012 that we met again at a lecture on Rwanda’s governance at the University of Pennsylvania. We recognised each other from the closing ceremony of Gacaca and began planning to meet afterwards to discuss Rwandan foreign affairs. (This was just before beginning my PhD) Unbeknownst to me at the time, this was the first moment that began our deep friendship.

Over the course of the following months and years, I met with Kabandana more times than I can remember. We always discussed Rwanda’s history, culture, reconstruction and the nation’s future. He continually challenged my perceptions and pushed me to become a better researcher and person. At times, we intensely debated broader subjects of international relations, economics, philosophy, metaphysics and so much more. To me, he was a Renaissance man, always interested in a wide range of subjects. Some of my most treasured moments came from my ability to make him laugh.

For instance, whenever we emailed or texted each other, I would call him ‘Uncle General’. I attempted to combine displaying my respect for his military rank and all he accomplished, as well as to make him smile. Maybe I did it to show how much I cared for him and saw him as a father figure in my own life. It was a badge of honour to make him laugh and later to make him proud after I completed my PhD.

Most of all, he imparted a deep sense of personal ethics. I often asked him for advice at times when I experienced pressure to conform to specific narratives or conduct questionable ethical acts.

When I was challenged, he was there…

During my PhD studies, I was asked to uncover some sensitive information before conducting one of my multiple fieldwork periods back in 2016. The request (to put it mildly) came from someone who could (and later to some extent did) make my PhD studies a bit of a nightmare. Fundamentally, the person wanted to use me to ‘find out if the gossip is correct’ about someone. I pushed back against the request as I felt it was inappropriate and well beyond my research scope. However, the person placed me in a difficult position. Should I cave into the pressures from someone who could make or break my PhD and academic career, or do what is right?

I turned to the most ethical person I knew… Innocent Kabandana

We met during that 2016 fieldwork period. While the conversation was mostly about family, it was also about his upcoming opportunities as Commander of the Special Forces. I decided to disclose what I had been asked to do. Kabandana looked me square in the eyes and calmly said how I knew the difference between what is and is not appropriate. And how the request crossed beyond any ethical or professional line. Despite the repercussions, I knew at that moment what I had to do. I refused even to consider carrying forth the ‘request’.

That is how I will remember Innocent Kabandana.

While I will never forget his laughter, debates and so much more, I will remember his ethics the most. He believed in honesty, morals and always doing what is right, even if it might not be advantageous to do so.

While spending time at his office, at home, or elsewhere, he challenged my beliefs and understanding of Rwanda and myself.

His passing seemingly came out of nowhere for me. I had heard rumours of his passing before, which we would always laugh about on the phone. We had talked about his health struggles, but he always held the desire never to give up. During the last wave of rumours, just a month or so ago, we talked and even began planning to meet in November.

Rwanda has lost a great man.

I have lost a great friend, father figure, mentor and guiding light in the journey which we call life.

Thank you for everything you did for me.

I will never forget you.

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Joseph Kabila is on trial for treason in the DRC. What the case against the former president is all about

Jonathan Beloff, King’s College London

The Congolese military court has accused former president Joseph Kabila of treason, corruption, war crimes and supporting the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group. During court proceedings that began in July 2025, arguments were made for utilising the death penalty against Kabila, who was in power from 2001 to 2019. The trial is going on in Kabila’s absence as the threat of arrest led him into exile. The former president had fought against the M23’s first iteration in 2012-2013, as well as its predecessor, the National Congress for the Defence of the People, which fought the DRC government between 2006 and 2009. Jonathan R. Beloff, who has studied the regional and internal political dynamics in the DRC for over a decade, examines the implications of the case.

What is Joseph Kabila’s political history?

Joseph Kabila took over as president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 26 January 2001 after the assassination of his father, Laurent-Désiré. He was 29.

Before this, during the First Congo War (1996-1997), he served in the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, which aimed to overthrow the Zairean dictator Joseph Mobutu. This war has been labelled “Africa’s World War” by historians like Gérard Prunier because of the large number of foreign actors it involved. These include Angola, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda.

A significant number of soldiers and commanders in the alliance were Rwandan. Much of the war was conducted by Rwandan General James Kabarebe, who became a de facto father figure for Kabila, training him in military strategy, tactics and politics.

A breakdown in Rwanda’s relationship with the DRC in 1998 led to the bloody Second Congo War (1998-2003). It was between Uganda, Rwanda and to a lesser extent Burundi, who fought against the DRC and its allies like Angola and Zimbabwe. The war was mostly fought by rebels from these nations who had varying interests. During this period, Kabila became the deputy chief of staff for the Congolese military.

After he became president, he successfully applied pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to negotiate peace agreements in 2002.

Overall, his presidential term was marred by the persecution of political rivals, corruption and multiple active rebel forces in the volatile eastern region.

Further, despite the DRC’s constitution forbidding it, Kabila extended his presidency from two five-year terms, only stepping down in 2019. A political deal was struck that saw him relinquish power and hand over to Felix Tshisekedi.

What has happened to Kabila since then?

Kabila and his successor have not seen eye to eye.

Since departing from power, the former president has faced increased accusations of corruption during his presidency. Further, by 2021, many of Kabila’s supporters within the government and military had been removed.

The relationship between the two further soured in 2023 when Kabila spoke out against Tshisekedi’s handling of the M23’s violent campaign in eastern DRC. Kabila has also criticised Tshisekedi’s use of uncontrolled militias, Wazalendo, who have been unsuccessful in combating the M23.

Kabila went into self-exile, reportedly in South Africa and other African nations, that year. He returned to eastern DRC’s regional hub Goma in May 2025, when he met with M23 leaders.

The Congolese government used Kabila’s visit to M23-controlled Goma to justify the charges brought against him. Further, the government suspended Kabila’s political party, Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie. The party represented Kabila’s interest in Congo’s legislative branch.

Soon after the party’s suspension, the senate stripped Kabila of his immunity, allowing charges to be filed against the former president.

Why is the case against Kabila before a military court?

While Kabila doesn’t hold any political or military post – he last served as president and major-general in January 2019 – his past experience in the army led to a military rather than civilian process.

Additionally, the case is before a military court as Kabila is accused of committing treason by meeting with an opposing military force, the M23. The government seized his assets after he met and engaged with leaders of the rebel group.

While it’s not the most significant charge, Kabila also faces accusations of massive corruption during his 18-year presidency. Further, he’s being held accountable for past military decisions that led to war crimes, murder and rape during and after the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

What are the implications of the court case for DRC’s peace process?

In June 2025, Rwanda and the DRC signed a peace agreement following negotiations led by Qatar and the United States.

On the surface, the agreement could lead to regional stability and growth. However, for Tshisekedi, it is a landmine of political risks.

Since the M23’s resurgence in November 2021, Tshisekedi has blamed Rwanda, as well as the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, who are historically Rwandan populations resident in eastern DRC, for the return of the rebel group.

The new peace deal significantly complicates Tshisekedi’s relationship with his key political allies and ministers. If they begin to believe he is caving in to Rwanda, Tshisekedi could lose the presidency ahead of next year’s election.

Thus, in my view, based on my research on Congolese instability, Tshisekedi needed to find a political distraction that his supporters could rally behind.

Kabila’s return to Goma and relationship with the M23 provided that opportunity. The court case allows Tshisekedi to highlight his fight against the rebel group and its allies. The Congolese military has been unable to significantly halt the M23’s advances.

The case also allows the president to demonstrate his tough stance on opposition figures.

However, Tshisekedi will need to be careful of the potential implications of the case for himself. Kabila’s remaining loyalists could become even more daring in standing up against Tshisekedi. While a majority were removed, there are still some left.

Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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When did the Genocide against the Tutsi end?

Every July 4th, Rwanda commemorates the end of the Campaign against Genocide War in Kigali. It was on this date in 1994 that the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) gained control over Rwanda’s capital after the retreating Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) fled. But the final weeks of the war in Kigali witnessed the FAR and genocidaires, such as the Interahamwe, lose much of their control to the RPA. Nevertheless, it was the late evening of July 3rd when the remaining forces at Camp Kimihurura, Camp Kacyiru, and Mt Kigali fled the city, going north. While Lt General (Rtd) Charles Kayonga, commander of Bravo CMF at the time, along with 7th CMF, followed the retreating soldiers, fighting continued.

During much of the Campaign War, most of the RPA’s forces and resources focused on Kigali. While the genocide regime, created shortly after the death of former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, based itself in Gitarama (April 16th) rather than Kigali, the city still held significant political, economic, and military importance. Within military studies, the city was the centre of gravity for the war. Additionally, during much of the fighting, many Rwandan Tutsis and non-extremist Hutus hid at locations such as St Andres, Amahoro Stadium, St. Paul, St Familie, and other places, waiting to be rescued.

Outside of Kigali, several RPA’s CMF fought throughout the hilly nation, such as the 101 (under Lt General (Rtd) Charles Muhire); 157th (under General (Rtd) Fred Ibingira); 7th (under Colonel William Bagire) and Charlie CMF (under Colonel Thadee Gashumba). However, these CMF focused on different areas with the 157th fighting across much of the east, south, and west of the nation. This is not to minimise the contribution of the other units. For instance, Charlie CMF focused its fighting in the Musanze region. Without Lt General (Rtd) Charles Muhire’s 101 CMF, much of southern Rwanda would not have been militarily secured. The mobile force even played a significant role in the capture of Gitarama on June 13th. The 7th CMF played a significant role in capturing the eastern neighbourhoods of Kigali, which aided in the capture of Camp Kanombe in late May.

As I argue in my recent book, The Strategy to End the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda: Understanding the War in Kigali, the RPA’s central strategy was to end the Genocide against the Tutsi. To reach this strategic end, the RPA conducted military and humanitarian operations through various tactical methods. Stopping the genocide’s wrath was so important that the RPA at times risked military objectives in order to save Rwandans. Every force involved in ending the genocide received clear orders from its commander-in-chief, current Rwandan President Paul Kagame, to focus on saving lives even at the expense of military targets. For those mobile forces in Kigali, this was difficult in the urban setting. Those fighting outside Kigali did not have an easier time reaching this objective. Whenever I travel around Rwanda, I make it a point to reach out to former soldiers of the 157th CMF. I often express to them how I am in disbelief that they have liberated such a large and hilly environment in such a short time.

But there has always been a question I have asked myself, or others have asked me. When did the Genocide against the Tutsis really end? While many within the Rwandan government publicly stick to the July 4th date, other critical dates should be considered.

When Gisenyi fell on July 18th:

    After the FAR fled Kigali during the evening of July 3rd and early 4th, many used the Kigali-Musanze route to escape. The RPA allowed the accessibility of the passageway for the retreating soldiers. This might lead to some serious questions about RPA military strategy. After all, why grant these forces the ability to flee? However, it becomes clear when studying the RPA’s military tactics, operations, strategy, and other relevant aspects. President Kagame had at times created ‘humanitarian zones’ for civilians loyal to the genocide regime to escape the upcoming battles. (This contrasted with the FAR, which would often leave weapons behind for Interahamwe to continue their genocidal killings or kill any remaining Tutsi during the RPA’s approach.) For instance, before the battle for Camp Kanombe, President Kagame ordered Lt Col. (Rtd) Jacob Tumwine to establish a corridor just south of Kanombe for any forces or civilians to escape the upcoming battle.

    This falls in line with the encirclement tactics employed by the RPA, which focused more on creating confusion, decreasing enemy morale, and forcing them to flee (often leaving military equipment behind). This was the perfect response to what Minister of Defence Brigadier General Juvenal Marizamunda classified as ‘defensive military tactics’ that originated from the FAR’s close relationship with French forces. Whenever the FAR retreated, they rarely counterattacked but instead established newer, but weaker, defensive positions. During each retreat, the FAR’s morale declined, the RPA collected abandoned weapons, and planned a new strike. Thus, allowing the retreating FAR to use this corridor should be seen within the constructs of the RPA’s tactics and overall strategy.

    The retreating FAR, which travelled north, would eventually be pushed into eastern Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by July 18th. The following day, a new government designed by a modified version of the Arusha Accords was sworn in. However, the RPA did not have control over all of Rwanda. Many fleeing FAR travelled southwest by the end of the war, which was under Opération Turquoise. Nevertheless, July 18th is another date that could be considered as the end of the Genocide against the Tutsi.

    End of Opération Turquoise on August 21st:

    After the arrival of Alpha CMF under Major General (Rtd) Samuel Kaka to the Rwandan Parliament on April 12th, uniting with Lt General (Rtd) Charles Kayonga’s 3rd Battalion (better known as ‘The 600’), the FAR had little chance of winning the war. While they would continue fighting, thus allowing the Interahamwe time to murder Tutsis and non-extremist Hutus, the FAR never had the organisational structure, military expertise, morale, or clear strategic goals. Many took the opportunity to either participate in the genocidal killings or to profit from the chaos. This is not universal, as those such as Minister Juvenal Marizamunda, Major General (Rtd) Albert Murasira, and Brigadier General Evariste Murenzi, among others, served the FAR and/or fought the RPA but did not participate in the genocidal killings. Thus, their integration into the new Rwandan military after the war was possible despite them joining at different times and through very different circumstances.

    Minister Juvenal Marizamunda was one of the FAR members who had travelled to the zone under Opération Turquoise during the waning months of the Genocide. He had spent much of the war in France for military training, but returned to find his family. Opération Turquoise provided him the ability to reconnect with family who resided in southwestern Rwanda. Unlike Minister Marizamunda, who did not participate in any genocidal killings, many within the FAR took the opportunity to continue waging their genocidal war against the Rwandan Tutsis.

    By June 19th, France, which held close relations with the former Habyarimana regime, announced the creation of a multilateral force consisting of roughly 2500 French, Senegalese, and other fighters. Under French control, with UN Security Council approval, these forces created a zone in southwestern Rwanda, occupying nearly a fourth of the country. On the surface, this zone would be for those seeking peace away from the violence. The reality indicated a somewhat different objective with accusations of French support for the retreating FAR. During the days following the announcement of Opération Turquoise, the territory still held by the FAR and the genocide regime was celebrated. Akin to earlier on in the Liberation War (1990-1993), French forces aided the struggling FAR to push back the RPA. However, the FAR quickly realised these French forces were not there to fight the RPA.

    Nevertheless, the RPA command was quickly prepared, through the 157th CMF, to fight these new forces. As General (Rtd) James Kabarebe commented during a 2023 conversation, the RPA began constructing military defensive bases to prepare for a new war. Thankfully, that never materialised. By August 21st, Opération Turquoise ended with many of the FAR and actors within the genocide regime able to cross into Bukavu, Zaire. Some question, such as Prunier, whether Opération Turquoise was France’s attempt to save their faltering allies.

    Why consider August 21st as the end of the Genocide against the Tutsi? One of the controversial outcomes of Opération Turquoise was how it both saved and killed Rwandan Tutsis. While Bisesero is perhaps the best-known example of killings in this region, many testimonies exist of those who became victims thanks to the French forces. Many Rwandans who were in hiding since the beginning of the genocide began to leave their hideouts once they saw the foreign troops. Some believed they were either part of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) or another peacekeeping force. Thus, they believed the massacres were over. However, the French forces often did not disarm the Interahamwe and allowed them to still carry out their massacres. Rwandans who had spent the last few months in hiding were now an open target.

    By August 21st, the French forces left, and the RPF immediately took the region. Thus, the last genocidal killings in Rwanda that continued during Opération Turquoise were now over.

    First Congo War:

    While conducting my PhD research on Rwandan foreign policy, I had the opportunity to meet Rwanda’s former military historian.[1] He said something rather interesting to me about the First Congo War (1996-1997). From August 1994 until October 1996, the former FAR, Interahamwe, and genocide regime restructured in eastern Zaire. Akin to Hamas’ use of Gaza civilians, the refugee camps were a way to be protected from responsibility; use international attention to the plight of the refugees as a political tool, and require aid agencies to pay taxes to the government-in-exile for access to the civilians. While using the cover of nearly two million Rwandan refugees, they conducted raids into Rwanda, often being bloody. These near-constant attacks led to the inevitable decision to invade eastern Zaire to remove the refugee camps. Despite criticisms by human rights organisations, former US ambassador to Rwanda Robert Gribbin called the refugees’ return to Rwanda orderly with little violence.

    By December 1996, most of the refugee camps were dismantled. Many refugees returned to Rwanda with those from the FAR, Interahamwe, and genocide regime facing a choice: fight, flee deeper into the jungles, or return to Rwanda. Those such as Minister Juvenal Marizamunda decided to return home and join the new military, which later became the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). However, many fled deeper into the jungles, leading most to their deaths. Those who survived continued to fight against Rwanda, in a significantly diminished capacity, created the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) and later the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Nevertheless, the dismantlement of the refugee camps resulted in a significant reduction in attacks against Rwanda by former genocide forces. The war continued until May 1996 with the overthrow of President Joseph Mobutu’s regime and the installation of Laurent Kabila as President. However, violence recommenced shortly afterwards.

    Did it ever?

    In 2013, while working at the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG), now part of the Ministry of National Unity & Civic Engagement (MINUBUMWE), one could not escape Gregory Stanton’s description of the stages of genocide. Within his description of genocide are the expected categories, such as (in order): classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, objectification, preparation, extermination, and denial. This last element is key to the question of when the Genocide against the Tutsi ended.

    While any of the dates above can be considered as the end of the massacres, within Rwanda, the perception by many is that the genocide continues, but in a different form. Actors, mainly in the Global North, hijack ‘human rights’ or ‘democracy’ language as a cover to promote their genocidal ideology. Some forms of genocide ideology consist of outright denying the genocide, or trivializing the suffering, reducing numbers, or blaming the RPA. Many, such as in the FDLR, still proclaim their desire to return to Rwanda to finish the genocide. There are numerous elements within this category that Rwandan foreign policy addresses. There have been acts of terrorism and physical attacks by actors still holding the genocide’s ideology, such as Paul Rusesabagina’s Party of Democracy in Rwanda – Ihumure (PDR-Ihumure), responsible for killing nine Rwandans back in 2018. However, the primary threat that genocide denial and the ideology at its core pose is the ontological insecurity it produces, as it threatens Rwanda’s socially constructed norm of Ndi Umunyarwanda.

    Thus, some within Rwanda believe the Genocide against the Tutsi never ended, as there are actors who either want Rwanda to return to the genocidal massacres or deny what occurred in 1994.

    Conclusion:

    So, when did the Genocide against the Tutsi end? The July 4th date is the most well-known day, despite it commemorating more of a military victory in Kigali. Is July 18th the final day, as that is when the RPA captured the last major FAR-controlled territory? If this is the answer, then how does one account for those still dying in southwest Rwanda under Opération Turquoise? Fundamentally, the genocidal massacres continued in other parts of the country until they were under the RPA’s control. This does not ignore how some still died even after the RPA took a specific territory. The retreating FAR would often leave behind military equipment to Interahamwe, instructing them to wear civilian clothing and wait until the bulk of RPA forces left an area before returning to killing Tutsis. This led to RPA ‘clean-up’ operations to uncover and stop the Interahamwe. However, some human rights organisations mistook these operations as directed towards civilians rather than active genocidaires wearing civilian clothing. Did the dismantlement of the refugee camps during the initial months of the First Congo War end the genocide? The majority of surviving FAR, Interahamwe, and genocide regime after 1994 used these camps to launch attacks against Rwandans. The international community failed to disarm the camps until Rwandan forces did so in 1996. Lastly, did the genocide ever really end, as its ideology and denial still can be found today?

    Unfortunately, I do not have an answer to this question. While I often point to August 21st as the end of the physical genocide, its pain continues to this day. Whether in the form of denial or revisionism, the ideology that killed roughly a million Rwandan Tutsis and non-extremist Hutus remains today.

    [1] To keep focus on this article’s central question, when the Genocide against the Tutsis ended, I am avoiding diving into his situation.

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    DRC and Rwanda sign a US-brokered peace deal: what are the chances of its success?

    Jonathan Beloff, King’s College London

    The foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed a new peace agreement on 27 June 2025 under the auspices of the US.

    The agreement aims to foster long-term peace, and increased economic trade and security. The DRC is one of Africa’s largest nations, with over 110 million people. Rwanda has a population of 14 million.

    After three decades of war and tensions between the two neighbours since the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the hope is that this agreement will establish the foundations for progress that benefits both nations.

    It was the Donald Trump administration’s moment to illustrate the effectiveness of its “transactional” foreign policy, focused on exchanges and short-term benefits for each actor.

    Most of the agreement’s details remained undisclosed until its signing. One aspect that’s surfaced was the claim that the DRC abandoned its demand for the removal of Rwandan soldiers from its territory. The Congolese government, research groups and the UN have accused Rwanda of supplying military aid, including soldiers, to the March 23 Movement (M23), which has been at war with the government in Kinshasa since 2021. The Rwandan government denies any active involvement but has some sympathies for the Congolese rebel group.

    Under the June 2025 agreement, each side provided concessions and demands that are perhaps easier said than done. Both countries also want to show the Trump administration their willingness to negotiate and make a deal. This is in the hopes of future deals with the US, which Trump has remained vague on.

    The DRC has immense mineral wealth, including gold, diamonds, tungsten, coltan, tin and lithium. These latter minerals are used in computer chips, batteries and other technologies.

    The question is whether this latest agreement will lead to peace in the DRC. The likely answer is no, based on research on instability in the eastern DRC, Rwandan foreign policy and the security and political dynamics between Rwanda and the DRC for over 15 years.

    This is mainly because

    • key players involved in the crisis were left out of negotiations
    • no provisions are made for enforcement
    • the opportunities for US companies remain questionable given the lack of security in the mining regions.

    The roots of the crisis

    After the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, former genocide perpetrators used the DRC’s vast size as cover to plan attacks on Rwanda. They intended to return to Rwanda to finish the genocide. The consequences led to the First Congo War (1996-1997) and the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

    It was during the bloody Second War that the DRC was carved up by multiple rebel groups aligned with various nations and political actors. The UN accuses Rwanda and Uganda of carrying out a massive illegal mineral trade. Both nations deny this.

    The consequences of the conflict are still felt over 20 years later. Despite multiple peace agreements, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, an estimated 120 rebel groups remain active in the Congo.

    One of them, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), aims to return Rwanda to ethnic division and the genocide. The Rwandan government fears the group’s genocide and hate ideology.

    Additionally, the FDLR and other extremist actors such as Wazalendo target the Banyarwanda. This ethnic group, residing primarily in eastern DRC, is historically related to Rwanda. It has been the target of attacks, which have forced tens of thousands of people to flee into Rwanda.

    These attacks led to the resurrection of the M23. Despite its failures in 2013, the M23 scored major advances in late 2021 in response to attacks on the Banyarwanda. The rebel group led a successful military campaign that occupied large swathes of territory in eastern DRC.

    Their success is largely attributed to the Rwandan Defence Forces, despite Kigali denying this claim.

    Concessions from each nation

    The latest peace agreement addresses the security, political and economic interests of both nations.

    The specifics are still unavailable. However, several assumptions based on the framework and leaked reports can be made.

    The first is that both nations must respect each other’s territorial sovereignty and stop aiding rebel forces. This will include joint security coordination, and working with the existing UN peacekeeping mission. Additionally, Congolese refugees who fled eastern DRC – estimated to be over 80,000 – will be allowed to return. Finally, the two nations will establish mechanisms to foster greater economic integration.

    The DRC has also signalled its willingness to attract American investors. DRC’s vast mineral wealth remains largely underdeveloped. American investment could develop mining that’s safer and extracts larger amounts of minerals than current methods. Kinshasa has also agreed to combat corruption and simplify the tax system.

    While most of these incentives would be aimed at mineral extraction companies, they also include private security firms. The Congolese military’s inability to defeat the M23 highlights a problematic security environment that some in the DRC believe can be addressed through foreign intervention. However, these security guarantees are still relatively unknown and face complications that could affect the success of any agreement.

    The weaknesses

    There are a number of reasons this latest agreement is unlikely to lead to peace.

    First, the M23 did not participate in the negotiations. Given that they are the primary military actor in eastern DRC, their commitment to a peace process cannot be guaranteed.

    Second, other rebel forces in different parts of the country will feel left out too. They could see this agreement as an opportunity to press for greater concessions from the Congolese government.

    Third, there are few mechanisms to enforce the agreement. Since the Second Congo War, there have been multiple treaties, agreements and disarmament programmes with little success. The Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and the DRC in 2002 did not lead to long-term peace. The M23’s name is a nod to their anger over a failed 2009 agreement. In 2024, Rwanda and Congo nearly reached an agreement under Angola’s mediation, but Angola stepped down. The process was then taken over by Qatar and later the US.

    Lastly, American investors may be deterred by the security, regulatory and corruption issues that plague the DRC. Even if the Congolese government promises to address these issues, it lacks the necessary capabilities to fulfil its commitment.

    Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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    Early Thoughts on the Rwanda-DRC Agreement

    This was written prior to the release of the Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda framework.

    On June 27, 2025, Congolese and Rwandan officials signed an agreement that some hope will lead to stability and peace between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. The ongoing crisis in eastern DRC has been somewhat overlooked, as much international attention is focused on events within the Middle East. For the Trump Administration, the agreement is an example of its shifting foreign relations, especially with the Global South, from the previous administration’s ‘humanitarian approach’ towards a ‘transactional’ foreign policy. The question of whether this new agreement will lead to long-term security and peace within the region is questionable.

    DRC and Rwanda’s Complex Relationship:

    Summarising Rwanda and the DRC’s relationship is near impossible. Over the past thirty years, the two nations witnessed the aftereffects of the Genocide against the Tutsi, First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars, conflicts with and often between irregular (rebel) fighters, failed agreements, corruption, and so much more. After the Genocide against the Tutsi, when up to a million Rwandan Tutsis and non-extremist Hutus were murdered in one hundred days, it led to a mass exodus of Rwandan Hutus fearing a double genocide, which never happened. Over two million Rwandan refugees fled to eastern DRC, at the time known as Zaire, and resided in horrific conditions. While former Zarian dictator Joseph-Désiré Mobutu welcomed the refugees, he did so with less than altruistic reasons. He saw those people and the growing humanitarian crisis as a way to regain favour with Western nations who recently abandoned him after the end of the Cold War. 

    For Rwanda, the refugees were not composed solely of civilians. Entangled within the mass refugee camps were the remnants of the leaders and orchestrators of the recent genocide. Rwanda’s genocide only ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) under General (now President) Paul Kagame, defeated the Rwandan military, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and genocide actors. Many who were defeated fled into Zaire to regroup and plan for their return. However, their goal to return to Rwanda to continue the genocide would never happen. Rather, in October 1996, a coalition of multiple national forces initiated the First Congo War, which ended with the capture of Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, and the removal of Joseph Mobutu, with Laurent Kabila replacing him as President. Despite the forces being labelled as an internal organisation, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), it was a predominantly Rwandan-led operation. General (at the time Colonel) James Kabarebe was not only the leader of the invasion but also became the Minister of Defence under the new Congolese government. More importantly, Rwandan refugees returned, with human rights groups citing classification as being forced, with former genocide leaders either killed, captured or forced deeper in the harsh jungles. Many former Rwandan military soldiers who had fought against the RPA reintegrated into the new Rwandan military, with notable examples including the current Minister of Defence, Juvenal Marizamunda, and the Minister in charge of Emergency Management, Albert Murasira.

    However, the conflict did not come to an end. Rifts began between the two nations. Congolese officials began accusing Rwanda of treating the new government as a puppet rather than an equal partner. Laurent Kabila would sack Kabarebe and dismiss Rwandans from not only his government but from Congo. Rwanda began to worry that their new ally was repeating his predecessor’s errors by supporting remnants of the genocide forces. Various incarnations of genocide forces, such as the Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (AliR) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), appeared to receive support from the Congolese government. What ignited the Second Congo War is hotly debated. Nevertheless, it ignited a war that continues to this day. Rwanda’s inability to formulate a similar successful coalition, as it had done just years prior, led to a fractured DRC with various rebel groups, allied to specific governments, countries, or interests, carving up the country. The trade of conflict minerals became so great that ‘New Wars’ theory began to overshadow traditional understandings of warfare. By October 2002, peace agreements had been signed between various governments and actors, ultimately leading to the end of the war. However, the instability remains.

    The nation remains very divided between the Congolese government and over one hundred rebel forces. Many of these irregular actors are Mai Mai, composed of localised militias, which protect specific cities, villages, or regions. However, there are roughly forty to fifty major forces, such as the previously mentioned FDLR, who participate in mineral smuggling, harassment of villages, massacring of different Congolese ethnic groups and much more. The FDLR, along with Wazalendo, residing in the jungles of eastern DRC, often target the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge populations. These groups, historically related to Rwanda, faced significant persecution with the Congolese government either ignoring or even at times aiding in the violence. Despite the Umoja Wetu military operation between Rwandan and Congolese forces, elements of the FDLR remained and eventually regrouped. This would lead to the resurrection of the March 23 Movement, better known as the M23.

    Who are the M23?

    Like many Congolese rebel groups, the M23’s history is complex as it evolved from former rebel forces. As I wrote in a previous publication, the origins of the M23 date back to the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), which later evolved into the RCD-Goma. After the Congo Wars, it became the Congrès National Pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). Eventually, in 2009, CNDP leaders signed several agreements with the Congolese government, allowing them to become part of the Congolese military and political institutions. The last major agreement, signed on March 23, did not yield a satisfactory outcome for the former fighters. Many believed the Congolese government had not honoured the agreement with their populations, composed mainly of the Banyarwanda, still targeted by former genocide forces and facing increasing discrimination.

    Thus, in 2012, the remains of the CNDP, under the leadership of Bosco Ntaganda, Makenga Sultani, and Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, among others, formed the M23. The new rebel force’s name, March 23, is a nod to what they perceive as the Congolese government’s failures to honour past agreements. Despite some successes, the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the specific Foreign Intervention Brigade (FIB), was able to essentially defeat the forces. Many fled to Uganda and Rwanda. During their short rise to regional power, even occupying Goma for a day or so, the United Nations Group of Experts for the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNGoE) accused Rwanda and Uganda, to a lesser extent, of aiding the M23. Similar to the Congo Wars, they accuse Rwanda of supporting the M23 in order to gain valuable minerals to boost the bank accounts of military officials (as in the case of Uganda) or to advance national development (as in the case of Rwanda). However, both governments denied the accusation.

    Despite the M23’s earlier defeat, increased persecution of the Banyarwanda led to the resurrection of the former rebel group. While the current Global North narratives blame Rwanda for the current M23, the rebel’s military leadership crossed from Uganda into Congo. Many who had previously fled to Rwanda would not be in the initial operations seen on November 7, 2021. One former M23 fighter, who had fled to Rwanda, privately expressed concern that Rwandan officials were monitoring their actions to prevent them from rejoining the group. Nevertheless, the international community accuses Rwanda of aiding the M23. Some of the accusations include the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) providing military equipment, logistical support and even up to 4000 soldiers to the rebels. However, the available evidence has been relatively poor, with vague evidence, innuendo, and a reliance on historical narratives.

    Even one researcher from the African Great Lakes region, a critic of Rwanda, admitted privately that they had no evidence to support their accusations but assumed Rwanda was involved due to the past Congo Wars. Even the evidence of Rwandan military active participation relies on pictures of African soldiers, with no means to verify whether they are Rwandan or Congolese. One could argue that they could be from any African military. Nevertheless, Rwanda is accused of being the mastermind of the conflict. As I wrote in a previous publication, I believe that much of the criticism of Rwanda stems from a lack of understanding of strategic theory, military operations, and tactics among humanitarians and researchers. Despite the semi-pedestal they are placed upon, researchers explaining a war from thousands of miles away, with little or no experience of actual warfare, will often rely on existing narratives to explain a complex situation. However, this trap is not composed solely of those criticising Rwanda for the M23 (but that is another story to be told for a different day).

    But why does Kinshasa perceive the M23, and particularly President Felix Tshisekedi, when there are multiple other major and minor rebel groups causing chaos throughout the DRC? While there are multiple reasons for the Congolese government’s focus on the M23, a significant part of it deals with the rebel group’s success. Unlike in 2012, the M23’s successes are much greater. They occupy large areas of eastern DRC, including the regional capital city of Goma. Unlike their actions a decade ago, the M23 are positioning themselves as a legitimate alternative to Congolese governance. One of their greatest targets has been against the existing systems of corruption by establishing new policies for governance. Stories (which I have not been able to confirm independently) illustrate how the M23’s policies include paying civil servants, many of whom had not been paid in months, actual policing of neighbourhoods, combating bribery, and constructing infrastructure such as roads and water pipes. This focus on public policy is radically different from a decade ago, when its motivations were unclear. Thus, it was easier to accuse the M23 of being like many other rebel forces, i.e., focusing on protecting their ethnic brothers and sisters, illegal mineral trade and the power search. Unlike in the past, the M23 seemed to have incorporated governance and security as key elements within their overall strategy.

    Trump and Africa:

    What does this conflict have to do with President Trump, more specifically, why does he care about it? The answer to this question may be known only by the President himself. His relationship with African countries ranges from calling some ‘sh-thole countries‘, forcing the trade of used clothing and most recently, showing a video to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, the racist proclamations made by some within his governing coalition. However, both the DRC and Rwanda can spark President Trump’s interest.

    The first reason why President Trump’s interest stems from economic opportunities. The vast DRC contains large deposits of rare earth minerals, such as gold, coltan, and lithium, which are essential for modern technological devices. Congo’s mineral wealth is largely a curse as it is a root cause for much of the corruption and underdevelopment since colonisation. Mobutu’s rise to power largely stemmed from his promises to guarantee Western companies access to valuable mines at the expense of, not his wealth, but of the nation. This trend continued in future governments and persists to this day. Fundamentally, it is challenging for many Western companies to invest properly in the DRC, as a substantial budget is required to address the extensive corruption. The cost of corruption disincentivises investment, with only a handful of companies willing to deal with the constant need to pay off government officials. Soon after President Trump’s re-election in November 2024, President Tshisekedi allegedly attempted to establish inroads with the incoming Trump administration by offering unfettered access to Congo’s mineral wealth in exchange for the US to withdraw its support for Rwanda. President Trump’s mineral agreement with Ukraine only aided in this belief. However, there are some elements of truth to this concept.

    President Trump’s focus on ‘transactional’ foreign policy and increasing the American economy leads to the opening of trade deals for Congo’s mineral access. Nevertheless, the agreement is not as easy at first sight. Congo’s corruption and overly complex tax revenue process are a headache too significant for many American companies to handle. The new Rwanda-DRC agreement contains provisions to simplify the tax code for foreign investment. Additionally, the Congolese military, particularly in light of its numerous defeats at the hands of the M23, is unable to provide adequate security. American companies will need to factor in how they protect their investments from the multiple rebel forces that exist throughout the country.

    Rwanda’s unique role within American foreign policy in the region also aids Trump’s interest. Since the end of the genocide, Rwanda positioned itself as an ally of the US and the United Kingdom compared to its past relationship with Belgium and France. Former US President Bill Clinton classified Paul Kagame as one of the new faces of Africa during the 1990s. Even during the Congo Wars, Rwanda continued to receive support from the US. After those conflicts, Rwanda repositioned itself as an important ally for the West in terms of proper utilisation of foreign aid and contribution to peacekeeping. This last aspect is critical for the US. While there are debates about the extent to which the famed ‘Mogadishu Line’ still exists, there is an intense desire by American officials not to have US soldiers fight in African conflicts. Thus, Rwanda positioned itself since the end of the Second Congo War as willing and, more importantly, able to provide the necessary forces in African conflicts. Since the early 2000s, Rwandan soldiers have been sent to Mali, Darfur, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mozambique. Unlike other peacekeeping contributing nations, Rwandan soldiers are well-equipped, trained, and willing to engage antagonistic forces to bring about stability and peace militarily. For President Trump, Rwanda can be seen, as his predecessors have, as a force on the ground, rather than an American one. This aligns with the recent Israel-Iran war, with Israel providing much of the military forces in the air combat zones. The recent US bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites came about after Israel secured Iranian airspace. For African conflicts, Rwanda can serve as a similar role model.

    Lastly, President Trump’s ego is well-known with an eye towards the Nobel Peace Prize. He perceives himself as a dealmaker above all else. The conflict presents an opportunity for his administration to be the dealmakers and perhaps resolve a crisis that began decades ago and continues to rage. Despite a majority of Americans being barely aware of the DRC crisis, an agreement can be depicted as a foreign policy ‘win’ not only for him but also for his ‘transactional’ foreign policy. But will it lead to actual peace?

    Will the Peace Last?

    Will this agreement between Rwanda and the DRC lead to sustained peace? Probably, no. There are multiple concessions made by both the Rwandan and Congolese, but the question is how they are enforced. The Congolese will take Rwandan security concerns, specifically the FDLR, seriously and withdraw their support from those forces. But how can the Congolese military achieve these goals? Its military has shown an inability not only to fight the M23 but also to control its forces. The M23’s name is based on a failed peace agreement between the CNDP and the DRC government. Additionally, there is the promise that the Banyarwanda will be better protected. However, members of the President Felix Tshisekedi coalition, which keeps him in power, have and continue to express their hatred for the Banyarwanda. Will he be willing to clamp down on this rhetoric even if it risks his political power?

    Another question is how the Congolese government try to entice American investment, something that the Trump Administration will monitor closely. While American companies will face fewer barriers to entry when investing in the DRC, along with reduced bribery requirements and a commitment to combat corruption, how will this be implemented? The means to enact these changes are beyond the current Congolese political and governance infrastructure. For over half a century, corruption has been the primary means by which the Congo state operates, and to change that requires time, money, and political will that are severely lacking in Kinshasa. 

    The Rwandan agreement to honour Congolese sovereignty is relatively minor, as the primary security threats within the DRC do not come from outside actors but from within. As mentioned earlier, the DRC comprises over 100 rebel forces, each with its own distinct strategic objectives. If we accept the narrative that Rwanda supports the M23, removing the M23 does little to address the systemic issues of poor governance, corruption, Mai Mai, underdevelopment, and a lack of nationwide infrastructure. The securitisation of Rwanda is great political theatre in Kinshasa, but does little to solve Congolese problems.

    Rwanda’s engagement in the negotiations appears to be more akin to playing a political game. They know that the Trump Administration wants a deal even if it is doomed to fail. Rather than try to fight it by describing the complexities of Congo’s problems, they would rather depict themselves as negotiating in good will to show President Trump that they can be trusted. Rwanda appears not to want to be the one who states the apparent past failures of Congolese peace agreements with internal and regional actors. Rather, let them be seen as the ones who kept their end of the deal when the DRC inevitably fails to uphold their side. This could be due to Congolese officials again aiding the FDLR, American investments being unprotected by various rebel forces, or the M23 not submitting to Kinshasa’s authority.

    Lastly, the agreement will likely fail because the M23 were not part of the negotiations. No matter the accusations made by humanitarian groups and activists, the M23 are an independent actor with their own policy, goals, and objectives. They will enact policies through strategies to achieve their desired outcomes. While Kinsasha has promised more autonomy for eastern Congo, which benefits the M23 as the de facto governing actor in the region, how long will this last? Conceding autonomy to eastern DRC will be seen by some or most of President Tshisekedi’s supporters as an admission to the M23 and Rwanda. After years of securitising the M23, Rwanda and the Banyarwanda, there will be many within the DRC who are not willing to concede an inch of power to the M23, despite not even controlling the region.

    I hope I am wrong, and this agreement leads to some sort of stability and peace within the region. The Congolese are victims of their rich mineral wealth, geographical challenges, and, most importantly, poor political leadership.

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    Rwanda and Belgium are at odds over the DRC: what’s led to the latest low point

    Jonathan Beloff, King’s College London

    Rwanda’s foreign affairs ministry suspended all diplomatic relations with Belgium in March 2025. Soon afterwards, Belgium expelled Rwandan diplomats. This came weeks after Belgium had suspended foreign aid to Rwanda. At the root of this diplomatic fallout is the resurgence of the rebel group, March 23 Movement (M23), which has made recent military gains in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

    Prior to Rwanda suspending diplomatic relations, President Paul Kagame accused Belgium of continually undermining Rwanda. This deterioration in Rwanda-Belgium relations illustrates decades of the Kagame regime’s lack of trust in Brussels since the 1994 genocide. Jonathan Beloff, who has studied Rwanda’s political, security and foreign policies for nearly two decades, explains.

    What is the historical relationship between Rwanda and Belgium?

    Belgium is perhaps better known for having colonised the Congo. However, it also colonised present-day Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi.

    Belgian forces conquered Rwanda, a former German colony, in 1916 during the first world war. They got help from nearby British forces in Uganda. The Treaty of Versailles, which brought an end to the world war, officially transferred Rwanda and Burundi to Belgium’s colonial holdings.

    While Rwanda was never a significant interest for the Belgian colonial authorities compared to neighbouring Congo, Brussels nevertheless helped shape Rwandan politics, economy and society for decades.

    Rwanda’s current government claims that ethnic divisions of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa only came to the foreground during Belgian colonial rule, which ended in 1962. Before German and Belgian colonisation, Rwandan officials described these communities as socio-economic groupings rather than ethnicities. It was only with the introduction of ethnic identification cards in 1933 that these groups became intractable ethnicities.

    During much of its rule, Belgium used the existing political structures of kings, called Mwami, to carry out colonial policies.

    While a majority of Tutsis and Hutus suffered under these policies, Belgian officials often blamed the Mwami and his courts. The Mwami was often a Tutsi based on the number of cattle he owned. This led to a growing anti-Tutsi sentiment within the majority Hutu population.

    Eventually, it boiled over and led to the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the 1961 Coup of Gitarama. This anti-Tutsi sentiment established much of the political order following Rwandan independence in July 1962.

    What key moments have shaped the relationship?

    Prior to Rwandan independence, Belgium’s political allegiance shifted away from the mostly Tutsi Mwami and their power base to the growing Hutu movement. Under Rwanda’s Hutu leader and later first post-independence president Grégoire Kayibanda, Belgium began favouring Hutus. The community got increased education opportunities. Its leaders were given more say over post-colonial political events than the Mwami and his court.

    Rwanda-Belgium relations focused on promoting the majority Hutu population, despite some discontent from conservative, mostly Tutsi, actors. With independence, Belgium played an important but diminishing role. It did not provide the financial support Kigali wanted. In response, Kigali turned to France, whose influence grew significantly under President Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994).

    Despite their diminished state, relations between Rwanda and Belgium were still important. Belgium became the primary western nation to help provide stability in Rwanda during the waning years of the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), known locally as the Liberation War.

    A peace deal in 1993, called the Arusha Accords, between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Habyarimana regime paved the way for a UN mission. However, getting western nations to send soldiers for the mission proved difficult. This was after a peacekeeping disaster in Somalia (the Battle of Mogadishu) earlier that year. As a result, Belgium ended up providing the bulk of troops for the Rwanda mission.

    The assassination of Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 triggered the Genocide against the Tutsi. The UN mission’s commander sent a platoon to guard the home of prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The platoon had 10 Belgian and five Ghanaian soldiers. They were captured when Rwandan Presidential Guard officers stormed Uwilingiyimana’s home and killed her.

    The Ghanaian soldiers were released relatively unharmed, while the Belgian soldiers were killed at the Camp Kigali military base. The murders were intended to provoke the UN mission’s withdrawal from Rwanda. Belgian troops departed within the genocide’s first week. This allowed Rwanda’s genocide to run uninterrupted for 100 days until the Rwandan Patriotic Front stopped it in July 1994.

    Since the genocide, the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front has had a sceptical view of Belgium. In 2000, former prime minister Guy Verhofstadt apologised for Belgium’s failure to stop the genocide and for fostering ethnic divisions during the colonial period.

    Nevertheless, many Rwandan officials still believe Brussels hasn’t done enough to acknowledge its colonial record.

    What’s behind the current fallout?

    The current diplomatic crisis erupted because of accusations of Rwandan involvement in eastern DRC. UN experts’ reports have accused Rwanda of supporting the reanimated M23. The rebel group has captured large swathes of eastern DRC.

    Belgium has been leading calls for European sanctions against Rwanda for this involvement. However, Rwanda – which denies supporting the M23 – claims that Belgium’s accusations are aimed at gaining favourable mining rights in the DRC.

    Relations between the two countries have been deteriorating steadily in 2025. In February, Rwanda suspended a five-year (2024-2029) €95 million (US$102.8 million) deal. This was one of the largest aid deals between the two countries. In March, in addition to the suspension of diplomatic ties, the Rwanda Governance Board, which registers and monitors non-governmental organisations, placed restrictions on NGOs receiving financial support from Belgium.

    What’s the impact of this diplomatic falling out?

    Rwanda-Belgium relations have never broken down to the current level.

    It is unlikely to last in the long term. Like many other donor nations, Belgium needs Rwanda as a case study for proper aid utilisation and for its contribution to African peacekeeping.

    Rwanda is Africa’s most active troop-contributing country to UN missions and the fourth most active worldwide. Its primary political, security and economic allies remain the United States and the United Kingdom. While relations with these two nations are strained, they’re not at the level reached with Belgium.

    Nevertheless, the current state of affairs will continue in the near future unless the M23 is defeated. The only available avenues for quick restoration of relations are if Belgium apologises for seemingly siding with the DRC over Rwanda in the conflict in eastern Congo and repeats its apology for its colonial legacy. Neither of these options seems likely in the short term.

    Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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    Review: Modern Rwanda: A Political History

    Filip Reyntjens. Modern Rwanda: A Political History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. $30.99. Paper. ISBN: 9781009284486.

    Rwanda is perhaps best known for its experiences during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, more commonly known as the Rwandan Genocide. Since the end of the genocide, researchers flocked to the small African nation to better understand what led to the massacres and how the society rebuilt itself. The level of success to which Rwanda rebuilds itself since the genocide is hotly debated. Reyntjens is perhaps one of the most known scholars and critics of Rwanda. Despite not visiting Rwanda since October 1994, he continues to write on Rwanda’s politics and human rights. His new book somewhat differs from much of his current research, focusing mostly on Rwanda’s pre-colonial and colonial history.

    The book is divided into seven chapters, excluding the Introduction and Conclusion. After the Introduction, the book’s first chapter examines the pre-colonial history of Rwanda. Reyntjens illustrates the complexities of this period of Rwandan history, which is mainly unexplored compared to the genocide but heavily debated within Rwandan studies. The current Rwandan government often describes this period as relatively tranquil, with no Tutsi, Hutu and Twa divisions. However, this chapter problematises this perception to indicate how not only did these ethnic divisions exist but also how the pre-colonial Rwandan state was not as united and uniform as described. The following two chapters explain how Germany and Belgium influenced and engaged with colonial Rwanda. The fourth chapter describes the final years of colonisation with the rise of the Hutu Revolution and independence. Despite somewhat minimising the human suffering during this period for Rwanda’s Tutsis, the chapter exceeds in clearly categorising the political turmoil and actors of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

    The final three chapters examine Rwanda’s political history since independence. The First (1962-1973) and Second (1973-1994) Republics are described in terms of historical narratives that do not focus on explaining the genocide. Rather, chapter five provides a purer form of political-historical analysis to understand that historical period rather than how it led to the genocide. Chapter six briefly examines the Rwandan Civil War and the genocide. The final chapter, before the book’s conclusion, contains Reyntjens’ harsh critiques of Rwanda since the genocide. His attention is not on describing the complexities of governance under the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) as he did with ruling elites in the previous chapters. Instead, his focus is to repeat previously published claims of how the ruling RPF conducts human rights violations both inside and outside Rwanda. In all of the book’s chapters, his seventh chapter on Rwanda’s post-genocide governance feels the most disconnected from the rest as it lacks the same nuance as in previous chapters.

    While there is no doubt this book will be used as a major source on Rwandan politics, it does contain some issues that need to be at least mentioned. The majority of this book is unique in providing a relatively straightforward description of early Rwandan history, both before and during colonisation. However, many of its citations stem from somewhat older sources, with only a few exceptions, such as Jan Vansina’s 2004 book Antecedents to Modern Rwanda[1]. There is also an underlying problem in how Reyntjens seems to downplay the suffering that occurred during and after the Hutu Revolution against Rwandan Tutsis and others who did not align with the Hutu ideological movement during much of the country’s independence and up until the genocide. It reads as a setup to later try to criticise the RPF’s governance by establishing a narrative of how things are worse now in Rwanda than decades ago.

    His criticisms of present-day Rwanda read more like an overview of other research, as his lack of fieldwork experience severely limited the practical realities of the complex nature of Rwandan politics within the nation. Fundamentally, one can only write so much insight into the current political dynamics while writing from Europe. The book’s methodology is the first topic covered in the Introduction, but it never addresses the issues found in Chapter Seven, which is either an incomplete or problematic illustration of Rwanda today as it relies solely upon observations from afar rather than proper fieldwork.

    One of the primary claims made against Reyntjens by Rwandans is his involvement in the 1978 constitution. This constitution legitimised former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s grip on power by establishing a one-party state along with the discriminatory quota system against Rwandan Tutsis. Supporters of the RPF often cite Reyntjens’ involvement in drafting the constitution with little supporting evidence. While reading the fifth chapter he does not address this accusation by writing, “space forbids a detailed analysis of the constitution” (page 114). This is despite him being a legal and constitutional specialist. However, in the following chapter, on page 146, he has space to write a subsection on the number of genocide victims. While this might seem a minor issue, it illustrates a missed opportunity for Reyntjens to refute some of the significant and damning claims made against him. It was an overlooked opportunity to provide a new element within his vast work on Rwanda.

    Reyntjens’ new book on Rwanda’s political history will undoubtedly be a much-used text in criticising Rwanda’s government and perception of the nation’s history. The book’s greatest strength is its clarity in describing the complex issues and history of Rwanda’s pre-colonial and colonial history. Its description of the political dynamics between former President Grégoire Kayibanda and Dominique Mbonyumutwa is unique in terms of clarity. However, the examination of modern Rwandan politics faces the issues found in his other publications, a lack of actual observational data collected from conducting proper fieldwork.

    [1] Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2004.

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    Rwanda Suspends Belgium Aid

    On 18 February 2025, the Rwandan government announced the termination of its development cooperation deal with Belgium. The five-year €95 million deal is roughly a year old and was negotiated to aid in Rwanda’s economic and social development. But now, the deal is off, with relations between the two nations soured.

    Context Behind the Suspension:

    Akin to much of past suspended foreign aid, the root cause of the current situation stems from the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Over the last few years, the resurrected Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), which had not been active for nearly a decade, began capturing villages, towns, and cities. While there are multiple reasons for their new offensive, one of the primary causes is the treatment of the Banyarwanda. Increased discrimination and attacks by the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and its allies, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Wazalendo forces and the localised militias of the Mai Mai was a leading factor in the M23’s resurgence. The FARDC’s ineffectiveness to stop the rebels resulted in much of North Kivu, including its capital city of Goma, being captured in January 2025. In a journal article for Military Strategy Magazine, I argue that the root cause of the renewed M23 is not Rwanda but the Congolese government’s lack of an effective strategy. Despite a brief cease-fire proposal, the M23’s forces now deployed in South Kivu with its forces, at the time of writing, at the cusps of Bukavu. The accusations of Rwandan involvement in the M23’s success are nothing new.

    During the M23’s initial period in the early 2010s, the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNGoE) accused Rwandans of aiding the rebels. Akin to a decade ago, Rwanda is again accused of assisting the rebels with logistics, military equipment and even a few thousand soldiers. The root cause for Rwanda’s involvement is often described within existing narratives of mineral theft, sovereign violations and expansionist attitudes. Rwandan security concerns in neighbouring DRC, specifically of the FDLR, are minimised, with evidence of Rwanda’s actions often being vague. For instance, the accusations of Rwanda’s military contribution in terms of soldiers stem from photos of African soldiers without specific identity markers to clearly indicate they are part of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). Belgium is a major critic, accusing Rwanda of aiding the M23. While some in Rwanda speculate the Belgian government is just repeating Congolese accusations to try to advance their foreign relations, its impact on Rwanda would be felt. As Professor of Law and Politics Filip Reyntjens tweeted, it was just a matter of time before Belgium would suspend their foreign aid to Rwanda. Despite Rwanda denying the accusations, it negatively impacted the country, with many countries suspending their foreign aid.

    While the economic effects could be felt throughout the country, the Rwandan government used it as an opportunity. In theory, the Agaciro Development Fund was an attempt to help alleviate foreign aid withdrawals by establishing a public wealth fund for Rwandans. While the fund could never compensate for the loss of foreign aid, it did help spur nationalism. Rwandan news media and government officials proclaimed how the fund was a sign of defiance against foreign aid and dependence on the Global North. The following section shows that foreign aid dependency is a major concern within Rwandan foreign policy.

    Foreign Aid:

    As I wrote, Rwandan foreign policy comprises three overarching issues. The first comprises state security interests and the second and third focus on economic development. More specifically, the second issue is the reduction of foreign aid reliance. With the recent news media focusing on USAID cuts by the Trump Administration, Rwanda’s government has long desired to remove its dependence on foreign aid. After the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the country’s bankrupt status forced it to be largely reliant on aid from the Global North. Just under 100 per cent of government income came from foreign aid in 1995. That number decreased over time as the economy rebounded and grew. During much of the 2010s, foreign aid composed around 40 per cent of the government’s income. With the exception of the Covid-19 pandemic, which witnessed an increase in foreign aid reliance due to the global economic shutdown, Rwanda recently returned to reducing its reliance, with aid accounting for roughly a third of the budget.

    But why is foreign aid considered harmful in Rwanda, specifically the Rwandan government? Fundamentally, foreign aid is seen as a method of dependence on the Global North, which has historically abandoned Rwanda. While most people will immediately think of how the world abandoned Rwanda during the Genocide, this was not the first instance. Rather, the Hutu Revolution (1959) and independence (1962) led to a massive forced emigration of Rwandan Tutsis and politically excluded Hutus. Despite some assurances from the United Nations and other nations, including Belgium, that the refugees would not be forgotten, they were quickly abandoned. Many of the Rwandan government’s leadership (recent trends of younger Rwandans taking positions of power and influence indicate this will no longer be the case in the near future) lived as refugees in much of the African Great Lakes region. The abandonment they experienced shaped their perceptions of how the international community can, and will, simply walk away from Rwanda. Thus, there is a need, whether through economic development or institutions such as the Agaciro Development Fund, to reduce reliance on foreign aid.

    The theme of abandonment, along with Rwandan human security and agaciro, underpins Rwandan foreign policy decisions. Foreign aid threatens Rwandan human security in multiple ways. On the surface, government programs funded by aid are significantly impacted during times of suspension. During the 2012-2013 aid withdrawals, I witnessed a farming education centre having to cut back services to subsistence farmers because the funds from the Global North ceased. Additionally, defining Rwandan human security, which composes the right of return and safety for all those who identify as ‘Rwandan’, is seen as necessary based on historical experiences of Germany and Belgium redefining identity that eventually led to the Genocide. The origins of Rwandan identity are hotly debated within academic circles, but they play an important role in terms of agency. While President Paul Kagame insists the Banyarwanda are Congolese, historical kinships connect Rwandans and Banyarwandas. Thus, Rwanda will show sympathy towards a group that is not only closely related to them but experiences persecution similar to that found before and during the Genocide.

    Lastly, the dependency created by foreign aid is largely seen as reducing the country’s self-reliance and dignity within the agaciro identity. As many Rwandan government officials commented to me during my PhD research, a beggar’s pride is only as far as the coins dropped into their cup. At times, the description of Rwanda accepting foreign aid illustrated a contradictory image of one who wants to build themselves up but cannot as they rely on others. Max Webber’s Protestant work ethic (specifically the ‘pulling oneself up by their bootstraps’) description often does not include a self-made man who asks for money. Overall, foreign aid dependency is seen not only as a threat to state security and interests but, at its root, as an unreliable substitute for national pride in its development for all those who identify as ‘Rwandan’.

    So Now What?

    The M23’s renewal and military successes can be seen impacting not only those who reside in eastern DRC. One of its consequences is the end of the Belgium-Rwanda foreign aid package. Rwandans on social media hailed the move to end the foreign aid with Belgium. Many perceive it as a sign of national pride that it upheld its agency through the agaciro ideology rather than caving to Belgium’s accusations. While Belgium indicated it remains committed to its foreign relations with Rwanda, this commitment will truly be tested in the upcoming weeks and months. There is no doubt that some in Rwanda will suffer because of the aid cut, as the nation is still developing, only thirty years after the Genocide.

    However, the decision should not surprise those who study Rwandan foreign relations or how the small nation perceives international relations. The distrust towards the reliance on other nations, forged over the decades, provides insights into how the Rwandan government perceives and engages with the international community. As there is no end in sight for a quick end for the conflict in eastern DRC, there is a greater chance for other Global North nations to cut their foreign aid as in years past. However, Rwanda’s economy can better absorb the shocks compared to the past, and the nation’s services, especially in its effective peacekeeping, make the country a necessary partner for those who might be accusing it of supporting the M23 now.